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In the ﬁrst chapter, we introduce a new matching model to mimic
inter-college tuition exchange programs for dependents of faculty to attend
other colleges tuition-free. Each participating college has to avoid being a net-
exporter of students. Programs use decentralized markets making it diﬃcult
to achieve balance. We show that stable equilibria discourage net-exporting
colleges from exchange. We introduce two-sided top-trading-cycles (2S-TTC)
mechanism that is balanced-eﬃcient, student-strategy-proof, and respecting
priority bylaws regarding dependent eligibility. Moreover, it encourages ex-
change, since full participation is dominant strategy for colleges. We prove
2S-TTC is the unique mechanism fulﬁlling these objectives and introduce new
student-strategy-proof mechanisms to achieve other objectives.
In the second chapter, we consider a house allocation with existing
tenants model in which each transaction is costly for the central authority, a
housing oﬃce. We compare two widely studied mechanisms, deferred accep-
tance (DA) and top trading cycles (TTC), based on their costs for the housing
vi
oﬃces. A mechanism in which more existing tenants are assigned to their
current house is preferred for the housing oﬃces due to the costs of moving.
We show that although there is no dominance between the two mechanisms,
DA has more desirable features in terms of the cost eﬃciency for the housing
oﬃces. Then we include the welfare of the housing oﬃce in the welfare analysis
and redeﬁne the Pareto eﬃciency notion. We show that every fair matching
is Pareto eﬃcient. Based on the extended Pareto eﬃciency deﬁnition, the DA
mechanism is the unique Pareto eﬃcient, fair, and strategy-proof mechanism.
Finally, the third chapter characterizes the top trading cycles mecha-
nism for the school choice problem. Schools may have multiple available seats
to be assigned to students. For each school a strict priority ordering of students
is determined by the school district. Each student has strict preference over
the schools. We ﬁrst deﬁne weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource
monotonicity. We show that the top trading cycles mechanism is the unique
Pareto eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanism that satisﬁes the weaker forms
of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. To our knowledge this is
the ﬁrst axiomatic approach to the top trading cycles mechanism in the school
choice problem where schools have a capacity greater than one.
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Chapter 1
Tuition Exchange
1
1.1 Introduction
It has always been diﬃcult for small colleges and universities to compete
with bigger schools in hiring the best and brightest faculty. Colleges located
farther away from major metropolitan areas face a similar challenge. Tuition
exchange programs play a prominent role for these colleges in attracting and
retaining highly qualiﬁed faculty.2
In a tuition exchange program, qualiﬁed dependents of faculty and
staﬀ are given tuitionwaivers at their home institutions, and can swap these
waivers with dependents of faculty and staﬀ at other colleges with the condition
of mutual acceptance of dependents to these institutions. Tuition exchange
has become a desirable beneﬁt that adds value to an attractive employment
1This essay is drawn from the joint work with Utku Ünver.
2Tuition Exchange enables us to compete with the many larger institutions in our area
for talented faculty and staﬀ. The generous awards help us attract and retain employ-
ees, especially in high-demand ﬁelds like nursing and IT.  Frank Greco, Director of Hu-
man Resources, Chatham University, from the home page of The Tuition Exchange, Inc.,
www.tuitionexchange.org, retrieved on 09/19/2012.
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package without creating additional outofpocket expenses for colleges.
One of the prominent programs is The Tuition Exchange, Inc. (TTEI),3
which is also the oldest and largest of its kind in the US. TTEI is a reciprocal
scholarship program for children (and other family members) of faculty and
staﬀ employed at more than 600 participating institutions. Member colleges
are spread over 47 states and the District of Columbia. Both research uni-
versities and liberal arts colleges are members. US News and World Report
lists 38 member colleges in the best 200 research universities and 46 member
colleges in the best 100 liberal arts colleges. Every year an average of 20 new
institutions join the program. Through TTEI, on average, 6,000 scholarships
are awarded annually, with amounts averaging about $24,000. Despite TTEI's
large volume, other tuition exchange programs clear more than 50% of all
exchange transactions in the US.4
Each participating college establishes its own policies and procedures
for determining the eligibility of employees' dependents for exchange and the
number of scholarships it will grant each year. Each member college has agreed
to maintain a balance between the number of students sponsored by that insti-
tution (exports) and the number of scholarships awarded to students spon-
sored by other member colleges who will enroll at that institution (imports).
Every year, colleges aim to maintain a onetoone balance between the num-
3See http://www.tuitionexchange.org.
4An alternative to tuition exchange is monetary subsidization of faculty members. Most
colleges do not prefer this, as any direct compensation is taxable income, whereas a tuition
exchange scholarship is not.
2
ber of exports and imports. In particular, if the number of exports exceeds
the number of imports, that college may be suspended from TTEI. Therefore,
each college determines the (maximum) number of students it will sponsor ac-
cording the expected number of students who will apply to that institution for
a tuition scholarship. In order not to be suspended from TTEI, colleges often
set the maximum number of sponsored students in a precautionary manner.
Many colleges explicitly mention in their application documents that in order
to guarantee their continuation in the program they need to limit the number
of sponsored students.5 As a result, in many cases not all qualiﬁed dependents
are sponsored. Colleges often use the length of the related employee's tenure
to prioritize the eligible students. Academic achievements are not necessar-
ily relevant to internal priorities, so that academically less successful students
may be prioritized over more successful ones.
From a market and eﬃciency perspective, tuition beneﬁts at home in-
stitutions are distortionary as they cause the dependents to attend their home
institutions. Tuition exchange programs help this distortion to be corrected.
Therefore, making the clearinghouses employed by these programs as eﬃcient
as possible would minimize this distortion. Our goal in this paper is to show
the problems with the current exchange systems and propose better mecha-
nisms to improve eﬃciency.
First, we introduce a new class of twosided matching problems to
5Lafayette College, Daemen College, DePaul University, and Lewis University are just a
few examples.
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model the matching process within a tuition exchange program. In a tuition
exchange problem, eligible dependents of faculty members are prioritized ac-
cording to the length of faculty tenure or some other external criterion. Each
college then determines its quota, which is the maximum number of students
it will sponsor (its export eligibility quota) and the maximum number it will
admit (its import quota) through the program. Then, the sponsored stu-
dents are awarded with scholarships or remain unmatched according to the
preferences of colleges over sponsored students and the preferences of spon-
sored students over colleges subject to the quota constraints.6 Students who
are not sponsored by their home colleges do not receive scholarships, and hence
cannot participate in the program.
We ﬁrst show that there may not exist a balanced7 matching that is
also non-wasteful8 and individually rational9 (Proposition 4). This fact is
6This class of problems is closely related to the wellknown college admissions problem
of Gale and Shapley (1962). From a theoretical point of view, there are two important
diﬀerences between the tuition exchange problem and the collegeadmissions problem. In
the college admissions problem, all students are considered eligible, whereas in the tuition
exchange problem the set of eligible students is determined according to the internal priority
order of each college. Hence, in college admissions, colleges determine the quota of students
they will accept, while in tuition exchange, they set the quota of internal students they will
sponsor in addition to the import quota. Secondly, in tuition exchange, maintaining a one
toone balance between the exports and imports is the central issue for colleges. However,
in college admissions, the students are not sponsored by any college before the enrollment,
and hence, balancedness is not a concern for colleges.
7A matching is balanced if each college maintains a balance between the number of
students sponsored by that institution ("exports") and the number of scholarships awarded
to students sponsored by other member colleges enrolling at that institution ("imports").
8A matching is non-wasteful if, whenever a college has an open slot, either each student
prefers her assignment to that college or that college ﬁnds that student unacceptable.
9A matching is individually rational if each agent ﬁnds its/her all assigned partners
acceptable.
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caused by the non-wastefulness notion that respects exogenously set quotas.
Because of the balancedness condition, this is not an appropriate property for
our problem.
In the earlier twosided matching literature, stability a la Gale and
Shapley (1962) has been the central solution concept. Proposition 4 also im-
plies that stability and balancedness are incompatible. We also show that there
doesn't exist a weakly stable mechanism that always selects an undominated
balanced (i.e., balancedeﬃcient) matching (Proposition 5). A matching is
weakly stable if it is individually rational and there is no block of a college
and a student such that the student prefers the college to her assignment and
the college prefers the student to one of the students currently matched with
it. Hence, this concept respects immunity against the mutually beneﬁcial re-
placement of a student without changing the overall balance of the school.10
Moreover, in any stable mechanism outcome, we show that it is the
best response for a college with a negative balance to decrease its export
quota, and increasing export quota is never a best response (Theorem 1).
Behaving with respect to such a best response may further cause another
college to have a negative balance, as decrease in participation never improves
the negative balances of other colleges (Theorem 2). Hence, if we take stability
as a benchmark market equilibrium concept in a decentralized market, such
an equilibrium, in general, discourages exchange and can prevent the market
10A weakly stable and balanced matching always exists; for example, the null matching
is one.
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from extracting the highest gains from trade.
On the other hand, in our proposed centralized balancedeﬃcient mech-
anism, colleges prefer to act non-strategically while determining their quotas
(Theorem 5).
We then restrict our attention to the set of balancedeﬃcient mech-
anisms. Unfortunately, there exists no balancedeﬃcient, and individually
rational mechanism that is incentive compatible for colleges (Proposition 8).
We propose a mechanism that is similar to Gale's toptradingcycles
(TTC) mechanism introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974) for ﬁnding core
and competitive allocations for a simple house exchange market without
money. In the school choice problem (cf. Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 2003)
and house allocation problem with existing agents (cf. Abdulkadiro§lu and
Sönmez, 1999), variants of mechanisms related to Gale's TTC have been in-
troduced and their properties extensively discussed. In all these problems, one
side of the market is considered to be objects to be consumed and are not
included in the welfare analysis. Schools and houses have no preferences, but
priorities. For instance, in the school choice problem, the priorities of schools
over the students are determined according to test scores or proximity of their
residential location to the school, whereas in the house allocation problem the
priorities of houses over the students are determined by random draws or se-
niority. Hence, they are not strategic agents. In these markets, it is shown
that TTC is individually rational, strategy-proof, and Pareto eﬃcient. In tu-
ition exchange, in contrast to school choice and house allocation, both sides
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of the market are strategic and should be included to the welfare analysis. To
capture this diﬀerence, we modify the TTC mechanism and refer to it as the
twosided toptradingcycles (2S-TTC) mechanism. To our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst time that a variation of the TTC mechanism is used in a twosided
matching problem where both sides are strategic. We show that 2S-TTC has
appealing properties. First of all, its outcome is balancedeﬃcient.11 It is indi-
vidually rational and cannot be manipulated by students; and it also respects
the internal priorities used to determine the set of sponsored students by each
college (Theorems 3 and 4). We also show that it is the unique mechanism
satisfying these four properties (Theorem 6).12 We also show the independence
of the axioms, which are held only by 2S-TTC.
Although 2S-TTC is balancedeﬃcient, it may not match the maximum
11This result is not an extension of the classical Pareto eﬃciency result of TTC in a one
sided market. Here, colleges are players and they have multiple seats over which they have
responsive preferences. Therefore, by assigning a college highly preferred students and
also some unacceptable ones, an individually rational balanced matching can potentially
be (weakly) improved for everyone, colleges and students alike, while violating individual
rationality for colleges and yet still obeying balancedness. We show that it is not possible
to improve upon 2S-TTC's outcome in such a fashion.
12Ma (1994) had previously characterized TTC when there is a single seat at each school
through Pareto eﬃciency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness for students. Our
characterization uses a diﬀerent proof technique not only from Ma (1994), but also sub-
sequent simpler proofs of this prior result by Sönmez (1995) and Svensson (1999), which
do not work in the current setup. There are a few other related characterization results
in the literature: Abdulkadiro§lu and Che (2010) characterize school choice TTC a la Ab-
dulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (2003); Pycia and Ünver (2011a) characterize general individually
rational TTC rules a la Pápai (2000) when there are more objects than agents; and Sönmez
and Ünver (2010) characterize TTC rules a la Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (1999) for house
allocation with existing tenants. Besides these characterizations, a related mechanism to
our 2S-TTC was proposed by Ekici (2011) in a one-sided matching problem for temporary
house exchanges with unit quotas.
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possible number of students while maintaining balancedness. Such a solution
would maximize gains from trade for the tuition exchange program. We show
that if the maximal balanced solution is diﬀerent from the 2S-TTC outcome
even for one preference proﬁle, it can be manipulated by students (Proposition
11). Hence, we do not recommend such a solution.
Sometimes exact balancedness is not needed, and average balancedness
over time may be all that is required. We also adapt 2S-TTC to such dynamic
environments. For predetermined minimum and maximum cut-oﬀ values, we
introduce the twosided toptradingcyclesandchains mechanism with toler-
ance (2S-TTCC) and show that it is strategyproof for students, individually
rational, respecting internal priorities, and Pareto undominated among all in-
dividually rational matchings in the same permissible imbalance interval (see
Appendix A.4). The minimum and maximum imbalance values can be made
statedependent and optimized dynamically to obtain average balancedness
over time for each college.
There also exist tuition exchange co-ops where balancedness is not the
participants' ﬁrst concern. For these programs, we also introduce a mechanism
that takes stability as the primary constraint. This mechanism is based on the
studentproposing deferredacceptance (DA) algorithm of Gale and Shapley
(1962). We repeatedly apply DA starting from a market in which import
quotas of schools are equal to their export quotas. After the ﬁrst execution,
if an unbalanced matching is found, we increase the eligible export quota of a
college that runs a positive balance (with more imports than exports) by one
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if possible. We execute DA again, re-adjust the eligible export quota of one
college, and repeat the above procedure. We continue this procedure. We show
that eventually the outcome of this mechanism converges to a stable matching
of a particular market with the least possible aggregate imbalance for colleges
(Proposition 14). Moreover, the outcome is independent of the order in which
we include new students (Proposition 13). That is, each repetition improves
the aggregate balance of the schools. We refer to this rule as the repeated
deferredacceptance (RDA) mechanism. We also prove that this mechanism
is strategy-proof for students (Theorem 7). 13
We also analyze tuition exchange problems while assuming that colleges
have preferences over their outgoing students. In this case, under very mild
assumptions, we show that the results we found earlier for colleges with pref-
erences over incoming students hold for 2S-TTC regarding immunity against
quota manipulation and characterization through the aforementioned four
properties. Hence, 2S-TTC's nice properties are robust to the speciﬁcation
of college preferences.
13The strategy-proofness of RDA is somewhat surprising, because by manipulating her
preferences under RDA, a student can potentially change the export quota of a school, and
hence, the set of students participating in the exchange. Although the strategy-proofness
result is in the ﬂavor of the results of Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982), which
showed that DA mechanism is strategy-proof for students, our proof does not use these
results.
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1.2 Related Markets
Although tuition exchange is a twosided matching market, students
cannot participate in the market activity unless their home colleges sponsor
them. Hence, an import/export balance emerges as an important feature of
sustainable outcomes. This is the most important feature of tuition exchange
that distinguishes it from previously studied matching markets. However,
tuition exchange is not unique; there are numerous similar markets, which
we brieﬂy discuss here. What we learn in the current analysis can help us
understand these other markets better as well.
Tuition exchange markets are closely related to favor exchange markets,
also known as time banks, where time spent doing a favor or the number of
favors is used as the currency of exchange.14 The currency of transactions
responds to a positive imbalance in tuition exchange markets. Baby sitting
co-ops are a leading example of such time banks. Negativebalance aversion
as in tuition exchange markets is also known to aﬀect such banks adversely
and cause the markets to shut down. Parallels have been drawn between such
markets and complex monetary systems, where liquidity shortage is known to
cause recessions (cf. Sweeney and Sweeney, 1977; Krugman, 1998).
Balanced and eﬃcient employee exchange within or across organiza-
tions is a direct application of our centralized market design using the 2S-TTC
mechanism. Some examples are employee exchange among country headquar-
14See Mobius (2001) for a dynamic analysis of a favor exchange model.
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ters of multinational ﬁrms; doctor and staﬀ exchange among hospitals; faculty
exchange among public health schools, and so on.
Secondary transfer window transactions in European club soccer have
the same features as our tuition exchange markets: monetary negotiations no
longer matter since a player is paid by his primary club regardless of which
team he plays for; roster size restrictions dictate balancedness; club and player
preferences dictate trades in this window. The window has a very limited
duration, in which centralized mechanisms can be used for synchronized trades
by UEFA.
Large appeals process transactions in centralized matching markets
have tuition exchange features as well. For example, the high school appeals
process of the New York City public school district has features similar to
those of tuition exchange (cf. Abdulkadiro§lu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005).
The Erasmus student exchange program among universities in Europe
is another example of a market to which we can apply our ﬁndings. In the past
twenty years, over two million students have beneﬁted from grant opportuni-
ties of the Erasmus exchange program. There are huge imbalances between
the number of students exported and imported by each country. Moreover,
countries with high positive balances are not willing to match the quota re-
quests of the net exporter countries. This precautionary behavior may lead to
ineﬃciencies as in tuition exchange markets (see Appendix A.2).
11
1.3 Tuition Exchange Programs
In this section, we provide a brief description of The Tuition Exchange,
Inc. (TTEI) program as a representative of similar programs.15 In TTEI,
every participating institution determines the number of outgoing students it
can certify, as well as how many TTEI awards it will grant to incoming students
each year. Each college determines its export and import quota. Then each
faculty member submits the TTEI application to the registration oﬃce of their
college. If the number of applicants is greater than the number of outgoing
students that the college is willing to certify, then the college decides whom
to certify based on years of service or some other criterion.
Each student certiﬁed eligible submits a list of colleges to the liaison
oﬃce of her home institution. Each liaison oﬃce sends a copy of the TTEI Cer-
tiﬁcate of Eligibility to the TTEI liaison oﬃcer at the participating colleges
and universities listed by the eligible dependents. Certiﬁcation only means
the student is eligible for a TTEI award; it is not a guarantee of an award.
The eligible student must apply for admission to the college(s) in which she is
interested, following each institution's application procedures and deadlines.
After admission decisions have been made, the admissions oﬃces or TTEI li-
aisons at her listed institutions inform her whether or not she will be oﬀered a
TTEI award. TTEI scholarships are competitive and some eligible applicants
may not receive them. That is, the sponsoring institution cannot guarantee
15In Appendix A.1, we describe the features of the other tuition exchange programs.
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that an export candidate, regardless of qualiﬁcations, will receive a TTEI
scholarship. Institutions choose their scholarship recipients (imports) based
on applicants' academic proﬁles. Some export candidates may receive more
than one scholarship oﬀer. It is also possible that an export candidate may
not be admitted to her listed colleges during the admission process, and as a
result, she will not be considered for a scholarship. The procedures of TTEI
applications and regular college admission in the U.S. have several common
features, but they diﬀer in that in tuition exchange, regular college admission
is a prerequisite, and each participating student needs to be certiﬁed by her
home college for eligibility. In the following examples, we illustrate the main
distinctions between tuition exchange and regular college admission, and the
main incentive problems faced by college tuition exchange liaison oﬃces.
Example 1 Suppose there are three colleges in the Exchange: University
of Southern California (USC), University of Pittsburgh (Pitt), and Boston
University (BU). The parents of Selma and Clay work at USC and the parents
of Phil and Betty work at Pitt and BU, respectively. The internal priority
orders based on years of service and preferences of students and colleges are:
Internal Priorities
USC Pitt BU
Clay Phil Betty
Selma
Student Preferences
Clay Selma Phil Betty
BU Pitt USC Pitt
c∅ c∅ c∅ c∅
College Preferences
USC Pitt BU
Phil Selma Selma
Betty ∅ ∅
∅
We read the preferences as follows. Clay prefers BU to being unassigned
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and prefers being unassigned to other colleges. USC prefers Phil to Betty and
prefers both of them to being unassigned.
First, consider the case in which USC decides to export and import only
one student. Since Clay is ranked above Selma in its internal ranking (e.g.,
based on years of service by his father), only Clay will be certiﬁed by USC.
Suppose that the other two colleges certify their unique students eligible. Clay,
Phil, and Betty are the export candidates of USC, Pitt, and BU, respectively.
Each export candidate applies to only one college. Only Phil is accepted by
the college he is applying to, USC, which runs a positive balance between its
imports and exports.
Next, consider the case in which USC decides to export and import two
students. Then, additionally, Selma is accepted by the college she is applying
to, Pitt. Hence, USC exports one of its students, and the numbers of students
it imports and exports are equal.
Now consider the same example with a slight modiﬁcation of BU's
preferences: Suppose BU considers Clay to be the only acceptable student.
In the ﬁrst case above, Clay and Phil are accepted by BU and USC,
respectively, and USC maintains a balance between its imports and exports.
In the second case, additionally, Selma will also be accepted by Pitt.
Hence, USC runs a negative balance between imports and exports. 
As illustrated in Example 1, it is a very important issue for colleges to
decide how many students to certify. If a college certiﬁes too few students,
14
then it will suﬀer from welfare loss due to both fewer imports and exports.
On the other hand, if a college certiﬁes too many students, then it will run a
negative imbalance between imports and exports under the current practice,
which will harm the school's membership in the program. This feature of
tuition exchange process makes it a distinctive allocation problem.
1.4 Model
A tuition exchange problem consists of
• a set of colleges C = {c1, ..., cm},
• a set of students S = ∪
c∈C
Sc where Sc is the set of students who are
applying to be sponsored by college c,
• an import quota vector q = (qc)c∈C where qc is the maximum number
of students who will be imported by college c,
• an export eligibility vector e = (ec)c∈C where ec is the number of
students in Sc certiﬁed eligible by college c,
• a list of college internal rankings C= (c)c∈C where c is the internal
priority order of students in Sc based on some exogenous rule,
• a list of student and college preferences P = (PC , PS) = ( (Pc)c∈C ,
(Ps)s∈S ) where Pi is the preference relation of student (college) i over col-
leges (students) including the remaining unmatched (no more students)
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option.16
Throughout the paper, C, S, and C are ﬁxed; each triple of a quota vector,
eligibility vector, and a preference proﬁle deﬁnes a tuition exchange problem
 or simply, a problem  as [q, e, P ].
Given a problem, we denote the set of eligible students that are
certiﬁed to be sponsored by college c by Ec where Ec = {s ∈ Sc | rc(s) ≤ ec}
where rc(s) is the rank of student s ∈ Sc under c. Let E = ∪c∈CEc be the
set of all eligible students.
Each college c ∈ C has a strict preference relation Pc on S ∪ ∅.17 We
assume that college preferences over admitted groups of students are respon-
sive (Roth, 1985) with a quota; that is, for each college c , if P ∗c is the induced
preferences over subsets of S by Pc, then for all T ⊂ S such that |T | < qc and
i, j ∈ S \T , (i) T ∪ i R∗c T ∪ j ⇔ i Rc j and (ii) T ∪ i R∗c T ⇔ i Rc ∅; and for
all for all T ⊂ S such that |T | > qc, ∅P ∗c T . 18 By a slight abuse of notation,
we also refer to the preference relation P ∗c as Pc.
Each student s ∈ S has a strict preference relation Ps on C ∪ c∅. We
assume throughout the paper that each student considers her home college
unacceptable. This assumption is justiﬁed by the fact that in tuition exchange
16For students, we assume there is an outside option, referring to remaining unmatched
within the tuition exchange program, and is denoted by c∅, and for colleges, the no more
students option is denoted by ∅.
17Let Ri denote the the atleastasgoodas relation associated with preference relation
Pi for any agent i ∈ C ∪ S.
18We will denote a singleton {x} as x whenever it is convenient.
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programs students only rank colleges other than their home colleges. The
tuition remission and tuition exchange programs operate separately. 19
We also assume that there is no tie in the internal priorities. In real
life, each college breaks any ties by using lotteries. Hence, each c is a strict
linear order over Sc.
In the tuition exchange problem, students may not consider all colleges
worth attending. Also, colleges may not ﬁnd a student worthy of a scholarship.
Hence, we should focus on the matchings that are acceptable for both colleges
and students. We say a student s is acceptable for college c if s Pc ∅ and a
college c is acceptable by a student s if c Ps c∅.
An outcome of a problem is a matching. A matching is a correspon-
dence µ : C ∪ S  C ∪ S ∪ c∅ such that:
• µ(c) ⊆ S where |µ(c)| ≤ qc for all c ∈ C,
• µ(s) ⊆ C ∪ c∅ where |µ(s)| = 1 for all s ∈ S,
• s ∈ µ(c) if and only if µ(s) = c for all c ∈ C and s ∈ S.
Let M be the set of matchings. In the tuition exchange problem, only the
students who are certiﬁed as eligible can be awarded a scholarship. Therefore,
19One way to include the option of attending home college as part of the tuition exchange
program is to count the students assigned to their home college in both the imported and
exported student set of the college. In this case, all our results in this paper go through.
As a simpliﬁcation and to be compatible with the current practice and jargon, we maintain
this assumption in this paper.
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if student s is not certiﬁed as eligible, i.e., if s ∈ S\E, then under any matching
µ ∈M we say that she will be assigned to the null college, µ(s) = c∅.
We introduce several properties of desirable matchings. A matching
µ ∈ M Pareto dominates another matching ν ∈ M if µ(i) Ri ν(i) for all
i ∈ C∪S and µ(j) Pj ν(j) for some j ∈ C∪S. A matching is Pareto eﬃcient
if it is not Pareto dominated by any other matching.
As we've noted, to stay in good standing in the tuition exchange pro-
gram, each college must satisfy a balance between its exports and imports. In
particular, the number of exports should not exceed the number of imports.
Hence, another objective of the colleges is maintaining a onetoone balance.
A matching µ ∈ M is balanced if |Xµc | = |Mµc | for all c ∈ C where Xµc
= {s ∈ Sc | µ(s) ∈ C\c} and Mµc = {s ∈ S\Sc | µ(s) = c} are the sets
of exports and imports, respectively. Note that Xµc and M
µ
c are disjoint
sets. Balancedness is the key property in a tuition exchange problem. For
each tuition exchange problem, the set of balanced matchings is non-empty.
For instance, the null matching where all students are unassigned satisﬁes bal-
ancedness. Moreover, there may exist multiple balanced matchings for a given
problem. In that case, we can Pareto rank some of the balanced matchings.
We say a balanced matching µ is balancedeﬃcient if it is not Pareto domi-
nated by any other balanced matching in which only the certiﬁed students are
assigned to a college in C. Let bµc be the net balance of college c in matching
µ and it is equal to bµc = |Mµc |−|Xµc |. We say college c has a negative (positive)
balance in matching µ if bµc < 0 (b
µ
c > 0) and college c has a zero balance if
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bµc = 0.
A mechanism is a systematic way of selecting a matching for each
problem. Let ϕ be a mechanism; then the matching selected by ϕ in problem
[q, e, P ] is denoted by ϕ[q, e, P ] and the assignment of agent i ∈ S ∪ C is
denoted by ϕ[q, e, P ](i). A mechanism is balanced if it selects a balanced
matching in any problem. Similarly, a mechanism is balancedeﬃcient if it
selects a balancedeﬃcient matching in any problem.
In addition to the properties of matchings already deﬁned, we introduce
two additional properties for mechanisms. A mechanism ψ is group strategy-
proof for N ⊆ C ∪ S if for all problems [q, e, P ], there exists no J ⊆ N and
P ′J such that
• ψ[q, e, (P ′J , P−J)](i) Ri ψ[q, e, P ](i) for all i ∈ J , and
• ψ[q, e, (P ′J , P−J)](i) Pi ψ[q, e, P ](i) for at least one i ∈ J .
Strategy-proofness for a group N is a special case of group strategy-proofness.
A mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof for N if it is immune to individual devia-
tions of agents in N , i.e., for J ⊂ C ∪ S such that |J | = 1 the above condition
holds.20
One distinctive feature of the tuition exchange problem is the existence
of internal priorities for each college c, c . A good mechanism should respect
20Although we formally deﬁne incentive compatibility only for preference revelation, we
will also inspect incentives in the quota revelation game of colleges.
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the internal priorities of each college. It would be desirable that whenever a
student s sponsored by college c is allocated to a college in ϕ[(qc, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ],
she should also be assigned in ϕ[(q˜c, q−c), (e˜c, e−c), P ] where e˜c > ec and
q˜c ≥ qc. That is, addition of students with lower internal priority should
not cause student s to be unassigned. Formally, a mechanism ϕ respects
internal priorities if, whenever a student i ∈ Sc is assigned to a college
in problem [(qc, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ], then i is also assigned to a college in the
problem [(q˜c, q−c), (e˜c, e−c), P ] where e˜c > ec and q˜c ≥ qc. Given that i is as-
signed in problem [(qc, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ], then i's internal rank should be lower
than ec, rc(i) ≤ ec and all the new students who are sponsored in problem
[(q˜c, q−c), (e˜c, e−c), P ] but not in [(qc, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ] should have higher in-
ternal rank (and hence lower internal priority) than i.
1.5 Stability vs. Balancedness: Decentralized vs. Cen-
tralized Matching
In the current tuition exchange program, as the centralized process is
loosely controlled, once each college sets its export/import quota and eligible
students are determined, the market functions more like a decentralized one
rather than a centralized one. Once colleges commit to the students they
will sponsor, they largely lose their control over them. A sponsored student
can sometimes get multiple oﬀers and decide which one to accept and when to
accept it. Hence, stability emerges as a relevant notion for a benchmark market
equilibrium concept when there are no other frictions. Stability has been one
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of the central solution concepts for twosided matching problems, and we will
also focus on it here for tuition exchange. To deﬁne it, we introduce some
preliminary concepts. We say a matching µ is blocked by a college c ∈ C if
there exists s ∈ µ(c) such that ∅ Pc s. A matching µ is blocked by a student
s ∈ S if c∅ Ps µ(c). A matching µ is individually rational if it is not blocked
by any individual college or student. A matching µ ∈ M is non-wasteful
for a pair (c, s) ∈ C × E if, whenever s prefers c to µ(s) and is acceptable
for c, then |µ(c)| = qc; it is non-wasteful if it is non-wasteful for any pair. A
matching µ ∈M is blocked by a pair (c, s) ∈ C ×E if c Ps µ(s), and there
exists s′ ∈ µ(c) such that s Pc s′.21
A matching µ is (pairwise) stable if it is individually rational, non-
wasteful, and not blocked by any pair. As we will focus on balanced matchings,
we also deﬁne a weaker version of stability: A matching µ is weakly (pair-
wise) stable if it is individually rational and not blocked by any pair. Hence,
a weakly stable matching can potentially be wasteful. A stable (and hence
weakly stable) matching always exists (Gale and Shapley, 1962). A (weakly)
stable matching µ is student optimal (weakly) stable if there does exist
another matching ν ∈M that is (weakly) stable and Pareto dominates µ.
Below, we characterize weakly stable matchings. Denote the set of all
stable matchings and weakly stable matchings for problem [q, e, P ] by Γ[q, e, P ]
and Γ˜[q, e, P ], respectively. In Proposition 1 we show that the set of weakly
21Observe that this deﬁnition of blocking is weaker than the traditional deﬁnition of
blocking, which also incorporates wastefulness for a pair.
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stable matchings for a problem is equal to the union of the stable matchings
for problems with weakly lower import quotas.
Proposition 1 Γ˜[q, e, P ] =
⋃
q′≤q
Γ[q′, e, P ].
We ﬁrst show that Γ˜[q, e, P ] ⊆ ⋃
q′≤q
Γ[q′, e, P ]. Let µ ∈ Γ˜[q, e, P ]. We
claim that µ is stable for the problem [q′, e, P ] where q′c = |µ(c)| for all c ∈ C.
By deﬁnition µ is not blocked by any pair (c, s) ∈ C × E and is individually
rational. Given that all the colleges ﬁll their available seats it is also non-
wasteful. Therefore, µ ∈ Γ[q′, e, P ].
Γ˜[q, e, P ] ⊇ ⋃
q′≤q
Γ[q′, e, P ] follows from the deﬁnition of stability and
weak stability.
The null matching in which all students are unassigned is a weakly
stable matching. Moreover, it is the worst weakly stable matching for the
students. In Proposition 2, we show that for any problem, a mutually best
weakly stable matching exists for all students.
Proposition 2 For any problem [q, e, P ], the studentoptimal weakly stable
matching  a weakly stable matching that all students weakly prefer over all
other weakly stable matchings  always exists and is the outcome of the student
proposing deferredacceptance algorithm (DA for short) for problem [q, e, P ].
In Proposition 1 we have shown that the outcome of DA for any problem
[q′, e, P ] is a weakly stable matching where q′ ≤ q. Since DA ﬁnds the student
optimal stable matching (cf. Gale and Shapley, 1962), every student likes its
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outcome for problem [q′, e, P ] at least as well as any other stable matching for
[q′, e, P ]. Due to the resource monotonicity of DA, the matching selected by
DA for problem [q, e, P ] is weakly preferred to the matching selected by DA
for any problem [q′, e, P ] where q′ ≤ q by all students (for example, see Kesten,
2006). These together with with Proposition 1 imply that the outcome of DA
for problem [q, e, P ] is the studentoptimal weakly stable matching.
Maintaining a balanced matching is important for the continuation of
the membership to the exchange program for a college. If the number of
exports of college c exceeds the number of its imports, i.e., if it has a negative
balance, then college c will be suspended from TTEI. Hence, balancedness is
one of the most important objectives of the colleges. Therefore, the preferences
of a college over its incoming class can be linked with the match status of its
sponsored students under a particular matching, inducing college preferences
over matchings. To capture the negative imbalance aversion explicitly, we
make the following assumption in some of our results in this section:
NegativeBalance Aversion: College c prefers all µ with bµc = 0 to all ν
with bνc < 0, and otherwise, it ranks matchings based on its preferences over
the incoming class.
The assumption also makes sure that preferences over matchings are
compatible with responsive preferences over the incoming class, which is our
main assumption throughout the paper. In particular, under this assumption,
our deﬁnition of pairwise stability is still valid if we used preferences over
matchings instead of preferences over imports for colleges as the primer for
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measuring the welfare of colleges. This is a reasonable assumption that reﬂects
the reallife preferences of colleges participating in tuition exchange. We will
explicitly note when we use this assumption in our results.
We can extend the deﬁnition of eﬃciency and other welfare criteria
using college preferences over matchings, as well. In this case, we have the
following result:
Proposition 3 Under negativebalance aversion, if a matching is balanced
eﬃcient then it is also Pareto eﬃcient.
Suppose µ is a balancedeﬃcient matching of problem [q, e, P ]. To the
contrary, suppose µ is Pareto dominated. Then there exists an unbalanced
matching ν that dominates µ. As it is unbalanced, ν induces a negative bal-
ance for some college c ∈ C (and a positive balance for some other college).
However, µ has a zero balance for c, and hence, c prefers µ to ν, which is a
contradiction.
We will illustrate how decentralized market forces moving toward sta-
bility can be at odds with the college's objective of maintaining a balanced
matching. We will also show that colleges always have incentives to decrease
their externally set quotas under stable outcomes. Hence, a decentralized mar-
ket or stable centralized mechanisms discourage exchange. In this section,
we restrict our attention to the case where each college c sets ec = qc. Our re-
sults do not depend on this assumption, and it is easy to generalize our results
for cases where ec 6= qc is allowed.
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We start with the following proposition, which shows that when the ex-
port eligibility and import quotas are set exogenously and each college certiﬁes
at least one student as eligible, there may not exist an individually rational
and non-wasteful matching that is also balanced.
Proposition 4 There may not exist a balanced matching that is also individ-
ually rational and non-wasteful.
Consider the following problem. Let C = {a, b, c} and each college
d ∈ C sets qd = ed = 1. The set of students in each college is: Sa = Ea = {1},
Sb = Eb = {2} and Sc = Ec = {3}. The student preference proﬁle is given as:
1 2 3
c a a
c∅ c b
c∅ c∅
Student 1 is not acceptable to college c, i.e., ∅ Pc 1. Remaining students
are acceptable to all colleges (note that we have no restrictions on the strict
preferences of colleges over the acceptable students).
There are two non-wasteful and individually rational matchings in this
problem:
µ =
(
a
2
b
3
c
∅
)
and ν =
(
a
3
b
∅
c
2
)
.
Both matchings fail to be balanced as colleges c and b have negative balances
under µ and ν, respectively.
Proposition 4 also shows that there may not exist a stable and balanced
matching. However, the problem is not just about non-wastefulness under
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a preset quota. There may not even exist a weakly stable and balanced
eﬃcient matching as shown in Proposition 5. Recall that a matching is weakly
stable if it is individually rational and not blocked by any collegestudent
pair. Weak stability may be relevant when the tuition exchange central oﬃce
acts cautiously and does not want to admit an additional student to a college
without making sure that more of its students are exported.22
Proposition 5 There may not exist a balancedeﬃcient and weakly stable
matching.
Consider the following problem. There are 4 colleges C = {a, b, c, d}
and Sa = Ea = {1}, Sb = Eb = {2}, Sc = Ec = {3}, and Sd = Ed = {4}. Let
q = (1, 1, 1, 1). The preference proﬁles are:
1 2 3 4
b a d a
c∅ c∅ c∅ c
c∅
a b c d
4 1 4 3
2 ∅ ∅ ∅
∅
We will ﬁrst consider the individually rational and balanced matchings. All
individually rational and balanced matchings are:
a b c d
µ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
ν 2 1 ∅ ∅
η ∅ ∅ 4 3
pi 2 1 4 3
22A balanced and weakly stable matching always exists; for example, the null match-
ing. However, this is in general not a desired outcome for a tuition exchange problem.
A balancedeﬃcient and individually rational matching also always exists (see the next
section).
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Balanced matching pi Pareto dominates all other balanced matchings; hence
it is the unique balancedeﬃcient and individually rational matching.
Now we check whether pi is blocked by a pair or not. In pi, (a,4) is a
blocking pair because 4 Pa pi(a) = 2 and a P4 pi(4) = c; hence, it is not weakly
stable.
Proposition 4 shows that there exists no stable and balanced mecha-
nism. One can then wonder whether there exists a stable mechanism that
performs better than all the other stable mechanisms in terms of balanced-
ness. In the following proposition we show that for a given tuition exchange
problem, in all stable outcomes each college has the same balance. Therefore,
the level of imbalance is not aﬀected by which stable mechanism is selected.
Proposition 6 Each college c ∈ C has the same balance in all stable match-
ings of the problem [q, e, P ].
Let ν and µ be any two stable matchings of the problem [q, e, P ]. In the
rural hospital theorem (Roth, 1986) it is shown that the number of students
assigned to a hospital is the same in all stable matchings, |ν(c)| = |µ(c)| for
each college c ∈ C. Moreover, the set of students assigned to a real college is
the same in all stable matchings, i.e., ν(i) ∈ C if and only if µ(i) ∈ C. That
is, the export set of each college c is the same in all stable matchings. Then,
|Mµc | = |Mνc | and |Xµc | = |Xνc |. Moreover, because by assumption, no student
ﬁnds her home college acceptable, she is never assigned to her home college in
any stable outcome. Hence, bµc = |Mµc | − |Xµc | = |Mνc | − |Xνc | = bνc .
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Note that if the students are considered acceptable by their home col-
leges and students rank their home schools as acceptable then Proposition 6
does not hold. Due to the rural hospital theorem, in each stable matching the
number of students assigned college c ∈ C is the same. On the other hand,
in some stable matchings the students may be assigned to their home college
and they will not be considered as export. Therefore, the number of students
exported by each college is not the same in all stable matchings.
As mentioned before, running a negative balance may cause a college
to be suspended from the exchange program. Each college prefers to stay in
the exchange, and therefore, prefers to prevent any negative balance. Once
the colleges report the set of eligible students, they cannot aﬀect the number
of exports. Acting cautiously, some colleges set the number of certiﬁed eligible
students to 1 or 2. However, this may lead to avoidable welfare losses through
better coordination. We illustrate this in the following example.
Example 2 Let C = {c1, c2, ..., cn} and |Sc| = k > 1 for all c ∈ C. Suppose
college ci considers only the students in Sci−1 acceptable and each student in
Sci−1 prefers college ci to c∅. Let c0 = cn. Let each college c set ec = qc = 1.
Any stable matching will be balanced and the number of students assigned to
colleges will be n. However, if each college c sets ec = qc = k then there will
be a unique stable matching and it will be balanced. Moreover, the number
of students assigned to a college will be k × n > n. 
Moreover, if the market is trapped in a lowquota outcome, increasing
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the quotas incrementally through some minimal coordination among colleges
may not immediately lead to a balancedeﬃcient matching. The following
example illustrates this point.
Example 3 Let C = {c1, c2, ...cn} and |Sc| = k > 2 for all c ∈ C. Suppose:
• For all i > 1, the highest priority student of college ci is the most pre-
ferred acceptable student of college ci+1 (let cn+1 = c1).
• The highest priority student of college c1 is unacceptable to all colleges.
• For all i ≥ 2, all other students in Sci are acceptable to college ci+1 and
this college is the most preferred college of these students.
• Except the highest priority student of c1, all students in Sc1 are accept-
able to all colleges.
• Except the lowest priority student of c1, all students in Sc1 consider c2
to be unacceptable and the lowest priority student of c1 prefers c2 the
most.
If each college c sets qc = ec = 1 then there is a unique stable matching µ
with µ(ci) ∈ Sci−1 for all i 6= 2 and µ(c2) = ∅. The unique stable matching
is unbalanced where c1 has a positive balance and c2 has a negative balance.
Let c1, the unique college with a positive balance, certify one more student.
In this new environment µ is still the unique stable matching. As each college
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c with a positive balance increases ec, we will have a unique stable matching
that is unbalanced until we reach e1 = k. 
We also investigate what kind of strategic decisions a tuition exchange
oﬃce in a college would face in quota determination if a stable outcome emerges
in the market under the negativebalance aversion assumption. In the follow-
ing Theorem 1, by using the results of Proposition 7 below, we show that in
any stable solution (or mechanism) if a college holds a negative balance then
the best response is only to decrease the number of certiﬁed eligible students.
Proposition 7 also gives us a comparative result regarding how the balances of
colleges change when they certify one additional student and do not decrease
their import quotas. The proof of the proposition is in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 7 When college c sets qc ≥ ec as its import and eligibility quo-
tas, suppose pi is a stable matching. When it sets q˜c and e˜c such that q˜c ≥
qc and e˜c = ec + 1, suppose p˜i is a stable matching. Then bp˜ic ∈ {bpic − 1, bpic } if
bpic < 0; and b
p˜i
c ∈ {bpic − 1, bpic , ..., bpic + q˜c − qc} if bpic ≥ 0.
The proposition concludes that when a college increases its export eli-
gibility quota by one without decreasing its import quota, its overall balance
will decrease at most by one. Its balance may increase only if it is a positive
balance college to start with.23
23This is possible only if q˜c > qc.
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Theorem 1 Under negativebalance aversion, if college c has a negative bal-
ance in a stable matching for problem [q, e, P ] where qc ≥ ec, then its best
response in any stable solution is to set only lower qc and ec, but not higher;
and in particular, there exist q˜c and e˜c ≤ ec such that college c has zerobalance
in every stable matching of the problem [(q˜c, q−c), (e˜c, e−c), P ].
Given Proposition 7 and the fact that q˜c = e˜c = 0, we always get a
non-negative balance and any college prefers a zerobalance matching to any
negativebalance matching.24
In Theorem 1, we show that if college c has a negative balance then
it tends to decrease the number of certiﬁed students and this will eventually
increase its balance.25 When college c certiﬁes fewer students it may cause
another college c′ to have a negative balance. Then college c′ will have a
negative balance and will certify fewer students, too. In Theorem 2 below, we
show this result. The proof of this theorem is in Appendix A.3.
Theorem 2 If a college c is holding a negative balance in a stable matching
µ for problem [q, e, P ] where qc ≥ ec then bµ−c ≥ bµ
′
−c where µ
′ is any stable
24Note that setting q˜c = e˜c = 0 may not be the only way to have a zero balance.
25This result is in a similar vein as the results on college admissions where the DA mech-
anism is shown to be prone to import quota manipulation of the colleges under responsive
preferences, regardless of imbalance aversion (cf. Sönmez, 1997). However, Konishi and
Ünver (2006) show that the DA mechanism would be immune to quota manipulation, if
preferences of colleges over incoming students were responsive and monotonic in number.
On the other hand, even under this restriction of preferences over the incoming class, our re-
sult would imply all stable mechanisms are manipulable with quota reports for colleges with
negative balances if colleges have preferences with negativebalance aversion over matchings.
(See also ?.)
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matching of problem [(q′c, q−c), (e
′
c, e−c), P ], qc ≥ q′c ≥ e′c and ec > e′c.
Theorems 1 and 2 do not constitute an equilibrium analysis in a quota
determination game. But they do point out that in a frictionless market,
the negativebalance colleges will be conservative and decrease their eligibility
quotas for exports, certifying fewer students, which will further deteriorate the
balances of colleges who had negative balances to start with. On the other
hand, in Appendix A.5, we analyze the equilibrium in a quota determination
game when colleges are positivebalanceaverse. Positivebalance aversion can
be justiﬁed in markets where transactions do not need to balance out; colleges
with a positive balance admit more students than they need to, which is not
desirable. Tuition exchange programs such as The Council of Independent
Colleges Tuition exchange program (CIC-TEP) do not require balanced ex-
changes. In such markets, colleges may prefer not to admit more students
than they export.
We illustrate Theorem 2 with the following example.
Example 4 There are n colleges, C = {c1, c2, ..., cn} and each college has m
students. Consider the following problem:
• Each college sets ec = qc = m.
• Each student in Sck prefers ck+1 most where cn+1 = c1. Each student in
S \ Scn−1 prefers being unassigned to any other college. Each student in
Scn−1 ranks c1 second and being unassigned third.
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• Each student in S \ Scn is acceptable to all colleges. All students in Scn
are unacceptable to c1.
There exists a unique stable matching for the given problem. In this stable
matching only c1 has a negative balance. If c1 certiﬁes m− 1 (and sets qc1 =
m − 1) students, then there exists a unique stable matching in which only c1
and c2 have a negative balance. If c1 and c2 certify m − 1 students, then in
the unique stable matching only c1 and c3 have a negative balance. If c1, c2
and c3 certify m− 1 students, then in the unique stable matching only c1 and
c4 have a negative balance. Finally, we will have a problem where all colleges
except cn certify m − 1 students and only c1 has a negative balance. If we
continue we can get a matching problem in which all colleges in C \ cn certify
zero students and there exists a unique stable matching: the null matching.
On the other hand there exists a unique balancedeﬃcient matching in
which all students in S \Sn are assigned to their top or second best choices. 
However we can show that there exists a balancedeﬃcient mechanism
under which it is a dominant strategy to certify the maximum number of
students that each college is willing to sponsor.
We conclude that under a new design for the tuition exchange mar-
ket, there should be no need for external quota determination by the colleges
due to negativebalance aversion. A fully centralized solution disregarding
stability seems to be inevitable, as stability is at odds with balancedness and
has various other shortcomings regarding other incentives. In our proposed
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design, we will stick to balancedeﬃciency and individual rationality as our
desired features. It turns out that we can ﬁnd a plausible balancedeﬃcient
mechanism and individually rational mechanisms that make it a dominant
strategy for a college to certify its full set of eligible students (see Proposi-
tion 5 below). Under a centralized mechanism, incentives for participants to
truthfully reveal their preferences are desirable. Unfortunately, we show that
balancedeﬃciency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness for colleges
are incompatible properties:
Proposition 8 There does not exist an individually rational and balanced
eﬃcient mechanism that is also incentive compatible for colleges.
Suppose there does exist such a mechanism. Denote it by ψ. In this
proof we will use diﬀerent examples to show our result.
Case 1: There are 3 colleges C = {a, b, c} and 4 students Sa = {1, 2},
Sb = {3} and Sc = {4}. Let q = e = (2, 1, 1). Each student considers all
colleges acceptable. The preferences of colleges are given as: Pa : 3Pa4Pa∅,
Pb : 1Pb∅ and Pc : 1Pc2Pc∅. There are 2 balancedeﬃcient and individually
rational matchings:
a b c
µ1 4 ∅ 1
µ2 3,4 1 2
If the outcome of ψ is µ1, then college a can manipulate the mechanism
by submitting P ′a : 3P
′
a∅. Then the only individually rational and balanced
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eﬃcient matching is µ3(a) = 3, µ3(b) = 1 and µ3(c) = ∅. Therefore, if there is
a mechanism that is incentive compatible for colleges, balancedeﬃcient, and
individually rational, then it selects µ2.
Case 2: We consider the same example with a slight change in college
a's preferences: Pa : 4Pa3Pa∅. In this case µ1 and µ2 are the only two balanced
eﬃcient and individually rational matchings.
If the outcome of ψ is µ1, then college a can manipulate the mechanism
by submitting P ′a : 3P
′
a4P
′
a∅. Then we will be in case 1, in which case we show
that µ2 will be selected and this makes a better oﬀ. Therefore, if there is a
mechanism that is incentive compatible for colleges, balancedeﬃcient, and
individually rational, then it selects µ2.
Case 3: Now consider the case where colleges report the following
preferences: Pa : 4Pa3Pa∅, Pb : 1Pb∅, and Pc : 1Pc∅. Then, there are two
individually rational and balancedeﬃcient matchings:
a b c
µ4 4 ∅ 1
µ5 3 1 ∅
If the outcome of ψ is µ4, then in case 2 college c can violate the
mechanism by excluding 2 from its preferences. Therefore, any balanced
eﬃcient and individually rational mechanism that is incentive compatible for
colleges selects µ5.
Case 4: Now consider the case where colleges report the following
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preferences: Pa : 4Pa∅, Pb : 1Pb∅ and Pc : 1Pc∅. There is a unique balanced-
eﬃcient and individually rational matching: µ4. Note that in case 3 college a
can manipulate the mechanism by excluding 3 from its preferences; then we
will be in case 4 and a will be better-oﬀ.
Therefore, there does not exist a strategy-proof mechanism that is also
balancedeﬃcient and individually rational.
Although there doesn't exist a balancedeﬃcient and individually ratio-
nal mechanism that cannot be manipulated by colleges, in the next section we
show that there exists a balancedeﬃcient and individually rational mechanism
that cannot be manipulated by students. Moreover, colleges can manipulate
our proposed mechanism by reporting an acceptable student as unacceptable;
but they cannot manipulate it either through export eligibility/import quota
manipulation or by ranking acceptable students untruthfully.
1.6 A BalancedEﬃcient Mechanism: TwoSided Top
Trading Cycles
In this section, we consider the model in which all colleges are restricted
to maintain a zero balance in every period. We propose a mechanism that is in-
dividually rational, balancedeﬃcient, and strategy-proof for students. More-
over, it respects the internal priority orders of the colleges, i.e., it respects
internal priorities. In Appendix 15, we relax the zero balance requirement
and allow colleges to have a balance in a predetermined interval. This relax-
ation also allows us to study the problem in a dynamic environment where a
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cumulative balance over the years determines the continuation of membership.
As mentioned in the previous section, the assignment selected for each
problem should be balanced; a college with a negative balance can be sus-
pended from the program. If a matching is balanced then the number of
students exported by each college c is equal to the number of students im-
ported by that college. We can consider a balanced matching as a onetoone
trade between each college.
Before introducing a new mechanism that satisﬁes the desired features,
we deﬁne a cycle. A trading cycle is an ordered list of colleges and students
(c1, s1, c2, s2, ..., ck, sk) such that:
• college c1 points to student s1,
• student s1 points to college c2,
• : :
• college ck points to student sk,
• student sk points to college c1.
A trivial cycle is a collegestudent pair (c, s) such that college c points to
student s and student s points to college c.
In the following proposition, we show that if a matching is balanced
then we can ﬁnd a ﬁnite number of trading cycles involving colleges and stu-
dents who do not remain unmatched.
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Proposition 9 A matching µ is balanced if and only if each student s assigned
to a college is in a unique cycle where she points to µ(s) and is pointed to by
her home college c.
We propose a variant of the toptradingcycles mechanism (TTC).
Variants of TTC have been studied in matching literature for onesided dis-
crete resource allocation problems such as school choice (Abdulkadiro§lu and
Sönmez, 2003) and dormitory room allocation at college campuses (Abdulka-
diro§lu and Sönmez, 1999). TTC was based on Gale's toptradingcycles al-
gorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), which was used to ﬁnd the core allocation
of a simple discrete exchange economy, commonly referred to as the housing
market. In each of these problems, there is an active side of agents who are
exchanging objects that are allocated either through individual property rights
or through the mechanism's deﬁnition to agents as endowments (also see Pá-
pai, 2000; Pycia and Ünver, 2011a). However, in our problem college slots
are not objects, as the colleges are active decision makers. To capture this
diﬀerence, we propose a twosided version of the TTC. For any given problem
[q, e, P ], it works iteratively in a number of rounds:
The TwoSided TopTradingCycles Mechanism (2S-TTC):
Round 1: Assign two counters, for import and export eligibility, for
each college c ∈ C, and set them equal to qc and ec, respectively. Each student
points to her favorite college in C ∪ c∅ that considers her acceptable, and
each college c ∈ C points to the student s ∈ Sc who has the highest internal
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priority. The null college c∅ points to the students pointing to it, i.e., the
students pointing to the null college. Because of the ﬁniteness of colleges and
students, there exists at least one cycle. Each (real) college and student can
be part of at most one cycle. Every student in the cycle is assigned a seat at
the college she points to and is removed. If the cycle is nontrivial then the
counters of each college in that cycle are reduced by one, and if any of them
reaches zero, the college is removed with its remaining students. If the cycle
is trivial then we reduce only the export counter of the college whose student
is in that cycle, and if it reaches zero, the college is removed.
In general, at
Round k: Each remaining student points to her favorite college in C∪c∅
that considers her acceptable among the remaining ones, and each remaining
college c points to the student s ∈ Sc who has the highest internal priority
among the remaining ones. The null college c∅ points to the students pointing
to it, i.e., the students pointing to the null college. There exists at least
one cycle. Each (real) college and student can be part of at most one cycle.
Every student in the cycle is assigned a seat at the college she points to and is
removed. If the cycle is nontrivial then the counters of each college in that cycle
are reduced by one, and if any of them reaches zero, the college is removed
with its remaining students. If the cycle is trivial then we reduce only the
export counter of the college whose student is in that cycle, and if it reaches
zero, the college is removed.
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The algorithm terminates when there are no remaining eligible students
in the problem. We illustrate the dynamics of the 2S-TTC mechanism with
an example below:
Example 5 (2S-TTC) Let C = {a, b, c, d, e}, Sa = {1,2}, Sb = {3,4},
Sc = {5,6}, Sd = {7,8}, and Se = {9}. Let each college certify all its
students as eligible and q = (2, 2, 2, 1, 1). The internal priority orders are
given as:
a b c d e
1 3 6 7 9
2 4 5 8
The preference proﬁles of colleges and students are given as:
a b c d e
3 5 2 2 2
4 1 3 3 3
5 6 4 4 8
9 2 9 9 7
7 7 7 5 5
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
b b a c b a c e c
c c c a a b a c d
c∅ c∅ c∅ c∅ c∅ c∅ c∅ c∅ c∅
Let oe and om be the vectors representing the export eligibility and
import counters of colleges, respectively. Then we set oe = (2, 2, 2, 2, 1) and
om = (2, 2, 2, 1, 1).
Round 1: The only cycle formed is (b,3, a,1). Therefore, 1 is assigned
to b and 3 is assigned to a. Observe that although college b is the most preferred
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Figure 1.1: Round 1 of Example 5
Figure 1.2: Round 2 of Example 5
college of student 6, she is not acceptable to b, and hence, she points to college
a, instead. The updated counters are oe = (1, 1, 2, 2, 1) and om = (1, 1, 2, 1, 1).
Round 2: The only cycle formed in Round 2 is (c,6, b,4). Therefore,
6 is assigned to b and 4 is assigned to c. The updated counters are oe =
(1, 0, 1, 2, 1) and om = (1, 0, 1, 1, 1). College b is removed.
Round 3: The only cycle formed in Round 3 is (a,2, c,5). Therefore,
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Figure 1.3: Round 3 of Example 5
5 is assigned to a and 2 is assigned to c. The updated counters are oe =
(0, 0, 0, 2, 1) and om = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1). Colleges a and c are removed.
Round 4: The only cycle formed in Round 4 is (c∅,7). Therefore, 7
is assigned to c∅. Given that we have a trivial cycle, we only update oe. The
updated counters are oe = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1) and om = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1).
Round 5: The only cycle formed at this round is (e,9, d,8). There-
fore, 8 is assigned to e and 9 is assigned to d. The updated counters are
oe = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and om = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0). All agents are assigned, so the algo-
rithm terminates and its outcome is given by matching
µ =
(
a b c d
{3,5} {1,6} {2,4} 9
)
.

In the following theorem, we show that 2S-TTC is balancedeﬃcient
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Figure 1.4: Round 4 of Example 5
Figure 1.5: Round 5 of Example 5
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and individually rational, and respects internal priorities. We prove this in
Appendix A.3.
Theorem 3 2S-TTC is a balancedeﬃcient and individually rational mecha-
nism that also respects internal priorities.
In Proposition 8, we show that there does not exist an individually
rational and balancedeﬃcient mechanism that is also strategy-proof for col-
leges. From Proposition 8 and Theorem 3, it is easy to see that the 2S-TTC
mechanism is not strategy-proof for colleges.
Proposition 10 2S-TTC is not strategy-proof for colleges.
It follows from Proposition 8 and Theorem 3.
Although 2S-TTC is not strategy-proof, in the following theorem we
show that it is group strategy-proof for students. This result is a consequence
of TTC being group strategy-proof in a house allocation/exchange market (cf.
Pápai, 2000).
Theorem 4 2S-TTC is group strategy-proof for students.
Consider the preference relations of each student that rank as accept-
able only the colleges that ﬁnd her acceptable. If we consider only these
preferences as possible preferences to choose from for each student, we see
that 2S-TTC is group strategy-proof for students, as Pápai (cf. 2000) showed
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that TTC is group strategy-proof. In 2S-TTC, observe that students are in-
diﬀerent among reporting preference relations that rank the colleges that ﬁnd
themselves as acceptable in the same relative order. Thus, 2S-TTC is group
strategy-proof for students.
In Proposition 10 we show that 2S-TTC mechanism is not strategy-
proof for colleges. However, if we focus on the game played by the tuition-
exchange oﬃce of a college, given its preferences, truthful import quota revela-
tion and certifying all its own students is a (weakly) dominant strategy under
2S-TTC. The proof is in Appendix A.3.
Theorem 5 It is a weakly dominant strategy for any c ∈ C to certify all
its students in 2S-TTC and to reveal its true import quota under any ﬁxed
reported preference proﬁle such that c does not report an unacceptable student
as acceptable in its preference report.
Moreover, reporting an unacceptable student as acceptable in its pref-
erence report is a dominated strategy in the mechanism game.
Theorem 5 is in stark contrast with similar results in the literature for
stable mechanisms. For example, it is well known that the DA mechanism is
prone to import quota manipulation of the colleges even under responsive pref-
erences regardless of imbalance aversion (cf. Sönmez, 1997); truthful revelation
does not even constitute an equilibrium, and any pure strategy equilibrium,
if it exists, increases all colleges' welfare above truthful revelation (cf. Konishi
and Ünver, 2006). Thus, 2S-TTC presents a robust remedy for a common
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problem seen in centralized admissions that use the DA mechanism (such as
K-12 public school choice in US school districts) and also in tuition exchange
in a decentralized market (cf. Theorems 1 and 2).
Theorem 4 and Proposition 5 point out that only colleges can beneﬁt
from manipulation, and they can manipulate the 2S-TTC mechanism by mis-
reporting their preferences over incoming students. However, as we only care
whether a college ﬁnds a student acceptable or not in running 2S-TTC, it can
be run as an indirect mechanism where colleges report only their acceptable
incoming students. Hence, the strategy space for the colleges is very simple in
using 2S-TTC in the ﬁeld: reporting their import and eligibility quotas and
their sets of acceptable students.
Corollary 1 Under the 2S-TTC mechanism, colleges are indiﬀerent among
strategies with preference rankings considering the same set of students as ac-
ceptable.
In the market, we propose to run 2S-TTC in sequential stages in a
semi-decentralized fashion: ﬁrst, colleges announce their import quotas and
which of their students are eligible to be sponsored; then, eligible students
apply to the colleges they ﬁnd acceptable; colleges send out admission letters.
At this stage as students have also learnt their opportunities in the parallel
running regular college admissions market, they can form better opinions about
the relative ranking of the null college, i.e., their options outside the tuition
exchange market. Students submit ranksings over the colleges that admitted
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them and the relative ranking of their outside option. Finally, 2S-TTC is run
centrally to determine the scholarship recipients.
We have shown that 2S-TTC has appealing properties. In the fol-
lowing theorem, we show that it is the unique mechanism satisfying respect
for internal priorities, individual rationality, balancedeﬃciency, and strategy-
proofness for students. We prove this in Appendix A.3.
Theorem 6 2S-TTC is the unique studentstrategy-proof, individually ratio-
nal, and balancedeﬃcient mechanism that also respects internal priorities.
Below we show the independence of axioms mentioned in Theorem 6.
• A studentstrategy-proof, individually rational but not balancedeﬃcient
mechanism that also respects internal priorities: A mechanism that al-
ways selects the null matching for any problem.
• A studentstrategy-proof, balancedeﬃcient, individually rational mech-
anism that does not respect internal priorities: Consider a variant of
2S-TTC mechanism in which each college points to the certiﬁed student
who has the lowest priority among the certiﬁed ones. This mechanism is
strategy-proof for students, balancedeﬃcient, and individually rational,
but it fails to respect internal priorities.
• A balancedeﬃcient, individually rational, but not studentstrategy-proof
mechanism that respects internal priorities: Consider the following prob-
lem. There are three colleges C = {a, b, c} and four students Sa = {1,2},
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Sb = {3} and Sc = {4}. The preference proﬁle P is given as
1 2 3 4
b b a a
c c c∅ c∅
c∅ c∅
Let mechanism ψ select the same matching as 2S-TTC for each problem
except the problem [q = (2, 1, 1), e = (2, 1, 1), P ], and for this problem it
assigns 1 to c 2 to b, 3 to a and 4 to a. The mechanism is not student
strategy-proof, because when 1 excludes c, ψ and 2S-TTC will assign 1
to b.
• A balancedeﬃcient, studentstrategy-proof, but not individually ratio-
nal mechanism that respects internal priorities: Consider a variant of
2S-TTC mechanism in which students are not restricted to point to
the colleges considering them acceptable. This mechanism is balanced
eﬃcient, strategy-proof, and respecting internal priorities, but it fails to
be individually rational since an unacceptable student can be assigned
to a college.
We show that 2S-TTC is the unique mechanism satisfying all the axioms dis-
cussed. Among all axioms, only the respect for internal priorities is based
on exogenous rules. Then, one might suspect that more students will beneﬁt
from the tuition exchange program if we allow the violation of respect for in-
ternal priorities. A natural question that arises is whether there is a balanced
and individually rational mechanism that never assigns fewer students than
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the 2S-TTC mechanism and selects a matching in which more students are
assigned whenever there exists such an outcome. In the following proposition,
we show that the mechanism satisfying the above conditions is vulnerable to
manipulation.
Proposition 11 Any balanced and individually rational mechanism that does
not assign fewer students than the 2S-TTC mechanism, and selects a matching
in which more students are assigned whenever such a balanced and individually
rational outcome exists, is not strategy-proof for students.
Let ψ satisfy all conditions and be strategy-proof for students. Then,
consider the following example. There are 3 colleges C = {a, b, c} with q =
(2, 1, 1). Let Sa = {1,2}, Sb = {3}, Sc = {4} and let each student be
acceptable to each college. The internal priorities and preference proﬁles are
given as:
a b c
1 3 4
2
1 2 3 4
b c a b
c∅ c∅ c∅ a
c∅
The 2S-TTC mechanism will select matching µ =
(
a b c
{3,4} 1 2
)
.
Moreover, ψ will select the same matching.
If student 4 reports her preferences as bP ′4c∅P
′
4a then 2S-TTC will se-
lect µ′ =
(
a b c
3 1 ∅
)
. The only balanced and individually rational matching
in which more than two students are assigned is µ′′ =
(
a b c
3 4 2
)
. There-
fore, the outcome of mechanism ψ when 4 reports P ′4 is µ
′′. Student 4 can
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manipulate mechanism ψ since she strictly prefers her assignment under mis-
reporting.
1.7 Stability and Repeated DeferredAcceptance Mech-
anism
In this section, we focus on the tuition exchange co-ops where stability
is valued over balancedness.26 In these programs, colleges are not punished
for holding a negative balance, but holding a zero balance is still a desired
feature and plays key role in the longevity of the programs.27 In this section,
we aim to come up with a stable mechanism that lowers the imbalance as far
as possible.
For a tuition exchange program that favors stability over balancedness,
the following mechanism can be considered a good option.28
The Repeated DeferredAcceptance Mechanism (RDA) :
Let e˜c = min{qc, ec} for each school c.
Round 1: Run the DA mechanism for problem [q, e˜, P ]. Denote the
matching selected in this round by µ1. If there exists a college c with a positive
26We provide details about some of these programs in Appendix A.1.
27For example, the Northwest Independent Colleges Tuition Exchange Program, which
does not require any sort of balancedness criterion, will be dissolved in 2015 because of
accumulation of imbalances (cf. Basu, 2012).
28For completeness of the deﬁnition of our mechanism, we remind the reader of the
studentproposing deferredacceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) in Appendix
A.3. We refer to the mechanism that ﬁnds an outcome according to this algorithm simply
as the DA mechanism.
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balance, bµ1c > 0 and e˜c < ec, then certify a new student in Sc by increasing e˜c
by 1. Keep the export eligibility quotas of other colleges unchanged. If there
is more than 1 college with a positive balance, take one of them randomly. If
there does not exist a college with a positive balance or e˜c = ec for all colleges
c with positive balances, then stop.
In general, at
Round k: Run the DA mechanism for the updated problem [q, e˜, P ].
Denote the matching selected in this round by µk. If there exists a college c
with a positive balance, bµkc > 0 and e˜c < ec, then certify a new student in
Sc by increasing e˜c by 1. Keep the export eligibility quotas of other colleges
unchanged. If there is more than 1 college with a positive balance, take one
of them randomly. If there does not exist a college with a positive balance or
e˜c = ec for all colleges c with positive balances, then stop.
The mechanism will terminate, since each college has a ﬁnite number
of students to sponsor.
If the mechanism terminates since there does not exist a college with a
positive balance, then the matching selected in that round is balanced.
However, recall that it is not guaranteed that we can get a balanced
and stable matching for all problems (Proposition 4).
In the following proposition, we show that, while running the RDA
mechanism, the balance of each college c whose export eligibility quota is the
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same in any Rounds k and k+1 will stay the same or increase between these
rounds.
Proposition 12 If the export eligibility quota of college c is the same in
Rounds k and k+1 of RDA, then bµk+1c ∈ {bµkc , bµkc + 1}, and otherwise, bµk+1c ∈
{bµkc − 1, bµkc } and 0 ≤ bµk+1c .
It follows from Lemma 1 stated in Appendix A.3.
As can be seen from Proposition 12, only one college's balance deterio-
rates, and that college has a positive balance in the previous period. Since the
deterioration will be at most by 1, that college will still have a non-negative
balance in the outcome selected in the next round. On the other hand, all
other colleges' balances will weakly improve. Therefore, if college c has a pos-
itive balance in the outcome selected in round k, bµkc > 0, then independent
of the order of the colleges selected to certify new students in the following
rounds, college c will certify at least min{bµkc , ec− e˜c} students before the RDA
mechanism terminates.
In the following proposition we show that the outcome of the RDA
mechanism is independent of the order of student certiﬁcation. Its proof is in
Appendix A.3.
Proposition 13 The outcome of RDA is independent of which colleges we
choose to update in each round.
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Then consider the following selection rule: Let S˜ = {s ∈ Sc|bµkc >
0, e˜c < rc(s) ≤ min{e˜c + bµkc , ec}}. That is, S˜ is the set of students who are
guaranteed to be certiﬁed as a consequence of the outcome selected in round 1.
Then, in the following |S˜| rounds, we always certify a student from S˜. Based
on this selection rule in round |S˜| + 1 the set of certiﬁed students will be the
union of the initial certiﬁed students and S˜. Instead of certifying one student
in each round, we can certify all students in S˜ at the end of round 1 and jump
to round |S˜| + 1. That is, we can update the export eligibility quota of each
college with a positive balance at the same time, and this will decrease the
number of times that we need to run the DA mechanism.
Now we can look at which other appealing properties are satisﬁed by
RDA. We prove this theorem in Appendix A.3.
Theorem 7 RDA is strategy-proof for students.
In order to compare the performance of weakly stable matchings and
the outcome of RDA in terms of balancedness, we introduce a new measure.
Let Bµ be the aggregate balance of matching µ and Bµ =
∑
c∈C |bµc |. In
the following proposition, we show that if we were to introduce more students
above the eligible set in the round that the RDA mechanism terminates, any
stable outcome of that market will have a worse aggregate balance. That is,
RDA optimizes aggregate balance. The proof is in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 14 Let µ be the matching selected by RDA for problem [q, e, P ]
and e˜ = (e˜c)c∈C be the vector of certiﬁed students when RDA terminates. Let
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ν be a stable matching for a problem [q, e′, P ] where ec ≥ e′c ≥ e˜c for all c ∈ C.
Then Bµ ≤ Bν .
Corollary 2 Let e˜ be the vector of the numbers of certiﬁed students when
RDA terminates in problem [q, e, P ]. If the ﬁnal matching selected by RDA is
not balanced then there does not exist a stable and balanced matching for any
problem [q, e′, P ] where ec ≥ e′c ≥ e˜c for all c ∈ C.
Corollary 3 Let e = (min{qc, ec})c∈C be the number of certiﬁed students that
we consider in the ﬁrst round of RDA and e′c ≥ ec for all c ∈ C. If there exists
a balanced and stable matching for the problem [q, e′, P ] then the outcome of
RDA is also balanced.
The RDA mechanism can be proposed to the Council of Independent
College Tuition Exchange Program (CIC-TEP) (see Appendix A.1 for details).
Although CIC-TEP does not require balancedness, it is widely agreed that
a method to balance the beneﬁt and cost between schools is a key goal of
all tuition exchange programs. Otherwise, some institutions might carry an
inordinate number of consortium dependent children. In the current system,
all colleges are required to import at least 3 students. There is no feature
that limits the monetary imbalance of highertuition institutions exchanging
students with lowertuition institutions. This may result in the membership
composition shifting to less prestigious colleges with lower annual tuition costs.
In practice, we can ﬁx each college's quota to 3 and apply RDA. Note that
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in the current practice there is no limit on exports, and hence each student is
considered to be eligible and sponsored by her home college.
1.8 College Preferences Over Outgoing Students and TTC
In earlier sections, we deﬁned the preferences of colleges over incoming
students, and avoided explicitly modeling their preferences over the outgoing
class other than noting in a few instances that colleges would like to avoid a
negative balance. Modeling colleges with preferences over incoming students is
consistent with the rest of the literature. In contrast with the markets studied
earlier, in a tuition exchange market, each college has outgoing students. Since
a tuition exchange program is considered a beneﬁt for faculty members, college
preferences can be taken over the outgoing students, as well. In this section,
we consider the case in which colleges have preferences over outgoing students
and are indiﬀerent among acceptable incoming students.
If balancedness is required and colleges are assumed to care only about
their exports, then the tuition exchange oﬃce of the college would like to
accept all of its applicants, including the unacceptable ones. In real life, an
unacceptable student, a student who is not admitted during the regular admis-
sion procedure, cannot be awarded a scholarship. We will use two assumptions
about college preferences over matchings in some of our results in this section;
otherwise no explicit assumptions are made about college preferences.
Responsive Preferences Over Export Students: For each college c, if ∗c
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is the induced preferences over subsets of Sc by internal priority order of college
c, c, then for any T ⊂ Sc with |T | < ec and i, j ∈ Sc \ T , (i) T ∪ i ∗c T ∪ j
⇐⇒i c j and (ii) T ∪ i ∗c T ⇐⇒rc(i) ≤ ec. College c's preferences over
matchings are determined with respect to its preferences over export students.
No Unacceptable Import Students: College c prefers a matching where
it imports and exports no students to any matching with an unacceptable
import student.
Recall that colleges have three components in their strategy to play
with in a tuition exchange market: (1) revealed preferences over applying im-
port students, (2) import quota, and (3) export eligibility quota. Here, we
assume that colleges are indiﬀerent among incoming students as long as they
are acceptable; hence the above interpretation of strategies is consistent also
for direct mechanisms in this setting. The internal priority order is exoge-
nously given by the bylaws of the university, which cannot be easily changed
or manipulated as they represent a promise to the hired faculty members.
However, colleges can and still do aﬀect the set of students that they will
export by acting strategically when they report import and export eligibility
quotas (see Theorem 8 below). In spite of these real-life interpretations, we
should note that our results are robust to the case where colleges are assumed
to determine the internal priority order strategically.
As in the previous sections, our main focus is ﬁnding a mechanism that
satisﬁes strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and balancedeﬃciency. In
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Theorem 8 we show that there does not exist a mechanism satisfying the
previously deﬁned desirable properties. The proof is in Appendix A.3.
Theorem 8 Under assumptions of responsive preferences over export students
and no unacceptable import students, there does not exist a balancedeﬃcient
and individually rational mechanism that is immune to import preference and
quota manipulation.
In Section 1.6, we show that the 2S-TTC mechanism is the unique
mechanism satisfying individual rationality, balancedeﬃciency, respect for
internal priorities, and strategy-proofness for students. It is easy to see that,
2S-TTC satisﬁes strategy-proofness for students and respects internal prior-
ities independent of the assumption about college preferences. As long as
colleges report their acceptable set, 2S-TTC will still be individually ratio-
nal when we deﬁne colleges' preferences over the outgoing students. Under
the assumption of no unacceptable import students, any matching in which
an unacceptable student is assigned to a college cannot Pareto dominate the
outcome of the 2S-TTC mechanism. When we prove that the outcome of the
2S-TTC mechanism cannot be Pareto dominated by a balanced and individ-
ually rational matching, we consider the preferences of the students and we
only look at whether the student is acceptable or not. This is also true in the
uniqueness proof. Therefore, changing the assumption about the preferences
of colleges does not change our result. We state our uniqueness result under
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the assumption of no unacceptable import students in Theorem 9. We prove
it in Appendix A.3.
Theorem 9 Under the assumption of no unacceptable import students, the
2S-TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying individual rationality,
balancedeﬃciency, respect for internal priorities, and strategy-proofness for
students.
In Theorem 8 we showed that there is no individually rational and
balancedeﬃcient mechanism that is also strategy-proof when colleges have
preferences over outgoing students. Given that the 2S-TTC mechanism is
balancedeﬃcient, individually rational, and strategy-proof for students, it
should fail to be strategy-proof for colleges. That is, colleges beneﬁt either
from quota manipulation or from misreporting preferences over the incoming
students or both. In Theorem 10 we show that colleges can only beneﬁt from
misreporting their preferences over the incoming students. We prove it in
Appendix A.3.
Theorem 10 When preferences of colleges are responsive over export stu-
dents, the 2S-TTC mechanism is immune to quota manipulation.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a new class of matching problems, modeling
tuition exchange programs used by colleges in the US as a beneﬁt to faculty
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members. The most important beneﬁt of participating in a tuition exchange
program is that colleges strengthen their compensation package to their faculty
and staﬀ at a nominal cost. Participating colleges ﬁnd that tuition exchange
can serve as a strong incentive for top job candidates to accept their oﬀers.
Hence, tuition exchange programs help level the playing ﬁeld for small colleges
in hiring and retaining promising faculty. The main concern for each college
participating in an exchange is maintaining a balance between the number
of exported and imported students. In this paper, we show that decentral-
ized practices used in the ﬁeld discourage colleges from participation and limit
gains from exchange. By intervening the current decentralized practice with a
minimal centralization, we can ﬁx most of the woes of this market. This mech-
anism is not only strategy-proof for students, balancedeﬃcient, individually
rational, and respecting internal priority bylaws of colleges governing the eligi-
bility of sponsored students, it is also the only mechanism that satisﬁes these
properties. Moreover, it cannot be manipulated by colleges through quota
manipulation, unlike the current procedures. We also extend TTC to dynamic
settings by allowing colleges to run imbalances in a predetermined interval.
The interval can be calibrated to have balanced matchings on average.
There also exist tuition co-ops where balancedness is not the main con-
cern. However, extreme imbalance is not desirable and is a danger to the
longevity of the program. For these programs, we propose the repeated de-
ferred acceptance mechanism, which is studentstrategy-proof and ﬁnds the
studentoptimal weakly stable matching. It also minimizes the aggregate im-
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balance while respecting stability.
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Chapter 2
A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles
Mechanism for the School Choice Problem
2.1 Introduction
In their seminal paper, Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (2003) introduce
the school choice problem. Before that paper, in some of the major cities
students were assigned to public schools via deﬁcient mechanisms which give
high incentives to the students to misreport their true preferences in order to
get better allocations. To eliminate the gaming, they propose two competing
strategy-proof mechanisms: the Top Trading Cycle (TTC) mechanism and
the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism. The TTC mechanism is not only
strategy-proof but also Pareto eﬃcient. However, it fails to be fair1. On
the other hand, the DA mechanism satisﬁes fairness but fails to be Pareto
eﬃcient. When the policy makers decided to adopt one of the two strategy-
proof mechanisms, the DA mechanism was selected due to its better features in
terms of respecting school district priorities.2 However, in 2012 New Orleans
1Fairness is the natural counterpart of the stability in the school choice context (Balinski
and Sönmez, 1999). An allocation is fair if there does not exist a student who prefers another
school to his assignment and that school admitted a student with lower priority.
2School districts in Boston, New York City and Denver have adopted versions of the DA
mechanism.
61
Recovery School District became the ﬁrst school district to adopt TTC.
Adoption of the TTC by New Orleans school district shows us that
some school districts may value eﬃciency over fairness. If Pareto eﬃciency
and strategy-proofness are the main objectives of the school districts then TTC
can be considered one of the candidates. However, it is not the unique Pareto
eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanism. For instance, the serial dictatorship
mechanism also satisﬁes these two axioms.3 In this paper, we try to help the
policy makers who are willing to adopt a Pareto eﬃcient and strategy-proof
mechanism by providing the full characterization of the TTC mechanism. Our
characterization is based on Pareto eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, mutual best
along with two axioms that we introduce: resource monotonicity for top-ranked
students and weak consistency. We show that TTC mechanism is the unique
mechanism satisfying Pareto eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, mutual best, weak
consistency and resource monotonicity for top-ranked students.
Mutual best4 requires that a student be assigned to the school at the
top of his preference whenever he has the highest priority at that school. A
mechanism is resource monotonic for top-ranked students if the assignment
of the top-ranked student for a school is not worsened when the number of
available seats in that school increases. A mechanism is said to be weakly
consistent if the removal of a set of agents with their assignments does not
3Pycia and Ünver (2011b) provide a class of mechanisms satisfying strategy-proofness
and Pareto eﬃciency in the school choice problem.
4Morrill (2012) uses the same axiom in the characterization of TTC in a school choice
problem where each school has only one available seat.
62
aﬀect the assignments of the remaining agents as long as each agent is the
top-ranked student for one of the assignment of the removed agent.
Mutual best, weak consistency and resource monotonicity for top-ranked
students are weaker forms of fairness, consistency5 and resource monotonic-
ity6, respectively. TTC mechanism does not satisfy fairness, consistency and
resource monotonicity. In particular, there does not exist a mechanism that
is fair, strategy-proof and consistent.7 Moreover Pareto eﬃciency and fairness
are incompatible.8 Therefore, we cannot have a mechanism satisfying all of
the axioms.9 Kesten (2006) shows that TTC satisﬁes fairness, consistency and
resource monotonicity if the priority order satisﬁes strong acyclicity condition.
In this paper, we show that TTC is not totally unsuccessful in these three
dimensions and none of the Pareto eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanisms
can perform better than TTC in all the three dimensions.
A mechanism which fails to satisfy mutual best, resource monotonicity
for top-ranked students and consistency may not meet the demands of both
students (families) and school districts. We consider mutual best as a must
fairness requirement in the school choice context. For instance, most school
5Amechanism is consistent if whenever a set of agents are removed with their assignments
then all the remaining agents will be assigned to their initial assignment when we run the
mechanism only considering the remaining agents and remaining copies of the objects.
6Resource monotonicity requires that if the number of available objects increases then
all agents should be aﬀected in the same direction (?).
7Alcalde and Barbera (1994) show that DA mechanism is the unique strategy-proof and
fair mechanism but it fails to be consistent.
8Balinski and Sönmez (1999) show that there does not exist fair and Pareto eﬃcient
mechanism.
9Serial dictatorship mechanism satisﬁes four of them. It fails to be fair.
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districts give highest priority at a school to a student whose elder sibling is
already attending that school and most of the families have preference over
keeping their children in the same school (Pathak, 2011). Therefore, both
parents and school districts beneﬁt from the mutually best mechanisms . Sim-
ilarly, resource monotonicity for top-ranked students is a must resource mono-
tonicity requirement. We modify this requirement in two ways. When public
goods are allocated, we should not have a decrease in the welfare of any of the
agents. Otherwise, providing less and less public goods will be a clear solution
for the policy makers. Therefore, we restrict our attention to the mechanisms
under which the welfare of agents weakly increases when the number of avail-
able objects increases.10 We also modify the resource monotonicity axiom by
only requiring not to have a reduction in the welfare of the top-ranked student
for the school whose number of seats has increased. Therefore any resource
monotonic mechanism under which welfare of the agents weakly increase with
an increase in the number of available objects satisﬁes resource monotonic-
ity for top-ranked students. Consistency is a desired property in the school
choice context where the assignment process for diﬀerent types of schools are
done separately. For instance, in New York City the assignment of exam and
mainstream schools are done separately (Abdulkadiro§lu, Pathak, and Roth,
2009). Therefore, running a consistent mechanism will prevent the request
of remaining agents for another run when the other agents are removed with
their assignments.
10Kojima and Ünver (2010) deﬁne resource monotonicity similarly.
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Although, mutual best and resource monotonicity for top-ranked stu-
dents axioms are enough to prove our uniqueness result, the TTC mechanism
satisﬁes stronger forms of these two axioms. TTC respects the priority of stu-
dent i for school s if the number of students with higher priority for school
s is less than the number of available seats in that school. Moreover, if the
policy makers and families are only sensitive to priority violation in the upper
priority groups then TTC can be considered to have a good performance in
terms of respecting priorities. Under TTC mechanism, the students who are
ranked at the top q of the priority order of school s cannot be made worse oﬀ
due to the increase in the number of available seats from q to q′.
This is the ﬁrst paper characterizing TTC mechanism in the school
choice context where each school may have more than one available seat. Ab-
dulkadiro§lu and Che (2010) and Morrill (2012) provide alternative charac-
terizations of TTC mechanism in the school choice context where each school
is restricted to have only one available seat. Abdulkadiroglu and Che show
that TTC mechanism is the only mechanism that is Pareto eﬃcient, strategy-
proof and recursively respects top priorities.11 Morill characterizes the TTC
mechanism in two diﬀerent ways. He ﬁrst shows that TTC is the unique
mechanism which is strategy-proof, Pareto eﬃcient, and independent of irrel-
evant rankings12 and satisﬁes mutual best. He also demonstrates that TTC is
11A mechanism respects top priorities if an agent is assigned an object, then the agent
that is top-ranked by that object should not be assigned to a worse object than that object.
12A mechanism is independent of irrelevant rankings if whenever the ranking of an agent
at an object's priority order does not aﬀect the assignment of that agent then it does not
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the unique mechanism satisfying Pareto eﬃciency, independence of irrelevant
rankings, weak Maskin monotonicity and mutual best. Results of these two
papers do not hold in the school choice problem where schools may have more
than one available seat (Morrill, 2012). Sönmez and Ünver (2010) provide the
characterization of the you request my house-I get your turn (YRMH-IGYT)
mechanisms in the house allocation problems with existing tenants (Abdulka-
diro§lu and Sönmez, 1999). They show that YRMH-IGYT mechanism is the
unique mechanism satisfying Pareto eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, individual
rationality, weak neutrality13 and consistency.14 Pycia and Ünver (2011a) in-
troduce a class of mechanism called trading cycles mechanisms and show that
in the house allocation problem a mechanism is individually rational, Pareto
eﬃcient, group strategy-proof if an only if it is a trading cycles mechanism.15
Pycia and Ünver (2011b) also analyze trading cycles mechanism in the school
choice environment where each school may have more than one available seat
and show that trading cycles mechanisms are Pareto eﬃcient and strategy-
proof.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce
the model and properties of mechanisms. In Section 3 we describe the TTC
mechanism. We present our main results in Section 4. In Section 5 we show
aﬀect the assignment of all the other agents.
13If a mechanism satisﬁes weak neutrality then the outcome of that mechanism will not
depend on the names of the unoccupied objects.
14Sönmez and Ünver (2010) also consider a weaker version of consistency in the house
allocation problem with existing tenants.
15The TTC mechanism belongs to the class of the trading cycles mechanisms.
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the independence of axioms used in our main results. A brief conclusion is
given in the ﬁnal section.
2.2 Model
A school choice problem is a list [I, S, q, P,] where
• I is the set of students,
• S is the set of schools,
• q = (qs)s∈S is the quota vector where qs is the number of available seats
in school s,
• P = (Pi)i∈I is the preference proﬁle where Pi is the strict preference of
student i over the schools including no-school option,
• = (s)s∈S is the priority proﬁle where s is the priority relation of
school s over I.
We denote the no-school option with s∅ and qs∅ =∞. Let Ri be the at-least-
as-good-as relation associated with the strict preference order Pi and for all
s, s′ ∈ S ∪ s∅ sRis′ if and only if s = s′ or sPis′. We assume that there are no
ties in the priority proﬁles of schools.16
A matching is a function µ : I → S∪s∅ such that µ(i) = s and µ(i) = s′
if only if s = s′. If µ(i) = s∅ then student i is unassigned. In a matching µ,
16School districts mostly use random tie breaking rules.
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the number of students assigned to a school s cannot exceed the total number
of available seats in school s. LetM be the set of all possible matchings.
A mechanism is a procedure which selects a matching for each problem.
That is, a mechanism ϕ takes the preference proﬁle of the students, the priority
order of students for schools, the quota vector, then selects a matching for every
problem. The matching selected by mechanism ϕ in problem [I, S, q, P,] is
denoted by ϕ [I, S, q, P,]. Let ϕ [I, S, q, P,] (i) denote the assignment of
student i ∈ I by mechanism ϕ for problem [I, S, q, P,].
Student i strictly prefers matching µ to matching µ′ if he strictly prefers
µ(i) to µ′(i), µ(i)Piµ′(i). A matching µ is Pareto eﬃcient if there does not exist
a matching µ′ ∈ M in which each student is not worse oﬀ and at least one
student is strictly better oﬀ. More formally, matching µ is Pareto eﬃcient if
there does not exist a matching µ′ ∈ M where µ′(i)Riµ(i) for each i ∈ I and
µ′(j)Pjµ(j) at least for one j ∈ I. A mechanism ϕ is Pareto eﬃcient if for all
problems it selects a Pareto eﬃcient matching.
A mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if it is (weakly) dominant strategy for
all students to tell their preferences truthfully. Formally, a mechanism ϕ is
strategy-proof if for every preference proﬁle P and P ′i ϕ [I, S, q, P,] (i)Riϕ [I, S, q, (P ′i , P−i),] (i)
for all student i ∈ I. Here, P−i represents the true preference proﬁle of students
except i.
Let ti be the set of schools ranking i over all other students under
priority proﬁle . Formally, ti = {s ∈ S|i s j ∀j ∈ I \ i}. A mechanism φ
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is mutually best if whenever there exists s ∈ ti such that qs > 0, sPis′ for all
s′ ∈ S \ {s} with qs′ > 0 then φ [I, S, q, P, ] (i) = s for all i ∈ I.17
A mechanism φ is resource monotonic if for all s ∈ S, all q′s ≤ qs
either for all i ∈ I , φ [I, S, q, P,] (i)Ri φ [I, S, (q′s, q−s), P,] (i) or for all
i ∈ I φ [I, S, (q′s, q−s), P,] (i)Riφ [I, S, q, P,] (i).18 I use a diﬀerent ver-
sion of resource monotonicity. Intuitively, if student i has the highest pri-
ority for school s then his welfare should not be worsened when the num-
ber of seats in school s increases. I formally deﬁne resource monotonicity
for top-ranked students as follows: A mechanism φ is resource monotonic
for top-ranked students if for all i ∈ I and all q′s ≥ qs > 0 where s ∈ ti
φ [I, S, (q′s, q−s), P,] (i)Riφ [I, S, q, P,] (i).
Before introducing our consistency axiom we need additional notation.
For any school s ∈ S, priority order s, and a set of students J ⊂ I, let
Js be the restriction of priority order s to students in J . Formally, for any
i, j ∈ J i Js j if and only if i s j. Let J= (Js )s∈S and −J= (I\Js )s∈S.
Given a problem [I, S, q, P,], a set of students J ⊂ I, and a quota pro-
ﬁle q˜ ≤ q we say [J, S, q˜, P−J ,J] is the restriction of the problem [I, S, q, P,]
to students in J and quota proﬁle q˜.19
17Morrill (2012) deﬁnes mutual best similarly. Diﬀerent from the deﬁnition of Morrill
(2012) our deﬁnition takes into consideration the fact that some schools may not have
available seats.
18See ?, Ehlers and Klaus (2003) and Kesten (2009) for related results.
19Similar notation is used in Sönmez and Ünver (2010).
69
A mechanism is consistent if whenever a set of students are removed
with their assignments then all the remaining students will be assigned to their
initial assignment when we run the mechanism only considering the remain-
ing students and objects.20 Formally, a mechanism φ is consistent if for any
problem [I, S, q, P,], when we remove a set of students J ⊂ I together with
their assignments φ[I, S, q, P,](J), then for any i ∈ I \ J
φ[I \ J, S, q˜, P−J ,−J ](i) = φ[I, J, q, P,](i)
where q˜s is the number of available seats remaining in school s.
In this paper, we introduce a weaker version of the consistency axiom.21
Amechanism satisﬁes weak consistency if whenever we remove a set of students
with their assignment such that the student with the highest priority for one
of the removed student's assignment is also another removed student then the
assignments of the remaining students do not change.
A mechanism φ is weakly consistent if for any problem [I, S, q, P,],
when we remove a set of students J ⊂ I together with their assignments
φ[I, S, q, P,](J) satisfying |tj ∩ φ[I, S, q, P,](J)| = 1 for each j ∈ J , then
for any i ∈ I \ J
20See ? and Ergin (2000) for related results.
21Sönmez and Ünver (2010) also modiﬁes the deﬁnition of the consistency axiom. In
that paper, they characterize YRMH-IGYT in the house allocation problem with existing
tenants. YRMH-IGYT also fails to satisfy the consistency axiom but satisﬁes the modiﬁed
version deﬁned in that paper.
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φ[I \ J, S, q˜, P−J ,−J ](i) = φ[I, J, q, P,](i).
Our restriction on the set of students and seats removed is simple. It
is easy to see that any mechanism which is consistent based on the traditional
deﬁnition satisﬁes the weaker form of it that we deﬁne here.
2.3 Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
In the school choice context, the TTC mechanism was ﬁrst introduced
by Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (2003). It was based on the Gale's top trading
cycles algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). It is a direct mechanism and for
any given problem [I, S, q, P,] it works iteratively in a number of steps:
Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (TTC):
Step 0: Assign a counter to each school and set it to the quota of each
school. If the counter of a school is zero, then that school is removed.
Step 1: Each student points to his most preferred school among the
remaing ones. Each remaining school points to the top-ranked student in its
priority order. School s∅ points to all students pointing to it. Due to the
ﬁniteness there is at least one cycle.22 Assign every student in the cycles to
the school he points to and remove him. The counter of each school in a cycle
is reduced by one and if it reduces to zero, the school is also removed.
22A cycle is an ordered list of distinct schools and distinct students (s1, i1, s2, ..., sk, ik)
where s1 points to i1 , i1 points to s2 , ... , sk points to ik , ik points to s1 .
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In general,
Step k: Each student points to his most preferred school among the
remaining ones. Each remaining school points to the student with the highest
priority among the remaining ones. School s∅ points to all students pointing
to it. There is at least one cycle. Assign every student in the cycles to the
school he points to and remove him. The counter of each school in a cycle
is reduced by one and if it reduces to zero, the school is also removed. Our
deﬁnition of TTC mechanism diﬀers from the one provided in Abdulkadiro§lu
and Sönmez (2003) by considering the posibility that some schools may not
have available seats.
The algorithm terminates when all students are assigned.
We illustrate the dynamics of TTCmechanism in the following example.
Example 6 Let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} , I = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5} and q = (1, 1, 1, 2).
The preferences of students and priorities are as follows:
i1 :s1Pi1s2Pi1s3Pi1s4 s1 :i5 s1 i3 s1 i4 s1 i2 s1 i1
i2 :s2Pi2s1Pi2s4Pi2s3 s2 :i3 s2 i1 s2 i4 s2 i2 s2 i1
i3 :s1Pi3s3Pi3s4Pi3s2 s3 :i3 s3 i2 s3 i4 s3 i1 s3 i5
i4 :s3Pi4s4Pi4s1Pi4s2 s4 :i1 s4 i3 s4 i2 s4 i5 s4 i4
i5 :s4Pi5s1Pi5s2Pi5s3
Step 0: All schools have available seats and we set counters to the quotas
of the schools.
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Step 1: Each students points to his most preferred school and each
schools points to the student with the highest priority. There is only one cycle:
(s1, i5, s4, i1). We assign each student in the cycle to the school he points to
and remove him: µ(i1) = s1 and µ(i5) = s4. We also reduce the counter of
each school in the cycle and remove only s1 since its counter reduces to zero.
Step 2: Each remaining students points to his most preferred remaining
school and each remaining schools points to the student with the highest priority
among the remaining ones. There is only one cycle: (s3, i3). We assign the
student in the cycle to the school he points to and remove him: µ(i3) = s1. We
also reduce the counter of the school in the cycle and remove it, s3, since its
counter reduces to zero.
Step 3: Each remaining students points to his most preferred remaining
school and each remaining schools points to the student with the highest priority
among the remaining ones. There is only one cycle: (s2, i4, s4, i2). We assign
each students in the cycle to the school he points to and remove him: µ(i2) = s2
and µ(i4) = s4. We also reduce the counter of each school in the cycle and
remove only both of them since their counter reduce to zero.
The mechanism terminates since all students are assigned.
2.4 Results
In the following theorem, we show that TTC is Pareto eﬃcient, strategy-
proof, weakly consistent, resource monotonic for top-ranked students and mu-
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tually best. Moreover, there does not exist another mechanism satisfying all
these axioms. We prove it in the Appendix B.
Theorem 11 In school choice problem TTC is the unique mechanism satis-
fying
• Pareto eﬃciency
• Strategy-proofness
• Weak consistency
• Resource monotonicity for top-ranked students
• Mutual best.
In the next section, we show that there always exist another mechanism
satisfying only four of the ﬁve axioms.
Abdulkadiro§lu and Che (2010) also use Pareto eﬃciency and strategy-
proofness in their characterization. In addition to Pareto eﬃcieny and strategy-
proofness they use recursively respecting top priorities. One can suspect
whether weak consistency, resource monotonicity for top-ranked students and
mutual best implies recursively respecting top priorities. In the following ex-
ample we show that this is not true.
Example 7 Boston mechanism satisﬁes consistency and resource monotonic-
ity (Kojima and Ünver, 2010). Theorefore, it is weakly consistent and resource
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monotonic for the top ranked agents. Moreover, in the ﬁrst step of the Boston
mechanism if a student applies to his most popular school for which he has
the top priority, then he will be assigned to that school. Therefore, it satisﬁes
mutual best.
Now consider the following example. There are three schools, S =
{s1, s2, s3}, and three students, I = {i1, i2, i3}. Each school has one available
seat. The prefernce proﬁle and priority structure are given as:
i1 :s1Pi1s2Pi1s3 s1 :i3 s1 i2 s1 i1
i2 :s2Pi2s1Pi2s3 s2 :i1 s2 i2 s2 i3
i3 :s1Pi3s3Pi3s2 s3 :i3 s3 i2 s3 i1
The outcome of Boston mechanism is: µ(i1) = s3, µ(i2) = s2 and
µ(i3) = s3. Matching µ does not respect top priorities since i2 is assigned to
s2 and the student i1 who has the top priority for s2 is assigned to a worse
school than s2. Therefore, Boston mechanism does not (recursively) respect
top priorities.
Mutual best can be considered as a very weak fairness requirement
and satisfying it may not make a mechanism more desirable. In the following
proposition, we show that TTC mechanism satisﬁes much stronger fairness
requirement.
Proposition 15 Under TTC mechanism, each student weakly prefers his as-
signment to each school s for which he is ranked at the top qs portion of that
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school's priority order.
Suppose not. Let student i's rank for school s be r < qs and he be
assigned to school s′ such that sPis′. School s will start pointing student i
after r − 1 students are assigned to it if i is not assigned in an earlier step.
First consider the case that i is not assigned before s points him. School s
will keep pointing i until he is removed. Therefore, i will be assigned to s
whenever he points to that school. Now consider the case that i is assigned
before s points to him. In this case, i should be assigned to a better school
and he never points to s.
We can also show that TTC mechanism satisﬁes a general form of
resource monotonicity for top-ranked student.
Proposition 16 When the number of available seats in school s is increased
from qs to q˜s, keeping everything else the same, then TTC mechanism assigns
top qs students in school s's priority order to weakly better schools.
We refer to the proof of Theorem 11. The part that we prove TTC
mechanism is resource monotonic for top-ranked students can be extended for
top qs students. It follows from the fact that the ﬁrst q ≤ qs seats of school s
cannot be ﬁlled before top q students in school s's priority order are removed.
So far, we show that TTC mechanism outperforms other strategy-proof
and Pareto eﬃcient mechanisms. Some school districts consider fairness as the
most important concern and these districts select DA mechanism instead of
76
the TTC mechanism. In the rest of this section, we focus on the fairness and
the performance of the TTC in terms of respecting priorities.
In the most of the school districts, priority structure is determined
based on some exogenous rules. For instance, Boston school district gives
the highest priority for a school to the students living in the same walk zone
and having a sibling attending that school.23 The second priority is given to
students having a sibling attending that school but living outside the walk
zone of that school. Students who are only living in the same walk zone have
the third priority and the fourth priority is given to the remaining students.
Ties between students in the same priority group is broken by random lottery.
That is, the priority structure, , in any problem is determined based on the
priority groups and random draw. Public policy makers and families might
give more importance respecting priorities in the upper priority groups (?). In
Proposition 17, we show that TTC is successful at respecting priorities in the
upper priority groups under some realistic conditions. Before presenting our
results we need some notation.
Suppose there are n priority groups and respecting priorities in the
ﬁrst n∗ priority group is more important. Let Gi : S → N be a function and
Gi(s) be the priority group that student i belongs to for school s. We say
student i's preference Pi is perfectly correlated with the priority groups if
the following condition holds: if Gi(s) < n∗ and Gi(s) < Gi(s′) then sPis′. A
23This priority group is known as sibling-walk zone priority.
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preference proﬁle P = (Pi)i∈I is perfectly correlated with the priority groups
if each student's preference is perfectly correlated with the priority groups.
As an example, suppose the ﬁrst priority group (sibling-walk zone) in Boston
is given more importance than the others. Then the preference proﬁle of the
students is perfectly correlated with the priority groups if each student having
sibling-walk zone priority in some school ranks one of the schools for which he
has sibling-walk zone priority at the top of his preference list.
Now we are ready to present our result on the performance of the TTC
mechanism in terms of respecting priorities.
Proposition 17 Let pi be the outcome of TTC mechanism in problem [I, S, q, P,].
There does not exist a student and school pair (i, s) such that Gi(s) < n∗,
sPipi(i), there exists another student j assigned to s and i s j if any one of
the following conditions holds:
(a) The total number of students in the ﬁrst n∗ priority class of each
school s is less than or equal to qs.
(b) Preference proﬁle P is perfectly correlated with the priority groups.
Table 2.1 shows the precentage of schools (grade K2) in Boston Public
School System where the number of applicants with sibling priority is more
than the number of available seats for the entering class. This data shows
that TTC respects the sibling-walk zone and sibling priorities of almost all
students.
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Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Percentage 0.8696% 2.521% 2.5641% 0.8929% 4.878%
Table 2.1: Percentage of School with Excess Sibling Priority Applicants
2.5 Independence of Axioms
Below we show the independence of axioms mentioned in Theorem 11.
• Strategy-proof, weakly consistent, resource monotonic for top-ranked stu-
dents, and mutually best, but not Pareto eﬃcient: Consider the following
problem. Two schools S = {a, b} with one available seat and two stu-
dents I = {1,2}. Let the preference proﬁle P and priority order 
be
P1 P2
b a
a b
s∅ s∅
a b
1 2
2 1
Let mechanism ψ assign 2 to b and 1 to a. Let ψ select the same as-
signment in the above problem independent of preferences. For all other
problems, ψ selects the same matching as TTC mechanism. Mechanism
ψ fails to be Pareto eﬃcient and satisﬁes other 4 properties.
• Strategy-proof, weakly consistent, resource monotonic for top-ranked stu-
dents, and Pareto eﬃcient, but not mutually best: Serial dictatorship
mechanism is strategy-proof, (weakly) consistent, and Pareto-eﬃcient.
Moreover, when the number of available seats in a school is increase all
students' welfare weakly improve. That is, it satisﬁes more generalized
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version of the resource monotonicity for top-ranked students. However,
it fails to be mutually best.
• Strategy-proof, weakly consistent, Pareto eﬃcient, and mutual best mech-
anism, but not resource monotonic for top-ranked students: Consider the
following problem: Two schools S = {a, b} with one available seat and
three students I = {1,2,3}. Let the preference proﬁle P and priority
order  be
P1 P2 P3
b b a
a a b
s∅ s∅ s∅
a b
1 3
2 1
3 2
Let mechanism ψ assign 3 to a and 1 to b in this problem. If the number
of available seats in school a is increased to 2 then ψ assigns 1 and 3 to a
and 2 to b. Let ψ select the same assignment in the above problem where
a has two available seats and 1 ranks a above s∅ and assign 1 to s∅ if he
ranks a below s∅. For all other problems ψ selects the same matching
as TTC mechanism. Mechanism ψ fails to be resource monotonic for
top-ranked students and satisﬁes other 4 properties.
• Strategy-proof, Pareto eﬃcient, mutually best mechanism, resource mono-
tonic for top-ranked students but not weakly consistent: Consider the fol-
lowing problem. Three schools S = {a, b, c} with one available seat and
three students I = {1,2,3}. Let the preference proﬁle P and priority
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order  be
P1 P2 P3
c a a
a b b
b c c
a b c
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
Let mechanism ψ assign 1 to c and 2 to b and 3 to a in this problem.
Let ψ select the same matching as long as 1 and 3 submit the same
preferences and 2 ranks b over s∅. If we remove 1 with his assignment
then 2 is assigned to a and 3 is assigned to b. For all other problems ψ
selects the same matching as TTC mechanism. Mechanism ψ fails to be
consistent and satisﬁes other 4 properties.
• Pareto eﬃcient, mutually best mechanism, resource monotonic for top
priority students and consistent but not strategy-proof: The Boston mech-
anism is Pareto eﬃcient, resource monotonic and consistent (Kojima and
Ünver, 2010). Moreover, in the ﬁrst step of the Boston mechanism when
a student applies to his most popular school for which he has the highest
priority he will be assigned to that school. Therefore it satisﬁes mutual
best. The Boston mechanism fails to be strategy-proof (Abdulkadiroglu
and Sonmez, 2003) and satisﬁes other 4 properties.
2.6 Conclusion
TTC mechanism has been studied extensively in the market design
literature. It and its variants have been proposed as one of the best alternatives
in many matching markets including public school choice systems, on-campus
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housing and the kidney exchange programs. However, TTC mechanism has
never been characterized for the cases where objects have a capacity greater
than one, i.e. school choice problem. In this paper, we provide the ﬁrst
characterization of the TTC mechanism in the school choice problem. Our
characterization will help the school districts choose between strategy-proof
and Pareto eﬃcient mechanisms. In particular, TTC mechanism is the unique
strategy-proof and Pareto eﬃcient mechanism satisfying mutual best, weak
consistency and resource monotonicity for top-ranked students.
We also focus on the performance of the TTC mechanism in terms of
respecting priorities. We show that TTC mechanism respects priorities in the
upper priority classes. If the policy makers and families are only sensitive for
the priority violations in the upper priority classes then TTC mechanism will
meet their needs.
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Chapter 3
A 1.5-Sided Matching Problem: The
Cost-Eﬃcient House Allocation
3.1 Introduction
The house allocation problem with existing tenants was introduced by
Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (1999).1 In their seminal paper, they compare
the mechanisms used for allocating campus housing to college and graduate
students in the US. They show that the mechanisms in use cause avoidable
welfare losses for students, and they propose the TTC mechanism instead.
The TTC mechanism is not only Pareto eﬃcient but also strategy-proof and
individually rational. However, the TTC mechanism fails to be fair (stable).2.
TTC is not the only alternative discussed in the literature. Guillen and Kesten
(2012) show that the New House 4 (NH4) mechanism, which is used at MIT,
is equivalent to the DA mechanism, where each existing tenant is given the
highest priority in his current house.3 Hence, this mechanism is individually
1The problem consists of existing tenants, newcomers, and occupied and vacant houses.
Each agent has preferences over the houses. Each existing tenant owns the house he is living
in. Each house ranks agents based on a single ordering.
2Fairness simply requires respecting priorities (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999). In the HAP-
wET literature fairness is not considered as an important issue because the priority structure
is determined by a draw. In this paper, we construct the priority order of a house by giving
the highest priority to the occupant and rank all the other agents according to the draw.
3In the rest of the paper we consider this variant of DA mechanism.
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rational, strategy proof, and fair, but fails to be Pareto eﬃcient. On the other
hand, its outcome Pareto dominates any other fair matching. In the literature,
these two mechanisms, DA and TTC, have been compared based on their
performance along various dimensions (see Chen and Sönmez, 2002; Guillen
and Kesten, 2012; Kesten, 2006). TTC can be considered the best mechanism
if Pareto eﬃciency is valued over fairness. On the other hand, DA can be
considered the best mechanism if fairness is valued over eﬃciency. Although
housing oﬃces can replace their current deﬁcient mechanism with one of these
two alternatives, most colleges still use a variant of the serial dictatorship
mechanism. For instance, Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights
(RSDwSR) is a widely used variant of the serial dictatorship mechanism.4
Under RSDwSR, existing tenants have the right to keep their current houses,
but if they want to apply for a new house they have to give up their property
rights for their current houses. The possibility of being assigned to a worse
house prevents many existing tenants from participating and applying for a
new house. As Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (1999) show, this causes welfare
losses for students. Some universities make life more diﬃcult for the existing
tenants. For instance, at the University of Texas if an existing tenant wants
to move to another house he has to give up his property rights on his house
in order to apply for a new house. Moreover, he is placed at the bottom
of the waiting list for a new house. When the supply of houses is limited,
4Carnegie Mellon, Duke, Northwestern, the University of Michigan, and the University
of Pennsylvania employ the RSDwSR mechanism.
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the existing tenant who applies for a new house may not be assigned to any
house. As a consequence, existing tenants keep their current houses and do
not participate in the allocation process. On the other hand, any individually
rational mechanism guarantees that any existing tenant will be assigned a
new house at least as good as his current house. Therefore, the participation
rate of the existing tenants should be higher under the individually rational
mechanisms. Then why don't housing oﬃces act benevolently and adopt a
mechanism that leads to welfare gains by increasing the participation rate?
A possible reason for sticking to RSDwSR and not replacing it with an
individually rational mechanism is that RSDwSR decreases the cost to housing
oﬃces by not giving an incentive to the existing tenants to participate. Here,
cost can be the administrative work of a move, the cleaning/maintenance cost
of an occupied house whose tenant moved to another house, or the opportunity
cost of not renting a house for a given time interval. Therefore, keeping the
existing tenants in their current houses is preferable for the housing oﬃce.
In this paper we compare the DA and TTC mechanisms based on their
cost to the housing oﬃce. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst comparison of
the two mechanisms that takes the preferences of the housing oﬃce (central
authority) into account. We assume that a mechanism in which more existing
tenants are assigned to their current house is preferable for the housing oﬃces
due to the lower cost of moving. A housing oﬃce that aims to adopt one of the
individually rational and strategy-proof mechanisms may ﬁnd our comparison
helpful. We ﬁrst show that RSDwSR can be more costly than both the TTC
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and DA mechanisms (Example 8). Therefore, replacing RSDwSR with one of
the two mechanisms can be beneﬁcial for the housing oﬃces in addition for
the students. Then, we show that the DA mechanism is less costly if there
exists only one existing tenant (Proposition 18). When there is more than one
existing tenant there is no dominance between the two mechanisms in terms
of cost eﬃciency5 (Example 10). However, for any priority order and set of
students there always exists a preference proﬁle such that the outcome of TTC
is more costly than the outcome of DA and the reverse is not true (Proposition
19). Moreover, whenever TTC is less costly than the DA mechanism, then it
fails to be fair. On the other hand, it is possible that DA selects a Pareto-
eﬃcient outcome that is less costly than the outcome of TTC (Proposition
20).
Since there is no clear-cut dominance between TTC and DA in terms
of cost eﬃciency, we use simulations to compare the performance of the two
mechanisms. In the simulations we calculate the average number of existing
tenants who keep their own houses and we count the number of runs in which
one of the mechanisms assigns strictly more existing tenants to their own
houses. Our simulation results show that in almost all cases DA performs
better than TTC from the point of view of the housing oﬃce.
We include the housing oﬃce in the welfare analysis and redeﬁne the
Pareto eﬃciency axiom. Based on our new Pareto eﬃciency deﬁnition, every
5By cost eﬃcient we mean less costly.
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fair matching is also Pareto eﬃcient (Theorem 12). There always exist both a
best and worst fair matching for agents.6 We show that the best fair matching
for students is the least preferred fair matching for the housing oﬃce (Proposi-
tion 22). In this setting we can also weakly rank the Pareto eﬃcient matchings
based on the housing oﬃce's welfare. The Pareto eﬃcient matchings in which
all the existing tenants are assigned to their own houses comprise the set of
the best Pareto eﬃcient matchings for the housing oﬃce. Whenever the TTC
mechanism selects a Pareto eﬃcient matching that is one of the best Pareto
eﬃcient matchings for the housing oﬃce, then the DA mechanism will select
the same matching. However, TTC may fail to select a Pareto eﬃcient match-
ing that is one of the best Pareto eﬃcient matching for the housing oﬃce when
the DA mechanism selects it (Proposition 23). When diﬀerent orderings are
used for the houses, there does not exist a fair and Pareto eﬃcient mechanism
(Theorem 13). In contrast to the one-sided problems, the DA mechanism does
not always select the Pareto eﬃcient and fair matching whenever it exists.
Finally, we provide conditions on the preferences of the housing oﬃce guaran-
teeing that every fair matching also satisﬁes Pareto eﬃciency (Theorem 14).
It is natural to think that the housing oﬃce can decrease the number
of moves by changing its priority structure. The obvious way is to give lower
priority to the existing tenants than to the newcomers in all houses except
their own houses. However, this is not true (see Example 2). That is, the
6A fair matching is the best fair matching for agents if every agent likes it at least as well
as any other fair matching. A fair matching is the worst fair matching for agents if every
agent likes any other fair matching at least as well as that matching.
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housing oﬃce cannot minimize its costs by just giving lower priority to the
existing tenants under DA or TTC.
By including the housing oﬃce (central authority) in the welfare anal-
ysis we help to close the gap between two-sided matching problems (Gale and
Shapley, 1962; Roth, 1985) and one-sided matching problems (Abdulkadiro§lu
and Sönmez, 1999, 2003). HAPwET has been studied as a one-sided matching
problem (Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 1999; Sönmez and Ünver, 2010). In
two-sided matching problems, agents in both sides of the market are included
in the welfare analysis. That is, we can turn HAPwET into a two-sided match-
ing problem by taking the priority orders as the preferences of the houses and
including the houses in the welfare analysis. We also increase the number of
the sides of the market by including the housing oﬃce in the welfare analysis.
Under our framework, some of the results that hold in two-sided problems
but not in one-sided problems become valid. For instance, in our framework
fairness implies Pareto eﬃciency, as in the two-sided problems. However, in-
cluding the housing oﬃce in the welfare analysis is not equivalent to including
all houses and turning the problem into a two-sided matching problem (see
Theorem 13).
Considering fairness as a desirable feature in the house allocation prob-
lem can be criticized. Earlier works mainly focus on problems where the
ordering used in the allocation is drawn randomly and violation of the or-
dering is not considered a problem. However, in many colleges the ordering
used in the allocation is not determined randomly. For instance, students may
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be ranked based on their seniority or GPA. When the students are ordered
based on predetermined rules by the colleges any violation of the ordering can
be considered a problem. Therefore, fairness should be taken as a desired
property.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce
the model and properties of the mechanisms. In Section 3 we describe the
competing mechanisms. We present our main results in Section 4. In Section
5 we show our simulation results. A brief conclusion is given in the ﬁnal
section.
3.2 Model
The house allocation problem with existing tenants consists of
1. a ﬁnite set of existing tenants IE,
2. a ﬁnite set of newcomers IN ,
3. a ﬁnite set of occupied houses HO = {hi}i∈IE ,
4. a ﬁnite set of vacant houses HV ,
5. a list of preference relations P = (Pi)i∈IE∪IN ,
6. an ordering, f , over all agents.
Let I = IE ∪ IN and H = HO ∪ HV denote the set of agents and houses,
respectively. Let h0 denote the null house: the option of being unassigned.
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Let f(k) be the kth ranked agent in f . Each existing tenant i ∈ IE has
property rights for house hi. Let θ = (θi)i∈I be the ownership proﬁle where
θi = hi if i ∈ IE and θi = h0 if i ∈ IN . The exogenous ordering f is randomly
chosen from a given distribution of orderings. The distribution of orderings
can be uniform or be dictated by seniority or academic performance.7 Given
ordering f and the ownership proﬁle we construct the priority order for each
house h ∈ H, h, as (1) for each h ∈ HV ∪ h0, i h j if f−1(i) < f−1(j) and
(2) for each hi ∈ HO, i hi j for all j ∈ I \ {i} and for each k, l ∈ I \ {i}
k hi l if f−1(k) < f−1(l). Let = (h)h∈H .8
The preference relation Pi for each agent i ∈ I is assumed to be strict.
We denote the weak preference relation associated with Pi by Ri. For expo-
sitional simplicity, we assume that the null house, h0, is the least preferred
house for each agent.9
We ﬁx the set of agents and houses and the orders and deﬁne a house
allocation problem with preference proﬁle [P ].
A matching µ : I → H ∪ h0 is a function such that every agent is
assigned to one house (including h0) and only h0 can be assigned to more than
one agent. LetM be the set of matchings.
7For instance, if the distribution of orderings is dictated by seniority, then randomly
selecting an exogenous ordering is equivalent to breaking the ties betweens the student in
the same cohort based on a random rule.
8Given a house allocation problem with existing tenants, Guillen and Kesten (2012)
construct the priority order for each house by using the ownership proﬁle and ordering in a
similar way.
9This assumption has been commonly used in earlier papers studying the house allocation
problem with exiting tenants.
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A matching µ ∈ M Pareto dominates another matching ν ∈ M if
µ(i) Ri ν(i) for all i ∈ I and µ(j) Pj ν(j) for some j ∈ I. A matching is
Pareto eﬃcient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other matching.
A matching µ is individually rational if each existing tenant weakly
prefers his assignment in µ to the house that he has been occupying. That is,
µ is individually rational if µ(i)Rihi for all i ∈ IE.10
A matching µ is fair if, whenever an agent i prefers house h to his
assignment µ(i), then there exists an agent j ∈ I assigned to j in µ and j has
higher priority than i for house h. Formally, a matching µ is fair if whenever
hPiµ(i) then µ−1(h) = j and j µ(j) i. It is easy to see that if a matching is
fair then it satisﬁes individual rationality.11
A mechanism is a systematic way of selecting a matching for each
problem. Let ϕ be a mechanism; then the matching selected by ϕ in problem
[P ] is denoted by ϕ[P ] and the assignment of agent i ∈ I is denoted by ϕ[P ](i).
A mechanism is Pareto eﬃcient if it selects Pareto eﬃcient matching
in every problem. A mechanism ϕ is individually rational if the outcome of ϕ
for every problem is individually rational. A mechanism ϕ is fair if it selects
a fair matching in every problem.
10Note that we do not require µ(i)Rih0 for all i ∈ I since h0 is assumed to be the least
preferred house for each agent.
11Note that, if we consider the priority order of each house h as the preference of that
house then the stability, which is highly discussed in the two-sided matching literature (Roth
and Sotomayor, 1990), and our fairness notions are equivalent.
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A mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if reporting true preferences is a
weakly dominant strategy for each agent in the preference revelation game;
that is, there does not exist a problem [P ], an agent i ∈ I, and a preference
relation P ′i such that ϕ[P
′
i , P−i] Pi ϕ[P ]. Here, P−i = (Pj)j∈I\{i}.
All these axioms are the standard axioms used in the literature. In
this paper, we introduce a new axiom and use it while comparing mechanisms
based on their costs.
In matching µ, let Υ(µ) be the set of existing tenants assigned to the
house where they are currently living, Υ(µ) = {i ∈ IE|µ(i) = hi}. A matching
µ is less costly than µ′ if |Υ(µ)| > |Υ(µ′)|. A mechanism ϕ is less costly
than mechanism Φ if in any problem the matching selected by Φ is not less
costly than the matching selected by ϕ and there exists a problem in which
the matching selected by ϕ is less costly than the one selected by Φ.
3.3 Competing Mechanisms
In this section we describe two individually rational mechanisms that
are proposed in the literature and the widely used RSDwSR mechanism. In
all three mechanisms, each existing tenant decides whether she will stay out
of the assignment process and keep her current house or participate and apply
for a new house. Without loss of generality, we consider all agents in IE as the
existing tenants who decide to enter the assignment process. Therefore, each
h ∈ HO is owned by an existing tenant who enters the assignment process.
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Given a house allocation problem [IE, IN , HO, HV , P, f ], the outcome of
DA mechanism is obtained by applying it to the associated problem [I,H, P,
].12
Deferred Acceptance Mechanism:
Step 1: Each agent applies to his ﬁrst choice house. Each house h tentatively
accepts the agent having the highest priority in h among the agents who
applied to it. The rest are rejected.
In general:
Step k: Each agent applies to the best house that has not rejected
him. Each house h tentatively accepts the agent having the highest priority
in h among the agents who applied to it. The rest are rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no agent is rejected any more.
For the TTCmechanism we also work on the associated problem [I,H, P,
]. The outcome of the TTC mechanism can be found by the following algo-
rithm.
Top Trading Cycles Mechanism:
Step 1: Each agent points to his ﬁrst choice house in his preference list.
Each house h ∈ H points to the agent who has the highest priority in h. The
null house points to the agents pointing to it. There always exists at least one
12In Guillen and Kesten (2012) the associated problem is considered as a school choice
problem, which was introduced by Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (2003).
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cycle due to the ﬁnite number of houses and agents. Assign the agents in the
cycle to the house they point to and remove them with their assignments.
In general:
Step k: Each remaining agent points to the best house among the
remaining ones. Each house h points to the agent who has the highest priority
in h among the remaining ones. The null house points to the agents pointing
to it. There exists at least one cycle. Assign the agents in the cycle to the
house that they point to and remove them with their assignments.
The algorithm terminates when all agents are removed.
For the RSDwSR mechanism we work on the house allocation problem
[IE, IN , HO, HV , P, f ]. The outcome of the RSDwSR mechanism can be found
by the following algorithm.
Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights:
Step 1: Agent f(1) is assigned to his top choice house. Remove f(1). If f(1)
is assigned to a house in H, then remove his assignment.
Step 2: Agent f(2) is assigned to his top choice house among the remaining
ones. Remove f(2). If f(2) is assigned to a house in H, then remove his
assignment.
In general:
Step k: Agent f(k) is assigned to his top choice house among the
remaining ones. Remove f(k). If f(k) is assigned to a house in H, then
remove his assignment.
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The algorithm terminates when all agents are removed.
Both the DA and TTC mechanisms are strategy-proof and individually
rational. The DA mechanism is fair but not Pareto eﬃcient. On the other
hand, TTC is Pareto eﬃcient but not fair. Kesten (2006) shows that if DA
fails to be Pareto eﬃcient for a problem TTC fails to be fair. However, there
are some problems in which TTC fails to be fair but the DA mechanism se-
lects a Pareto eﬃcient matching. The RSDwSR mechanism does not satisfy
individual rationality (Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 1999). It is strategy proof
and Pareto eﬃcient if we only consider the participants. However, it fails to
be Pareto eﬃcient within the set of all agents including both nonparticipants
and participants.
All these comparisons are done using the axioms that are related only to
the agents. If the housing oﬃce (central authority) is benevolent, then these
comparisons will help the housing oﬃce decide which individually rational
and strategy-proof mechanism to adopt. Since none of the axioms used in the
comparisons considers the preference of the housing oﬃce, these comparisons
do not help the housing oﬃce if it is not benevolent.
3.4 Results
In this section we ﬁrst compare the two individually rational and strategy-
proof mechanisms based on the number of existing tenants assigned to a dif-
ferent house under each mechanism. Each movement of an existing tenant is
considered a cost to the housing oﬃce. Then we redeﬁne Pareto eﬃciency by
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including the welfare of the housing oﬃce and do our analysis based on this
new deﬁnition of Pareto eﬃciency.
Before comparing the DA and TTC mechanisms, we ﬁrst answer two
natural questions: (1) Is RSDwSR mechanism less costly than both the DA
and TTC mechanisms? (2) Is it less costly to rank all the existing tenants
after all the newcomers in f under both the DA and TTC mechanisms?
If the answer to the ﬁrst question is Yes then it will be diﬃcult to in-
ﬂuence the housing oﬃce to replace RSDwST with the DA or TTC mechanism.
We answer the ﬁrst question by showing that RSDwSR may not be the best
solution for reducing the costs to housing oﬃces. In Example 8, we illustrate
that in some problems the outcome selected by TTC and DA mechanisms can
be less costly than the outcome selected by the RSDwSR mechanism.
Example 8 There are three students I = {i, j, k} and three houses H =
{h1, h2, h3}. Agent k is currently living in h3 and he is an expected utility
maximizer. Let u(h) be the utility of k from being assigned to house h and
u(h1) = 13, u(h2) = 0 and u(h3) = 5. The preference proﬁle is given as:
h1Pih3Pih2, h1Pjh3Pjh2, h1Pkh3Pkh2.
Based on the ordering f we get the following outcomes under serial
dictatorship.
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Ordering Assignment of Agent k Utility
i− j − k h2 0
i− k − j h3 5
j − i− k h2 0
j − k − i h3 5
k − i− j h1 13
k − j − i h1 13
Suppose the distribution of orderings is uniform. The expected utility of
agent k from participating in the assignment process is 6, which is greater than
the utility of keeping her current house. Therefore student k will participate.
If the selected ordering is i− j − k then k will be assigned to h2 by RSDwSR.
However, for this ordering both TTC and DA mechanisms assign k to his own
house. Moreover, in none of the orderings the outcome of the RSDwSR is less
costly than the outcome of TTC or DA mechanisms.
Example 8 does not show that either DA or TTC is less costly than
RSDwSR. One can show that with a diﬀerent distribution of orderings or
diﬀerent utilities student k will decide not to participate, whereas the DA and
TTC mechanism may assign him to another house. For instance, take utilities
as: u′(h1) = 7, u′(h2) = 0 and u′(h3) = 5. Then the expected utility of agent
k from participating is 4 which is less than the utility of keeping her current
house. Therefore k will not participate. On the other hand, if the selected
ordering is k − i− j both mechanisms will assign her to h1.
In Example 8, we assume that existing tenants give their participation
decision before seeing the exact ordering f . This assumption is consistent
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with Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (1999). It might be the case that existing
tenants give their participation decision after the realization of f . Even if this
is the case, not knowing the exact preferences of the other students also leads
to uncertainty over the outcomes of the assignment procedure for the existing
tenants. In this case we can come up with the same expected utility by using
a belief structure of the existing tenant about the preferences of the other
applicants.
For the second question, since ranking all the existing tenants after all
the newcomers gives them lower priorities, the immediate answer that comes
to mind is Yes. But this immediate answer is not true. In the following
example we show that ranking the existing tenants after all the newcomers
in f under the DA and TTC mechanisms does not always yield a less costly
outcome for the housing oﬃce.
Example 9 We ﬁrst focus on the DA mechanism. There are four houses,
H = {h1, h2, h3, h4} and four agents I = {i1, i2, i3, i4}. Agent ij is currently
living in hj where j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. That is, i1, i2 and i3 are the existing tenants.
Let the preferences of the agents be: h2Pi1h1Pi1h3Pi1h4, h1Pi2h2Pi2h3Pi2h4,
h4Pi3h3Pi3h2Pi3h1 and h4Pi4h1Pi4h3Pi4h2.
First consider the outcome of the DA mechanism for the following or-
der: f : i3 − i4 − i1 − i2. The DA mechanism selects the following matching
µ(i1) = h1, µ(i2) = h2, µ(i3) = h4 and µ(i4) = h3. The number of existing
tenants keeping their own house is two.
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Now consider the outcome of the DA mechanism for the following order:
f ′ : i4 − i3 − i1 − i2. The DA mechanism selects the following matching:
µ′(i1) = h2, µ′(i2) = h1, µ′(i3) = h3 and µ(i4) = h4. The number of existing
tenants keeping their own house is 1.
Now we focus on the TTC mechanism. We consider the same example
above with a slight change in the preferences. Consider the following pref-
erence proﬁle: h2P ′i1h1P
′
i1
h3P
′
i1
h4, h3P ′i2h2P
′
i2
h1P
′
i2
h4, h4P ′i3h1P
′
i3
h2P
′
i3
h3 and
h4P
′
i4
h3P
′
i4
h1P
′
i4
h2.
Consider the outcome of the TTC mechanism for the following order:
f : i3 − i4 − i1 − i2. The TTC mechanism selects the following matching:
pi(i1) = h1, pi(i2) = h2, pi(i3) = h4 and pi(i4) = h3. The number of existing
tenants keeping their own house is 2.
Now consider the outcome of the TTC mechanism for the following
order: f ′ : i4−i3−i1−i2. The TTC mechanism selects the following matching:
pi′(i1) = h2, pi′(i2) = h3, pi′(i3) = h1 and pi′(i4) = h4. The number of existing
tenants keeping their own house is 1.
When we compare both mechanisms in a general setting, TTC (DA) is
not less costly than DA (TTC). However, under some restrictions DA is less
costly than TTC. In particular, if the number of existing tenants is one, then
the DA mechanism is less costly than the TTC mechanism. We formally state
this result in Proposition 18.13
13When the number of existing tenants is zero, then DA and TTC will select the same
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Proposition 18 If |IE| = 1, then there does not exist a problem in which the
matching selected by TTC is less costly than the one selected by DA, but there
exist problems in which the matching selected by DA is less costly than the one
selected by TTC.
Denote the matching selected by TTC and DA by pi and µ, respectively.
We prove the ﬁrst part by contradiction. Suppose the statement is not true.
Then there exists a problem in which the matching selected by TTC is less
costly than the matching selected by DA. This is possible if and only if i ∈ IE
is assigned to hi under TTC and assigned to another house under DA. Given
that µ is individually rational, i cannot be assigned to a worse house than hi.
That is, µ(i)Pipi(i).
We will consider a variant of the TTC mechanism in which only one
cycle is removed in each step. Let µ(i) be removed in step k. Then the priority
order of student i cannot be less than or equal to k. Otherwise, i will be placed
to µ(i) or a better house. Then, {f(1), f(2), ..., f(k)} ⊆ IN . Student f(1) is
assigned to his top choice in pi. Student f(2) is assigned to his top choice in
step 2 among the remaining houses. It continues like this until step k. All
these houses are new houses.
Now consider the sequential version of the DA mechanism (McVitie and
Wilson, 1971). Students will apply based on their rank in f. f(1) will apply
to pi(f(1)) and is tentatively kept. Then it is student f(2)'s turn. If he ranks
matching for every problem (see Appendix C).
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pi(f(1)) at the top when he applies to that house he will be rejected. Since f(2)
prefers pi(f(2)) most among H \{pi(f(1))} then he will be tentatively accepted
when he applies to pi(f(2)) next. This will be the same for all students in
{f(1), f(2), ..., f(k)}. Therefore, i cannot be assigned to µ(i) under the DA
mechanism. This leads to a contradiction.
We prove the second part by example. There are 3 houses H =
{h1, h2, hi3} and 3 students I = {i1, i2, i3}. Here i3 is an existing student
currently occupying hi3 . Let f(1) = i1, f(2) = i2 and f(3) = i3. The prefer-
ence proﬁle is given by: hi3Pi1h1Pi1h2, h1Pi2h2Pi2hi3 and h1Pi3hi3Pi3h2.
In this problem TTC will select the following matching: pi(i1) = hi3 ,
pi(i2) = h2 and pi(i3) = h1. On the other hand the DA mechanism will select
the following matching: µ(i1) = h1, µ(i2) = h2 and µ(i3) = hi3 . The existing
tenant is assigned to a diﬀerent house in pi but stays in his house in µ.
When |IE| > 1 there is no dominance between DA and TTC in terms
of cost eﬃciency (being less costly). We illustrate this situation in Example
10.
Example 10 There are three students I = {i, j, k} and three houses H =
{h1, h2, h3}. Student i and j are existing tenants occupying h1 and h2, respec-
tively. Let f(1) = k, f(2) = j and f(3) = i. The preference proﬁle is given by:
h3Pih2Pih1, h3Pjh2Pjh1 and h1Pkh2Pkh3. DA will select the following match-
ing: µ(i) = h2, µ(j) = h3 and µ(k) = h1. On the other hand, TTC will select
the following matching: pi(i) = h3, pi(j) = h2 and pi(k) = h1. In µ all existing
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tenants change their places. In pi only one existing tenant changes his house.
Now consider a new preference proﬁle: h2P ′ih1P
′
ih3, h1P
′
jh2P
′
jh3 and
h1P
′
kh2P
′
kh3. In this problem, DA will select the following matching: µ
′(i) =
h1, µ′(j) = h2 and µ′(k) = h3. TTC will select the following matching: pi′(i) =
h2, pi′(j) = h1 and pi′(k) = h3. In pi′ all existing tenants change their places.
In µ′ all existing tenants stay in their houses.
In Example 10 we look only at the case in which |IE| = 2. We can
easily modify the example by adding more existing tenants who prefer their
own houses. Under both mechanisms, the existing tenants who prefer their
own houses will be assigned to their own houses. That is, adding other agents
will not change the assignments of the three agents considered in Example 10.
Therefore, we have the same result for all cases where |IE| ≥ 2.
When we consider the on-campus housing assignment system, it is quite
true that the number of existing tenants applying to be reassigned is greater
than one. Therefore, Proposition 18 does not give enough support to the
adoption of DA instead of TTC. Although there is no dominance between
the DA and TTC mechanisms in terms of cost eﬃciency when |IE| > 1, in
the following proposition we show that the DA mechanism has better features
than TTC in terms of cost eﬃciency.
Proposition 19 If |IE| ≥ 2 and at least one of the existing tenants is not in
{f(1), f(2)}, then for any set of agents, houses, and priority ordering there
always exists a preference proﬁle P such that the matching selected by DA is
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less costly than the matching selected by TTC. But the converse is not true:
There exists a set of agents, houses, and priority where there does not exist a
preference proﬁle P such that the matching selected by TTC is less costly than
the matching selected by DA.
We ﬁrst show the ﬁrst part of the statement. Let i ∈ IE and i /∈
{f(1), f(2)}. Consider the following problem. Except for i, each j ∈ IE such
that j /∈ {f(1), f(2)} prefers hj most. There are 4 possible cases.
Case 1: {f(1), f(2)} ⊆ IE. Student i and f(2) prefer house hf(1) most
and their own houses second. Student f(1) prefers hi most and his own house
second. DA will assign all existing agents to their current houses. On the other
hand f(1) and i will swap their houses in the matching selected by TTC.
Case 2: f(1) ∈ IE and f(2) ∈ IN . Student i and f(2) prefer a new
house h ∈ HN most. Student i prefers his own house second. Student f(2)
prefers hf(1) second. Student f(1) prefers hi most and his own house second.
DA will assign all existing agents to their current houses. On the other hand
f(1) gets hi and i gets h in the matching selected by TTC.
Case 3: f(1) ∈ IN and f(2) ∈ IE. Student i and f(2) prefer a new
house h ∈ HN most. Student i and f(2) prefer their own houses second.
Student f(1) prefers hi most and h second. DA will assign all existing agents
to their current houses. On the other hand i is assigned to h in the matching
selected by TTC.
Case 4: {f(1), f(2)} ⊆ IN . Student i and f(2) prefer a new house
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h ∈ HN most. Student i prefers his own house second. Student f(2) prefers
h′ ∈ HN second. Student f(1) prefers hi most and h′ ∈ HN second. DA
will assign all existing agents to their current houses. On the other hand i is
assigned to h in the matching selected by TTC.
Now, we prove the second part of Proposition 19. There are two existing
students IE = {i, k} and one newcomer IN = {j}. The priority order is
f(1) = i, f(2) = j and f(3) = k. Let hn be the new house and hi and hk be
current houses of i and k, respectively. There are 216 possible combinations
of preferences.
In all preference proﬁles in which i ranks hn or hi at the top, DA
and TTC will select the same matching. This corresponds to 144 preference
proﬁles.
In all preference proﬁles in which i and k prefer hk most, DA and TTC
will select the same matching. This corresponds to 24 preference proﬁles.
In all preference proﬁles in which i prefers hk and k prefers hi or hn
the most, i and k will be assigned to their top choice in TTC. Therefore both
existing tenants will move to another house. This corresponds to 48 preference
proﬁles. Note that TTC cannot be less costly than DA in this case because
all existing tenants are assigned to the other houses.
If i prefers hk the most and hi second, j and k prefers hi the most and
k prefers hk second then DA will assign each existing tenant to his current
house.
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According to Proposition 19, for any priority structure it is always
possible that DA selects a less costly assignment than the outcome of TTC
when we have more than one existing tenant.14
In Proposition 19 we restrict one of the existing tenant to not be in
{f(1), f(2)} because when all existing tenants belong to that set the DA and
TTC mechanisms select the same outcome (see Appendix C).
We cannot consider the housing oﬃce to be totally selﬁsh. It may also
take into account the welfare of the agents. Then we should consider the
performance of these two mechanisms in other aspects. In Proposition 20, we
show that if the outcome of TTC is less costly than the outcome of DA, then
the outcome of TTC fails to be fair. However, in some problems the outcome
of the DA mechanism can be Pareto eﬃcient and less costly than the outcome
of the TTC mechanism at the same time.
Proposition 20 Whenever the matching selected by TTC is less costly than
the matching selected by DA, then the matching selected by TTC is not fair.
But there exists a problem in which the matching selected by DA is Pareto
eﬃcient and less costly than the outcome of the TTC mechanism.
Let pi and µ be the matchings selected by TTC and DA, respectively.
If the matching selected by TTC is less costly than the matching selected by
DA, then pi 6= µ. The outcome of DA Pareto dominates all the other fair
14This result is also true for the case where |IE | = 1.
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matchings and the outcome of TTC is Pareto eﬃcient; therefore pi cannot be
fair.
For the second part consider the following example. There are three
students I = {i, j, k} and three houses H = {h1, h2, h3}. Student k is currently
living in h3. The priority order is f(1) = i, f(2) = j and f(3) = k. The
preference proﬁle is given as: h3Pih1Pih2, h2Pjh3Pjh1, h2Pkh3Pkh1. TTC will
select the following matching: pi(i) = h3, pi(j) = h1 and pi(k) = h2. On the
other hand, DA will select the following matching: µ(i) = h1, µ(j) = h2 and
µ(k) = h3. µ is Pareto eﬃcient and less costly than pi.
So far, we have considered only the welfare of the agents in our anal-
ysis. Now, we include the welfare of the the housing oﬃce and and analyze
the performance of the two mechanisms in this new environment. By includ-
ing the welfare of the housing oﬃce in our analysis we introduce a new class
of problem that we call a 1.5-sided house allocation problem with ex-
isting agents (1.5-sided HAPwET). In particular, we change the HAPwET
by adding the housing oﬃce to the set of agents and the preferences of the
housing oﬃce into the preference proﬁle. We deﬁne 1.5-sided HAPwET as a
6-tuple [IE, IN , o,HO, HV , (Px)x∈I˜ , f ] where o represents the housing oﬃce and
I˜ = IE ∪ IN ∪ o.
We assume that the housing oﬃce strictly prefers matching µ to match-
ing ν if the number of existing tenants assigned to their own houses is greater
under µ and the housing oﬃce is indiﬀerent between two allocations if the num-
ber of existing tenants assigned to their own houses is the same in both match-
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ings. Formally, (1)µPov if Υ(µ) > Υ(ν), (2) µRoν and vRoµ if Υ(µ) = Υ(ν).
In this new class of problems we only change the deﬁnition of the Pareto-
eﬃciency axiom that we deﬁned for the one-sided problems. In particular, we
change the deﬁnition of Pareto eﬃciency by including the housing oﬃce in
the welfare analysis in addition to the agents: A matching µ ∈ M Pareto
dominates another matching ν ∈ M if µ(i) Ri ν(i) for all i ∈ I ∪ o and
µ(j) Pj ν(j) for some j ∈ I ∪ o. A matching is Pareto eﬃcient if it is not
Pareto dominated by any other matching. In the rest of the paper, we use this
deﬁnition of Pareto eﬃciency which includes the welfare of the housing oﬃce.
In 1.5-sided HAPwET, we run the TTC and DA mechanisms without
taking the preferences of the housing oﬃce into account.15 Since we only
change the deﬁnition of Pareto eﬃciency and keep everything else the same
and run both mechanisms as in the one-sided HAPwET, DA satisﬁes individual
rationality, fairness, and strategy-proofness in 1.5-sided HAPwET. Similarly,
TTC is individually rational and strategy-proof. Moreover, TTC still satisﬁes
Pareto eﬃciency. We formally show this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 21 TTC is Pareto eﬃcient in the 1.5-sided HAPwET.
Suppose not. There exists another matching, ν that Pareto dominates
the outcome of the TTC mechanism, pi. Then, there exists at least one agent
15On the other hand, in two-sided problems the preferences of both sides are taken into
account by the two-sided versions of TTC and DA (see Dur and Ünver, 2012; Gale and
Shapley, 1962).
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whose allocations are diﬀerent in pi and ν and he prefers ν to pi. Otherwise, ν
cannot Pareto dominate pi. Let i be the agent preferring ν(i) to pi(i). Therefore
i is not assigned to his top choice in pi.
Denote the set of agents removed in step k of TTC with C(k). The
agents removed in the ﬁrst step of TTC are assigned to their top choices.
Therefore, i cannot be in this group. Now consider the agents removed in the
second step of TTC. Suppose i ∈ C(2). Then ν(i) should be i's top choice.
The only reason why i is not assigned to his top choice is that another agent in
C(1) is assigned to that house. That is, one of the agents in C(1) is assigned
to ν(i) in pi. Denote this agent with j. If i is assigned to ν(i) then j is assigned
to another house in ν. Given that pi(j) = ν(i) is the top choice of j, agent j
prefers pi to ν. This is a contradiction. We can continue with the other cycles
similarly and show that we cannot ﬁnd a matching that Pareto dominates pi.
Proposition 21 holds if only students have strict preferences over the
houses. This is also true for the one-sided HAPwET. That is, if agents have
weak preferences over the houses then TTC fails to be Pareto eﬃcient in
the one-sided problem. Note that Proposition 21 holds independent of the
preference proﬁle of the housing oﬃce.
In the two-sided allocation problems, DA satisﬁes Pareto eﬃciency.
One might wonder whether we can get this result in the 1.5-sided HAPwET.
In the following theorem we show that when the housing oﬃce is included in
the welfare analysis, any fair matching is also Pareto eﬃcient.
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Theorem 12 In 1.5-sided HAPwET, if matching µ is fair then it is also
Pareto eﬃcient.
Suppose there exists another matching ν that Pareto dominates µ.
Then there exists a set of agents J ⊆ I ∪ o strictly preferring ν to µ and
all the other agents are indiﬀerent between ν and µ. Since agents preferences
are strict, any agent who is assigned to diﬀerent houses in ν and µ should
prefer ν. If o ∈ J , then there exists an existing tenant i such that µ(i) is
not his own house whereas ν(i) is. Moreover, ν(i)Piµ(i). However, this vio-
lates the fairness of matching µ because he has the highest priority for ν(i)
and is assigned to a worse house in µ. Therefore, o is indiﬀerent between ν
and µ, and J ⊆ I. Suppose J is a singleton set. Then, j ∈ J should be
assigned to an empty house in µ. However, this contradicts the fairness of µ.
Moreover, any agent in J cannot be assigned to a house in ν that is empty
under µ. Therefore, J cannot be singleton and for each agent j ∈ J there
exists another agent j′ ∈ J such that ν(j) = µ(j′). Then, we can ﬁnd a cycle
J˜ ⊆ J = {j1, j2, ..., jn} where ν(jx) = µ(jx−1) for x > 1 and ν(j1) = µ(jn).
Since µ is fair, j ∈ J˜ has higher priority for µ(j) than ν−1(µ(j)). We claim
that at least one agent in J˜ is assigned to his own house in µ. Suppose not.
Then the only way agent jx has a higher priority for µ(jx) than jx+1 is if he
is ranked in a better position in the ordering f . Then, f−1(j1) < f−1(j2),
f−1(j2) < f−1(j3),..., f−1(jn−1) < f−1(jn) and f−1(jn) < f−1(j1). This can
be written as: f−1(j1) < f−1(j2) < f−1(j3) < ... < f−1(jn) < f−1(j1). This is
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a contradiction. Moreover, due to fairness there cannot be an existing tenant
assigned to his own house in ν but not in µ.
Given that the DA is fair as a consequence of Theorem 12 it is also
Pareto eﬃcient.
Corollary 4 In the 1.5-sided HAPwET, the DA mechanism is Pareto eﬃ-
cient.
Even if we include the housing oﬃce in the welfare analysis, it is not
a strategic agent. That is, it cannot determine which ordering f will be se-
lected. Only agents are strategic and they can manipulate their preferences.
Alcalde and Barbera (1994) show that DA is the unique strategy-proof and
fair mechanism when the other side of the market is not strategic. As a result,
DA is the unique fair, strategy-proof, and Pareto eﬃcient mechanism.
Theorem 12 shows us that any fair mechanism also satisﬁes Pareto eﬃ-
ciency. Then, do agents and the housing oﬃce have a favorite fair mechanism?
Before answering this question we give some deﬁnitions. We say that a fair
matching µ is the best fair matching for agents if every agent likes it at
least as well as any other fair matchings, and µ is the worst fair matching
for agents if every agent likes any other fair matching at least as well as µ.
Similarly, a fair matching µ is the best fair matching for the housing oﬃce if
the housing oﬃce likes it at least as well as any other fair matching and µ is the
worst fair matching for the housing oﬃce if the housing oﬃce likes any other
fair matching at least as well as µ. In the marriage problem, introduced by
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Gale and Shapley (1962), we can ﬁnd best fair matchings for men and women.
This is also true for the house allocation problem with existing tenants. That
is, if we consider agents as one side of the market and the housing oﬃce as the
other side, then there always exist best and worst fair matchings for both the
housing oﬃce and the agents. Moreover, the best fair matching for the agents
(housing oﬃce) is the worst fair matching for the housing oﬃce (agents). We
show these results in Proposition 22.
Proposition 22 There always exist best and worst fair matchings for agents
and the housing oﬃce. Moreover, the best (worst) fair matching for the agents
is the worst (best) fair matching for the housing oﬃce.
Consider the house allocation problem [IE, IN , HO, HV , P, f ]. Then con-
struct the associated problem [I,H, P,] as described in Section 3.2. This is
a school choice problem in which every school has only one available seat. In
the school choice problem, school proposing DA mechanism gives the worst
fair matching for the agents and agent proposing DA mechanism gives the
best fair matching for the agents. For the polarization we refer to the proof of
Theorem 12. Let µB and µW be the best and worst fair matchings for agents,
respectively. If there is a unique fair matching, then the best and worst fair
matchings are the same for both sides. If there is more than one fair matching
we can Pareto rank all the other fair matchings with µB and µW for the agents
(Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). If µ 6= µB then µB is weakly preferred over µ
by agents. As we show in the proof of Theorem 12, µB is more costly than µ
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and less preferred than µ by the housing oﬃce. Therefore µB is the costliest
matching. If µ 6= µW , then µ is weakly preferred to µW by agents. As we show
in the proof of Theorem 12, µW is less costly than µ and preferred to µ by
the housing oﬃce. Therefore µW is the most preferred fair matching for the
housing oﬃce.
In Proposition 22, we show that there always exist best and worst sta-
ble matchings for each side of the market. Then a natural question is whether
we can ﬁnd the best Pareto eﬃcient matching for both the agents and the
housing oﬃce. Since one side of the market consists of only one agent, we can
always rank the Pareto eﬃcient matchings for the housing oﬃce. Given that
the housing oﬃce has weak preferences over the matchings it can be indiﬀer-
ent between some Pareto eﬃcient matchings and strictly prefer them to other
Pareto eﬃcient matchings. Thus, there is a set of best Pareto eﬃcient match-
ings for the housing oﬃce. For the agents' side, there may not exist a Pareto
eﬃcient matching that is preferred to any other Pareto eﬃcient matching by
all agents. It is easy to see that the best Pareto eﬃcient matching for the
agents exists if and only if the most popular house of each agent is diﬀerent.
In that case, TTC and DA will select the same matchings. On the other hand,
DA and TTC do not have the same success in selecting a matching from the
set of best Pareto eﬃcient matchings for the housing oﬃce. We show this
diﬀerence in Proposition 23.
Proposition 23 If TTC selects a matching from the set of best Pareto eﬃ-
cient matchings for the housing oﬃce then DA selects the same matching. On
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the other hand, there exists a problem in which DA selects a matching from
the set of best Pareto eﬃcient matchings but TTC does not.
We start with the ﬁrst statement. We ﬁrst claim that the set of best
Pareto eﬃcient matchings for the housing oﬃce consists of Pareto eﬃcient
matchings in which all existing tenants are assigned to their own houses. To
prove this claim we need to show that there always exists a Pareto eﬃcient
matching in which all existing tenants are assigned to his current house. Con-
sider the following mechanism: In all problems each existing tenant is assigned
to their current houses. Then select a random order for the newcomers and
run the serial dictatorship mechanism based on the random draw in order to
assign newcomers to the vacant houses. Any Pareto improving trade between
agents includes at least one existing tenant and will make the housing oﬃce
worse oﬀ. Therefore this mechanism always selects a Pareto eﬃcient matching.
Denote the outcome of TTC with pi. If TTC assigns each existing
tenant to his own house then the outcome should be fair. Suppose not. First
note that there is no priority violation for the occupied houses. If there is a
priority violation then there exist two agents i and j such that f−1(i) < f−1(j)
and pi(j)Pipi(i). Here j is a newcomer and in the TTC mechanism a newcomer
agent will be assigned to a house after all the agents with higher priority in
f are removed. That is, when i was removed pi(j) was available. This is a
contradiction and pi is fair. When we only consider the welfare of the agents,
TTC selects an undominated matching in every problem. On the other hand,
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the outcome of the DA mechanism Pareto dominates all other fair matchings.
Therefore, DA also selects pi.
For the second part, consider the second part of Example 10. In that
example DA selects a matching from the set of best Pareto eﬃcient matchings
but TTC fails.
One may think that including the housing oﬃce in the welfare analysis
is equivalent to including all the houses in the welfare analysis.16 Once both the
agents and houses are considered in the welfare analysis, the house allocation
problem with existing tenants turns into the marriage problem introduced by
Gale and Shapley (1962). In the marriage problem, fairness (stability) implies
Pareto eﬃciency. In Theorem 12, we show that the same result holds in our
context. However, we later show (Theorem 13) that Theorem 12 does not
hold if we make more general assumptions about the priority structure. Thus,
including the housing oﬃce in the welfare analysis is not equivalent to including
all the houses in the welfare analysis.
Until now, we have focused on the case in which each house ranks agents
other than its existing tenant based on the same ordering f . Now we extend the
model by allowing each house to use diﬀerent orderings. It is worth mentioning
that our extension does not preclude the possibility that two diﬀerent houses
have the same ordering. For instance, diﬀerent dorms on a campus might
give higher priority to the students who lived in that dorm in the previous
16In this case, priorities of the houses can be considered as preferences.
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year or for some dorms honor students might have higher priority. For each
house h ∈ H, let fh be the ordering over the set of agents. Let h ∈ HV and
hk ∈ HO. Given the ordering fh, fh′ and the ownership proﬁle we construct
the priority order for house h ∈ HV , h, as i h j if f−1(i) < f−1(j) and for
house hk ∈ HO, k hk j for all j ∈ I \ k and for each l,m ∈ I \ k l hk m
if f−1(l) < f−1(m). Under this extension, Theorem ?? does not hold. In
Theorem ??, we show that there exists a problem in which all fair matchings
fail to be Pareto eﬃcient.
Theorem 13 If diﬀerent orderings are used for houses then there may exist
a problem in which all fair matchings are Pareto dominated.
There are 3 houses H = {h1, h2, h3} and 3 students I = {i1, i2, i3}.
All agents are newcomers and all houses are vacant. Let fh1 = i1 − i2 − i3 ,
fh2 = i3 − i1 − i2 and fh3 = i2 − i1 − i3 . The preference proﬁle is given by:
h2Pi1h1Pi1h3, h1Pi2h3Pi2h2 and h1Pi3h2Pi3h3. There is a unique fair matching:
µ(i1) = h1, µ(i2) = h3 and µ(i3) = h2. The unique fair matching is Pareto
dominated by the following matching: µ′(i1) = h2, µ′(i2) = h3 and µ′(i3) = h1.
In Theorem 13, we also show that there does not exist a fair and Pareto
eﬃcient mechanism by showing that the unique fair matching is not Pareto
eﬃcient.
In the 1.5-sided problem where all houses use the same ordering f , the
priority structure totally reﬂects the preferences of the housing oﬃce over the
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matchings. Therefore, an allocation that is Pareto eﬃcient based on the pref-
erences of the agents and preferences (priority orders) of houses also satisﬁes
Pareto eﬃciency in the 1.5-sided problem. However, when houses use a dif-
ferent ordering the priority structure does not reﬂect the preferences of the
housing oﬃce. This is the main reason why Theorem ?? does not hold when
houses rank agents based on diﬀerent orderings.
In the one sided problems, if the priority orderings of objects are het-
erogeneous17 then fairness and Pareto eﬃciency are incompatible (Balinski and
Sönmez, 1999). If there exists a fair and Pareto eﬃcient matching, it is unique
and it is the outcome of the DA mechanism. When we increase the level of
heterogeneity in the priority orders by using diﬀerent orderings for house, there
may exist more than one Pareto eﬃcient and fair matching. However, the DA
mechanism may fail to select one of the Pareto eﬃcient and fair matchings.
We illustrate this situation in Example 11.
Example 11 There are 7 agents, I = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7}, and 7 houses,
H = {h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, h7}. Agent i1, i2 and i6 are existing tenants in
houses h1, h2, and h6, respectively. The preference proﬁle is given by: h4Pi1h3Pi1h1,
h3Pi2h4Pi2h2, h1Pi3h3, h2Pi4h4, h3Pi5h5, h7Pi6h6 and h6Pi7h7. The orderings
for each house are given as: fh1 = fh2 = i1 − i2 − i3 − i4 − i5 − i6 − i7 , fh3 =
fh6 = i3−i1−i5−i2−i4−i6−i7 and fh4 = fh5 = fh7 = i4−i2−i1−i5−i3−i7−i6
.
17By heterogeneity we mean that objects are not ordering the agent in the same order.
116
In this example the following fair matchings are Pareto eﬃcient: (1)
µ(i1) = h1, µ(i2) = h2, µ(i3) = h3, µ(i4) = h4, µ(i5) = h5, µ(i6) = h6,
µ(i7) = h7, (2) µ′(i1) = h1, µ′(i2) = h2, µ′(i3) = h3, µ′(i4) = h4, µ′(i5) = h5,
µ′(i6) = h7, µ′(i7) = h6. However, the outcome selected by DA fails to be
Pareto eﬃcient: µ′′(i1) = h3, µ′′(i2) = h4, µ′′(i3) = h1, µ′′(i4) = h2, µ′′(i5) =
h5, µ′′(i6) = h6, µ′′(i7) = h7. It is Pareto dominated by the following matching:
µ˜(i1) = h4, µ˜(i2) = h3, µ˜(i3) = h1, µ˜(i4) = h2, µ˜(i5) = h5, µ˜(i6) = h6,
µ˜(i7) = h7.
Theorem 13 and Example 11 explicitly show that although the 1.5-sided
problem inherits properties of both the one-sided and two-sided problems it
has its own characteristic features and is diﬀerent from the other two problems.
When we allow diﬀerent orders for houses, in a fair matching there may
exist welfare improving trades between agents that do not make the housing
oﬃce worse oﬀ. For fairness to imply Pareto eﬃciency, a relation between the
priority structure and the preference of the housing oﬃce is required. In the
following theorem, we give the condition on the preference of the housing oﬃce
guaranteeing that every fair matching satisfy Pareto eﬃciency.
Theorem 14 Every fair matching is Pareto eﬃcient if whenever there exist a
set of students I˜ = {i1, i2, ..., in} and a set of houses H˜ = {h1, h2, ..., hn} such
that in hn in−1 hn−1 in−2 hn−2 ...i1 h1 in then the housing oﬃce strictly
prefers matching µ to ν where µ(ik) = ν(ik−1) = hk for all k ∈ {2, 3, ..., n}
and µ(i1) = ν(in) = h1.
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Let pi be a fair matching. If there does not exist another matching pi′
that is weakly preferred by all agents and strictly preferred at least by some
agents to pi, then pi is Pareto eﬃcient (see Proposition 21). Otherwise, there
exists a set of agents I˜ who strictly prefer their assignment in pi′ to pi. We claim
that for each i ∈ I˜ there exists another j ∈ I˜ such that pi′(i) = pi(j). That is,
the assignment of each agent in I˜ in matching pi′ is assigned to another agent in
I˜ in matching pi. Suppose not. Then, either pi′(i) = pi(k) where k ∈ I\I˜ or pi′(i)
is unﬁlled in matching pi. The former case cannot be true because of the strict
preferences and Pareto domination between pi and pi′. That is, pi′(k) = pi(k)
for all k ∈ I \ I˜. The latter case cannot be true because it contradicts the
fairness of matching pi. Recall that we incorporate non-wastefulness into the
deﬁnition of fairness.
Then for each i ∈ I˜ there exists another j ∈ I˜ such that pi′(i) = pi(j).
Due to the fairness of matching pi, j has higher priority than i for house
pi(j), i.e. j pi(j) i. Since the quota of each house is one, then j is assigned
to a diﬀerent house in matching pi′. As a consequence of our claim above,
there exists another agent l ∈ I˜ such that pi′(j) = pi(l) and l pi(l) j . Due
to ﬁniteness, we eventually have a cycle as in the statement of Theorem 14.
Then the trades that make all agents in I˜ should make the housing oﬃce worse
oﬀ. Otherwise, pi would fail to be Pareto eﬃcient. That is, the housing oﬃce
should strictly prefer pi to pi′.
The condition in Theorem 14 can be explained in words as follows:
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Whenever there exists a cycle18 in the priority structure, the housing oﬃce
always prefers the student with higher priority to be assigned to that house.
When we use a unique f while determining the priority orders, if we
can ﬁnd a cycle that consists of n students then at least n − 1 one of them
should be existing tenants. In this case, the preferences of the housing oﬃce
satisfy the requirement given in Theorem 14.
3.5 Simulations
In this section, we compare the performance of DA and TTC in a ran-
dom environment using computer simulations. In the previous section, we
showed that there is no dominance between the two mechanisms in terms of
cost eﬃciency. Using simulations, we will show whether one of these mecha-
nisms outperforms the other one in our setup. We develop our setup by taking
some important aspects of the house allocation problem into account. For
instance, moving from one house to another may be costly for the existing
tenants. Hence, an existing tenant may prefer to stay in her current house
even if there is another house that she slightly prefers to her current house.
Moreover, some houses may be preferred more than others by all agents. That
is, there may be a correlation in agent preferences. We incorporate these points
in our deﬁnition of the preferences of the agents over the houses.
Let Ui,h be the utility of agent i ∈ I for house h ∈ H. It is deﬁned as:
18A cycle is an ordered list of houses and students (in, hn, in−1, hn−1, ..., i1, h1) such that
ik has higher priority than ik−1 for house hk for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and i0 = in.
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Ui,h = β × (α× Z(h) + (1− α)× Z(i, h)) + (1− β)× own(i)× owner(i, h)
where α, β ∈ [0, 1].19 The correlation in the agent preferences is captured by
α. Parameter β captures the tendency of the existing tenants to keep their
current house. Z(h) is an i.i.d standard uniformly distributed random variable
and represents the common tastes of agents on house h. Z(i, h) is also an i.i.d
standard uniformly distributed random variable and represents the tastes of
agent i on house h. Existing agent i's value for keeping his current house is
denoted by own(i) and its value is drawn from a standard uniform distribution.
The last term in the utility equation, owner(i, h), is equal to 1 if i is currently
living in house h and 0 otherwise.
In our simulations, we set the number of students and houses to n and
the number of existing tenants to e. Then, given the number of students and
the number of existing tenants we index the students by i = 1, 2, ..., n and
houses by h = 1, 2, ...n. We give the ownership of house k to agent k where
k ≤ e. Then we determine the priority structure from the ownership proﬁle
and an ordering that is drawn randomly. We generate random variables Z(h),
Z(i, h) and own(i), and by using these random variables and predetermined α
and β we determine the utilities. For each setup we run the two mechanisms
and calculate the number of existing tenants keeping their current houses in
19Erdil and Ergin (2008) deﬁne utilities in their simulations similarly.
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the outcomes of these mechanisms. By keeping the ownership proﬁle and util-
ities the same, we run the mechanisms 1,000 times by using diﬀerent random
orderings of agents.
In Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, and Figure 3.3 we show how many times
(out of 1,000) each mechanism beats the other one in terms of cost eﬃciency
for diﬀerent values of α and β in a house allocation problem consisting of
20 agents (houses). We run our simulations for diﬀerent numbers of existing
tenants. Our simulation results show that the DA mechanism performs much
better than the TTC mechanism in terms of cost eﬃciency. When we look
at our simulation results in more detail we have the following observations.
When α = 1, perfect correlation, there is no dominance between the two
mechanisms since they mostly select the same outcome. This is a consequence
of perfect correlation in the preferences. As β decreases, the number of runs
that either mechanism is performing better decreases. Intuitively, when β is
low, existing tenants are ranking their current house at the upper portion of
their preference list and they most likely prefer to keep their current house.
Another observation is that as the number of existing tenant increases, the
number of runs where we observe a domination by either mechanism increases.
We also observe that TTC performs better for the lower values of α, i.e. when
the correlation is low.
In Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5, and Figure 3.6 we show the average number
of existing tenants assigned to their own house by each mechanism for diﬀerent
values of α and β in a house allocation problem consisting of 20 agents (houses).
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Our simulation results show that for any values of α and β the average number
of existing tenants assigned to their own house under TTC is less than or equal
to that under DA. For the lower values of β the diﬀerence between the average
number of existing tenants assigned to their own house under DA and TTC is
small. We observe a larger diﬀerence for the higher values of β. Intuitively, as
β decreases it is highly probable that existing tenants are ranking their own
houses at the top of their list. Another observation is that when α = 1 the
average number of existing tenants keeping own house is the same in both DA
and TTC. This is a consequence of the perfect correlation in the preferences.
We also observe that the average number of existing tenants keeping own house
increases as α increases under both mechanisms. This is another consequence
of the correlation in agent preferences.
3.6 Conclusion
In the one-sided matching problems, mechanisms have been compared
based on the welfare of the agents. An example for the one-sided matching
problems is the house allocation problem with existing tenants. On-campus
housing is one real-life application of this problem. The random serial dicta-
torship (RSD) mechanism and its variants are used by many colleges in the
US. Previous studies, which include only the welfare of the agents, suggest
that the housing oﬃces should replace the RSD mechanism with either the
deferred acceptance (DA) or the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism. In
contrast with these earlier studies, in this paper we include the welfare of the
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housing oﬃce. We assume that each move of an existing tenant is costly for
the housing oﬃce and therefore the housing oﬃce prefers that existing tenants
keep their own houses. We compare the two competing mechanisms based on
their costs to the housing oﬃce. Although there is no dominance between the
two mechanisms, DA has more desirable features in terms of cost eﬃciency
(being less costly) for the housing oﬃce. Our simulation results also suggest
that the housing oﬃce should choose DA instead of TTC.
We also introduce a new class of assignment problem in which the
housing oﬃce is included in the set of agents. The housing oﬃce has preferences
over the allocations but since it is deﬁned based on some predetermined rules,
i.e. number of moves, the housing oﬃce is not a strategic agent. This new class
of problem is in between the one-sided and two-sided matching problems. We
call it the 1.5-sided matching problem. We show that it inherits some features
of both the one-sided and two-sided matching problems. For instance, as in the
one-sided problems DA is strategy-proof in the 1.5-sided matching problem.
On the other hand, as in the two-sided problems every fair mechanism is Pareto
eﬃcient.
In this paper, we focus on the implications of including the welfare
of the central authority in the house allocation problem. Our model can be
extended where the housing oﬃce is strategic and can determine the ordering
used to prioritize the agents. Another possible extension can be to analyze the
problem in a dynamic environment where an agent can reapply to change his
current house more than once.
123
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
200
400
600
800
1000
beta=0.2
alpha
r
u
n
s
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
200
400
600
800
1000
beta=0.4
alpha
r
u
n
s
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
200
400
600
800
1000
beta=0.6
alpha
r
u
n
s
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
200
400
600
800
1000
beta=0.8
alpha
r
u
n
s
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
200
400
600
800
1000
beta=1.0
alpha
r
u
n
s
 
 
Number of Runs DA beats TTC
Number of Runs TTC beats DA
Figure 3.1: Simulations with 20 Houses (Agents) and 5 Existing Tenants
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Figure 3.2: Simulations with 20 Houses (Agents) and 10 Existing Tenants
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Figure 3.3: Simulations with 20 Houses (Agents) and 15 Existing Tenants
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Figure 3.4: Simulations with 20 Houses (Agents) and 5 Existing Tenants
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Figure 3.5: Simulations with 20 Houses (Agents) and 10 Existing Tenants
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Figure 3.6: Simulations with 20 Houses (Agents) and 15 Existing Tenants
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Tuition Exchange Programs and Tuition Co-ops
There are more than eight independent tuition exchange programs help-
ing employees and their families access tuition beneﬁts at member colleges.
Each tuition exchange program varies signiﬁcantly in its structure, beneﬁts,
and costs to institutions and students. We have already explained the details of
the largest program, The Tuition Exchange, Inc. (TTEI). In this appendix, we
provide details of other leading programs, including Council of Independent
Colleges Exchange, Catholic College Cooperative Tuition Exchange, Great
Lakes Colleges' Association, Associated Colleges of the Midwest, Associated
Colleges of the South, Faculty and Staﬀ Children Exchange Program, and
Council for Christian Colleges and Universities Tuition Waiver Exchange Pro-
gram.
The Council of Independent Colleges Tuition Exchange Program
(CIC-TEP): CIC-TEP is an extensive exchange program composed of ap-
proximately 400 small to mid-sized colleges across the nation, although most
colleges are based in the Midwest or the East Cost. All fulltime employ-
ees of a CIC-TEP participating institution are eligible for the beneﬁt, along
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with their spouses and dependents. Colleges determine their own policies and
guidelines for the eligibility of their own employees. Each participating col-
lege is required to accept a minimum of three new students per year. There
is no limitation on the number of exported students and all eligible students
can apply for the scholarship. Students should be admissible at the importing
institution in order to be considered for the scholarship.
After the determination of the sponsored students, the exporting in-
stitution completes the tuition exchange participation form and directs the
form to the institutions to which their sponsored students are applying. Each
student also applies for admission directly to the institutions of her choice and
submits all required ﬁnancial aid information.
Catholic College Cooperative Tuition Exchange (CCCTE): There are
70 members comprised of diﬀerent schools throughout the country, some large
and some small. Each member deﬁnes its own beneﬁt levels for tuition ex-
change. Each institution determines who among its employees is eligible to
apply for tuition exchange at another member college. All dependents must
be accepted to the college or university of their choice before applying for the
beneﬁt. Acceptance at the institution does not guarantee the availability of
the beneﬁt. Each participating college is not allowed to import more than 5
students per academic year over the number of students it exports to other
participating institutions. There is no limitation on the number of students it
exports in a given academic year. Hence, each employee who is determined to
be eligible can apply for the scholarship.
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Great Lakes Colleges' Association (GLCA): GLCA is a consortium of
thirteen private liberal arts colleges in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, and In-
diana. The eligibility of the student's parent is determined by the college
at which the parent is employed. All other policies aﬀecting the student are
determined by the college the student attends. Under this program, each
participant's family will pay a fee equal to 15% of the GLCA mean tuition.
The remaining 85% is paid by the exporting institution. Thus there are no
concerns about maintaining a balance. Hence, it is no longer an exact ex-
change program; previously, the association was using an exchange program.
After problems related to maintaining balances surfaced, they converted to
the current model.
Associated Colleges of the Midwest (ACM): This program is composed
of fourteen liberal arts colleges in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, and
Colorado. Eligibility is set by the exporting college. Anyone eligible for the
importing college's tuition remission program is considered eligible for the
program, and she is placed in the applicant pool.
Each participating ACM college compensates 50% tuition to all im-
ported students from participating colleges. Each exporting college determines
the level of beneﬁt it oﬀers its employees, though it must be at least 80% of
the importing college's tuition. If the exporting college beneﬁt is 80%, the
family is responsible for the remaining 20% of tuition. The exporting college
might choose a beneﬁt of 90% or 100% or any other level, as long as it is at
least 80% of the tuition of the college to be attended.
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The current ACM exchange replaced a previous exchange that resulted
in imbalances between the member colleges. Since the current system does not
have a balancing feature, popular colleges with few qualiﬁed employees with
dependent students could ﬁnd themselves with a greater number of incoming
students.
Faculty and Staﬀ Children Exchange Program (FACHEX): There are
28 participating Jesuit colleges in this program. The student ﬁrst must sub-
mit a regular application for admission to the FACHEXparticipating college
involved. This must be done in accordance with that college's regular admis-
sion requirements and procedures. Eligibility to participate in the FACHEX
Program does not qualify a student for admission, nor does admission qualify
a student for FACHEX tuition remission. No institution is obligated to enroll
more than three FACHEX students over the number it exports.
Council for Christian Colleges and Universities Tuition-Waiver Ex-
change Program (CCCU-TWEP): There are 100 participating colleges in
this program. Each participating college agrees to accept at least one (with a
recommendation of three) new student from other participating institutions.
Applicant students apply directly to the institutions of their choice and must
meet normal admissions requirements in order to be considered for the ex-
change program, due to limited space.
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A.2 Erasmus Student Exchange Program
The Erasmus program is a student exchange program between univer-
sities of the member countries of the European Union.1 Close to 3 million
students have participated since it started in 1987. The number of students
beneﬁting from the program is increasing each year; in 2011, more than 231,408
students attended a college in another member country as an exchange stu-
dent. The number of member universities is more than 4,000. The Erasmus
program aims to improve the quality of higher education and strengthen its
European dimension. Considering the growing numbers of exchange students,
we can say that the program is fulﬁlling its purpose.
Students from member universities can participate in the program.
Each university from the member countries has the right to apply to be a
member institute. All membership applications of universities are sent to the
European Commission. Once a university is awarded with membership, it
needs to sign bilateral agreements with the other member institutions. In par-
ticular, the student exchanges are done between the member universities that
have signed a bilateral contract with each other.
The bilateral agreement includes information about the number of stu-
dents that will be exchanged between the two universities in a given period.
Even if the two universities agree to import and export the same number of
students, they may fail to fulﬁll the agreement. The program does not di-
1Turkey and Norway are the non-EU members of the program.
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rectly punish the universities that run a negative balance. Instead the other
universities may prefer not to sign contracts with universities with a negative
balance or they may set the number of students to be exchanged very low in
their bilateral agreements. Alternatively, the imbalance between two universi-
ties can be carried to the new contract that they sign after the termination of
the initial one.
The selection process of the exchange students is mostly done as follows.
The maximum number of students that can be exported to a partner university
is determined based on the bilateral agreement with that partner and the
number of students who have been exported since the agreement was signed.
The students submit their list of preferences over the partner universities.
The university ranks its own students based on predetermined criteria, e.g.,
GPA and seniority. Based on the ranking, a serial dictatorship mechanism is
applied to place students at the available slots. Finally, the list of the students
who received the slots of the partner universities is sent to the partners. The
partner universities most likely accept all the students on the list.
An exchange student pays her tuition to her own college, not the one
importing her. This may lead to ﬁnancial issues when a college imports more
than it exports. For instance, when a college exports 10 students and imports
20 students, it receives tuition for only 10 students and spends money for 20
students. To prevent this ﬁnancial issue, colleges may be precautionary and
set the maximum number of students to be exchanged at a low level.
When we consider the balance of countries we observe that some coun-
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2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 Total
UK 9052 9,264 9,273 8,452 8,636 8,770 8,927 62,374
Sweden 3,928 4,532 4,827 5,403 5,793 6,060 6,348 36,891
Denmark 2,087 2,684 2,958 3,292 3,625 3,934 4,262 22,842
Poland -6,058 -6,911 -7,489 -7,744 -7,256 -6,079 -4,640 -46,177
Germany -5,154 -5,959 -6,006 -5,752 -5,685 -6,102 -6,059 -40,717
Turkey -843 -2,024 -3,117 -4,475 -4,560 -5,117 -5,209 -25,345
Table A.1: Balance of Member Countries
tries are running huge positive balances over the years and while others are
running huge negative balances (Table A.1). Between 2004 and 2011, the UK
imported 62,374 students more than it exported; while Poland exported 46,177
students more than it imported.
This huge imbalance between countries can be easily solved if the 2S-
TTC mechanism is adopted. Adoption of the 2S-TTC mechanism requires the
market to be centralized. When we look at the numbers of students exchanged
between the UK and other countries, we see that the UK always imports more
than it exports. Then it is clear that each student from the UK is assigned
to her top-choice country.2 If we assume that the number of students from
the UK preferring a college in each member country as their ﬁrst choice is
less than the number of students from that country preferring the UK, then
none of the students in the UK is made worse oﬀ due to the adoption of the
centralized 2S-TTC mechanism.
2This is true if we assume that students have preferences over countries.
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A.3 Proofs
We start by reminding the reader of the studentproposing deferred
acceptance (DA for short) algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962). The algo-
rithm works for a given problem [q, e, P ] in iterative steps:
StudentProposing DeferredAcceptance (DA) Algorithm:
Step 1: Each eligible student makes an oﬀer to her most preferred
college. If there is no such a college she is tentatively matched with the null
college.
Each college that receives an oﬀer tentatively accepts all best acceptable
oﬀers up to its import quota according to its preferences. Any unacceptable
oﬀer or any oﬀer not honored due to the import quota constraint is rejected
permanently.
In general,
Step k: Each eligible student who does not have a tentatively accepted
oﬀer from the previous step makes an oﬀer to the best acceptable college that
has not rejected her yet. If there is no such college, she is tentatively matched
with the null college.
Each college that holds tentatively accepted oﬀers or receives new oﬀers
in this step tentatively accepts all best acceptable oﬀers, among the new and
previously held ones, up to its quota according to its preferences. Any unac-
ceptable oﬀer or any oﬀer not honored due to the import quota constraints is
rejected permanently.
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The algorithm terminates when all eligible students are tentatively ac-
cepted either by a college or the null college. Tentatively accepted oﬀers are
ﬁnalized as matches. Gale and Shapley (1962) (and Roth, 1985) showed that
this algorithm ﬁnds a stable matching when college preferences over imports
are responsive.
We ﬁrst state and prove the following Lemma, which is used in proving
Proposition 7 and Theorem 2:
Lemma 1 When a college c sets qc and ec for its import and eligibility quotas,
suppose pi is a stable matching of this problem. It later sets e˜c = ec + 1 and
q˜c such that if |pi(c)| = qc then q˜c = qc, and otherwise q˜c ≥ qc. Suppose p˜i is
a stable matching of the second problem. Then we have bp˜ic ∈ {bpic − 1, bpic } and
bp˜ic′ ∈ {bpic′ , bpic′ + 1} for all c′ ∈ C \ c.
Let pi be a stable matching for [q, e, P ]. Note that Mpic = pi(c), as no
student ﬁnds her home school acceptable, and pi is stable. Denote the newly
certiﬁed student of college c by i in problem [(q˜c, q−c), (ec + 1, e−c), P ].
The number of positions ﬁlled by each college is the same at every
stable matching by Proposition 6. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume
pi to be the outcome of the DA mechanism.
First consider the problem [(q˜c, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ]. If bpic < 0, then adding
new seats to an under-demanded college will not change the set of students
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assigned to c in the DA mechanism will select the same outcome for prob-
lems [(qc, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ] and [(q˜c, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ]. Otherwise, q˜c = qc by
assumption.
We will use the sequential DA algorithm introduced by McVitie and
Wilson (1971) where the new agent i will be considered at the end, to ﬁnd the
DA outcome for problem [(q˜c, q−c), (ec + 1, e−c), P ]. Let p˜i be the outcome of
the DA mechanism for [(q˜c, q−c), (ec + 1, e−c), P ].
Let C< be the set of colleges that could not ﬁll all their seats, and C=
be the set of colleges that did, in pi. Formally, C< = {c ∈ C : |pi(c)| < qc}
and C= = {c ∈ C : |pi(c)| = qc}. Observe that if c has a negative balance at
µ, then c ∈ C<; otherwise c ∈ C= and qc = q˜c . Now, when it is the turn of i
to apply in the sequential DA, the current tentative matching is pi.
After i starts making oﬀers in the algorithm, let c˜ be the ﬁrst college
that does not reject i. Observe that c˜ 6= c as i does not consider c, her home
college, to be acceptable.
In the rest of the proof, as we run the sequential DA, we run the
following cases iteratively, starting with student i.
1. If c˜ = c∅, then the algorithm terminates; bp˜i = bpi.
2. If c˜ ∈ C<, then i will be assigned to c˜ and the algorithm terminates;
bp˜ic = b
pi
c − 1, bp˜ic˜ = bpic˜ + 1, and bp˜i−{c,c˜} = bpi−{c,c˜}.
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3. If c˜ ∈ C=, then student i˜ that has the lowest priority among the students
in pi(c˜) is rejected in favor of i. We consider two cases:
(a) Case i˜ ∈ Sc: The net balance of no college will change since the
beginning, and we continue from the beginning above again using
student i˜ instead of i.
(b) Case i˜ /∈ Sc: The instantaneous balance of c will deteriorate by 1
as i is tentatively accepted. Now, it is i˜'s turn in the sequential DA
to make oﬀers. In this series of oﬀers, suppose the ﬁrst college that
does not reject student i˜ is ˜˜c. Denote the home college of i˜ by c′
(note that c′ 6= c).
i. If ˜˜c ∈ c∅ ∪ (C< \ c), then the algorithm will terminate, and
bp˜ic = b
pi
c − 1 . Two cases are possible about ˜˜c:
A. Case ˜˜c = c∅: We have bp˜ic′ = b
pi
c′ + 1 and b
p˜i
−{c,c′} = b
pi
−{c,c′}.
B. Case ˜˜c 6= c∅: We have bp˜i˜˜c = bpi˜˜c + 1 and bp˜i−{c,˜˜c} = bpi−{c,˜˜c}.
ii. If ˜˜c = c, then i˜ will be assigned to c and the algorithm will
terminate; as the instantaneous change in the balance of c is
+1, the total change since the beginning will be 0; and no other
school's college's balance will change either: bp˜i = bpi.
iii. If ˜˜c ∈ (C= \ c), then the lowest priority student held by ˜˜c will
be rejected in favor of i˜. Let this student be ˜˜i. There are two
further cases:
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A. Case ˜˜i ∈ Sc: The instantaneous balance of c will increase by
1, and we will start from the beginning again above with
˜˜i instead of i. The total change in c's balance since the
beginning will be 0. Also no other college's balance has
changed since the beginning.
B. Case ˜˜i /∈ Sc: We start from Step 3(b) above with student ˜˜i
instead of i˜.
Thus, whenever we continue from the beginning, the instantaneous balance of
c is bpic , and whenever we continue from Step 3(b), the instantaneous balance
of c is bpic − 1 and the instantaneous balances of all other colleges are given by
vector bpi−c. Due to ﬁniteness, the algorithm will terminate at some point at
Steps 1 or 2, or Steps 3(b)i or 3(b)ii; and the net balance of c at the new DA
outcome will be bpic or b
pi
c − 1. Moreover, whenever the algorithm terminates,
the balance of any other college has gone up by one or stayed the same.
We are ready to prove the results stated in the main text:
[Proof of Proposition 7] Let pi be the outcome of the DA mechanism
in problem [q, e, P ] with qc ≥ ec and p˜i be the outcome of the DA mechanism
in problem [(q˜c, q−c), (ec + 1, e−c), P ] where q˜c ≥ qc. By Proposition 6, it is
suﬃcient to prove the proposition for pi and p˜i, as all stable matchings have
the same balance. Note that Mpic = pi(c), since no student ﬁnds her home
school as acceptable, and pi is stable.
Two cases are possible:
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• bpic < 0: We have pi(c) = |Mpic | < |Xpic | ≤ ec ≤ qc. Then, by Lemma 1,
bp˜ic ∈ {bpic − 1, bpic }.
• bpic ≥ 0: We have two cases again:
 |pi(c)| < qc or q˜c = qc: By Lemma 1, bp˜ic ∈ {bpic − 1, bpic }.
 |pi(c)| = qc and q˜c = qc + k for k > 0: Denote the newly certi-
ﬁed student of college c by i in problem [(q˜c, q−c), (ec + 1, e−c), P ].
We ﬁrst consider the outcome of the DA mechanism in problem
[(q˜c, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ], which we denote by pi′′. We ﬁrst show that
the number of students imported by c in matching pi′′ cannot be
less than the one in pi. Let C< be the set of colleges with unﬁlled
capacity in matching pi, i.e. C< = {c˜ ∈ C : |pi(c˜)| < qc˜}. Due to the
non-wastefulness of pi, pi(s)Psc˜ for all s ∈ E \ pi(c˜) and c˜ ∈ C<. We
know the DA mechanism is resource monotonic: when the number
of seats increases then every student will be weakly better oﬀ (cf.
Kesten, 2006). That is, pi′′(s)Rspi(s) for all s ∈ E. By combining
resource monotonicity and individual rationality of the DA mecha-
nism, we can say if a student is assigned to a college in pi then he
will also be assigned to a college in pi′′. Hence, we can write:
∑
c′∈C
|pi′′(c′)| ≥
∑
c′∈C
|pi(c′)|. (A.1)
Note that the diﬀerence between the lefthand side and the right
hand side of the equation can be at most one. This follows from
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the fact that in matching pi′′ no new student will be assigned to a
college in C˜, the number of students assigned to other colleges can
increase only for c, and the maximum increment is one.
By combining the non-wastefulness and resource monotonicity we can
write: ∑
c˜∈C<
|pi′′(c˜)| ≤
∑
c˜∈C<
|pi(c˜)|. (A.2)
Then, if we subtract the lefthand side of Equation A.2 from the left
hand side of Equation A.1 and the righthand side of Equation A.2 from
the righthand side of Equation A.1, we get the following inequality:
∑
c′∈C\C<
|pi′′(c′)| ≥
∑
c′∈C\C<
|pi(c′)|. (A.3)
Given that each college in C \ C< ﬁlls its seats in pi, when we subtract∑
c′∈C\(C<∪c)
qc′ from both sides of Equation A.3 we get the following in-
equality:
|pi′′(c)|+
∑
c′∈C\(C<∪c)
(|pi′′(c′)| − qc′) ≥ |pi(c)|. (A.4)
The term
∑
c′∈C\(C<∪c)
(|pi′′(c′)| − qc′) is non-negative since |pi′′(c′)| ≤ qc′ for
all c′ ∈ C \ (C< ∪ c). Therefore, |pi′′(c)| ≥ |pi(c)|.
If |pi′′(c)| = |pi(c)| then |pi′′(c′)| = |pi(c′)| for all c′ ∈ C ∪{c}. This follows
from Equation A.4, Equation A.2, and the fact that |pi′′(c′)| ≤ |pi(c′)| for
all c′ ∈ C \ {c}. Therefore, c cannot export and import more students
and bpi
′′
c = b
pi
c . If |pi′′(c)| > |pi(c)| then at most k more students can be
assigned to a college in pi′′ among the eligible students who were not
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assigned to a college in pi. It is possible that some of students belong to
Sc. Thus, bpi
′′
c ∈ {bpic , ..., bpic + k}.
Thus, by Lemma 1, as we increase the export eligibility quota of college
c by 1 and keep the import quota at q˜c, we have bp˜ic ∈ {bpi′′c − 1, bpi′′c }, and
hence, bp˜ic ∈ {bpic − 1, bpic , ..., bpic + k} .
[Proof of Theorem 2] To prove this theorem, we consider two problems:
[(qc, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ] and [(q′c, q−c), (ec − 1, e−c), P ] with qc ≥ ec and qc ≥
q′c ≥ ec − 1 such that for college c, bµc < 0 for a stable matching µ of the
ﬁrst problem. Let µ′ be a stable matching of the second problem. We want
to show that bµ−c ≥ bµ
′
−c where µ
′ is an arbitrary stable matching for problem
[(q′c, q−c), (ec−1, e−c), P ]. From Proposition 7, we know that bµ′c < 0 or bµ′c = 0.
By Proposition 6, without loss of generality we assume that µ is the outcome
of the sequential DA algorithm for [(qc, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ] and µ′ is the outcome
of the sequential DA algorithm for [(q′c, q−c), (ec − 1, e−c), P ]. We have two
cases:
Case 1: bµ
′
c < 0. We have |µ′(c)| = |Mµ′c | < |Xµ′c | ≤ ec − 1 ≤ min{qc, q′c}.
Hence, as c did not ﬁll its import quota at µ′ under both qc and q′c, in problem
[(qc, q−c), (ec − 1, e−c), P ], µ′ will still be the outcome of DA. Then when we
add a new student i from college c to the set of eligible students, we obtain
problem [(qc, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ]. By Lemma 1, we have b
µ
c′ ∈ {bµ
′
c′ , b
µ′
c′ + 1} for all
c′ ∈ C \ c.
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Case 2: bµ
′
c = 0. There are two possibilities: (1) |µ′(c)| < q′c and (2) |µ′(c)| =
q′c.
1. If |µ′(c)| < q′c, then by Lemma 1, we have bµc′ ∈ {bµ
′
c′ , b
µ′
c′ + 1} for all
c′ ∈ C \ c.
2. If |µ′(c)| = q′c, then |µ′(c)| = ec − 1 = q′c. We ﬁrst increase the import
quota of c from q′c to qc and keep its export eligibility quota at ec − 1.
Suppose the number of students assigned to college c increases at the
outcome of the DA mechanism under [qc, (ec−1, e−c), P ], which we denote
by µ′′, i.e., |µ′′(c)| > |µ′(c)| = ec − 1. Thus, bµ′′c > 0. When we increase
also the export eligibility quota of c from ec− 1 to ec, then by Lemma 1,
bµc ∈ {bµ′′c − 1, bµ′′c , bµ′′c + 1}, and hence, bµc ≥ 0. However, this contradicts
the fact that bµc < 0. Therefore, |µ′′(c)| = |µ′(c)| = q′c ≤ qc. Hence,
under both problems [q′c, (ec − 1, e−c), P ] and [qc, (ec − 1, e−c), P ], DA
chooses the same matching, i.e., µ′′ = µ′. When we increase the export
eligibility quota of c from ec − 1 to ec and keep the import quota at qc,
the DA outcome changes from µ′′ = µ′ to µ. By Lemma 1, we have
bµc′ ∈ {bµ
′
c′ , b
µ′
c′ + 1} for all c′ ∈ C \ c.
In either case, bµ
′
−c ≤ bµ−c.
[Proof of Proposition 9]Consider a graph consisting of students pointing
to their assignments under µ, if there is one; and each such student is pointed
to by her home college. If a student is assigned to her home college then that
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college can form only a trivial cycle, and a student in a trivial cycle is neither
an import nor an export. Therefore, they do not aﬀect the balance proﬁle.
Now consider the other students who are assigned to colleges other than their
home colleges. If each assigned student s is in a cycle with another student
from Sµ(s) then µ is balanced.
Consider the other direction. Suppose µ is a balanced matching that is
not a null matching. First, note that a student who is assigned to her home
college forms a trivial cycle. Remove all these students. If we consider the
remaining ones, we still have a balanced matching. We set C˜ = ∅ and start
with a college c and a student s ∈ Sc such that µ(s) ∈ C. We add c to C˜, i.e.,
C˜ = {c}. We select another student s′ from Sµ(s) such that µ(s′) ∈ C \ µ(s).
Such a student exists by the balancedness of µ. If µ(s′) ∈ C˜ then µ(s′) = c and
we have a cycle (c, s, µ(s), s′). In this case, we remove the students in the cycle
from the problem; the remaining matching is still balanced, and hence, we set
C˜ = ∅, and restart by considering the remaining graph. On the other hand, if
µ(s′) /∈ C˜ then we update C˜ by including µ(s′) , i.e., C˜ = {c, µ(s′)}. Then, we
take a student s′′ ∈ Sµ(s′) such that µ(s′′) ∈ C \ µ(s′). Such a student exists
by balancedness. If µ(s′′) ∈ C˜ then we have a cycle including some of the
colleges in C˜ ∪ µ(s′′) together with some of the students already encountered
and s′′. We remove the students involved in the cycle from the problem. The
remaining matching is still balanced. If µ(s′′) /∈ C˜, we update C˜ by including
µ(s′′), C˜ = {c, µ(s′), µ(s′′)}. Due to ﬁniteness, we will eventually have a cycle.
We continue similarly, and as balancedness is maintained whenever we remove
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students in a cycle, eventually C˜ should be the empty set and all students
should be removed from the problem by balancedness.
[Proof of Proposition 3]Individual Rationality and Respect for
Internal Priorities: We prove individual rationality and respect for internal
priorities for 2S-TTC and for the more general 2S-TTCC that we introduce
for problems that allow colleges to maintain balance within a predetermined
interval. 2S-TTCC also possesses these desirable properties. Individual ratio-
nality and respect for internal priorities for 2S-TTC follow from Theorem 16
in Appendix A.4.
Balancedeﬃciency: Since the matching selected by 2S-TTC consists of
trade cycles in which students and their assignments form unique cycles, its
outcome is balanced by Proposition 9. Let pi be the matching selected by
2S-TTC. Let S(k) be the set of students assigned in Round k of 2S-TTC. We
will prove that pi cannot be Pareto dominated by another balanced matching
in two parts.
Part I: We ﬁrst prove that pi cannot be Pareto dominated by another
individually rational balanced matching. If s ∈ S(1) then pi(s) is the highest
ranked college in her preference list that considers her acceptable. That is, no
agent s ∈ S(1) can be assigned to a better college considering her acceptable.
If there exists a matching ν such that ν(s) s pi(s) then ν(s) considers i
unacceptable. That is, pi cannot be Pareto dominated by another ν in which
at least one student in S(1) is better oﬀ under ν and all students are assigned
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to a college that considers them acceptable.
If a student s ∈ S(2) is not assigned to a more preferred college that
considers her acceptable, then that college should ﬁll its quota in Round 1 by
another student s′. Given s′ is assigned in Round 1, pi(s′) should be her favorite
college among the ones considering her acceptable. That is, in any matching
ν in which s is assigned to pi(s′), student s′ will be made worse oﬀ. Hence,
pi cannot be Pareto dominated by another balanced matching ν in which at
least one student in S(2) is better oﬀ under ν.
We similarly show the same for all other rounds of 2S-TTC. Thus,
no student can be assigned to a better college without harming any other
student among the colleges that consider her acceptable. Hence, no college
can be made better oﬀ without harming another college either, if we focus on
matchings that are individually rational.
Part II: Next we show that there does not exist an individually ir-
rational balanced matching that Pareto dominates pi. To the contrary of the
claim, suppose there exists an individually irrational balanced matching ν that
Pareto dominates pi. Then each i ∈ C ∪ S weakly prefers ν(i) to pi(i) and at
least one agent j ∈ C ∪ S strictly prefers ν(j) to pi(j). Due to the individual
rationality of 2S-TTC, every student weakly prefers her assignment in pi to
being unassigned or to being assigned to an unacceptable college. Therefore,
every assigned student in pi is also assigned to an acceptable college under ν.
Thus, due to the balancedness of both pi and ν, |v(c)| ≥ |pi(c)| for all c ∈ C.
As ν is individually irrational, there exists some college c0 such that s0 ∈ ν(c0)
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is unacceptable for c0. As ν(c0)Rc0pi(c0), there should be at least one student
s1 ∈ ν(c0) \ pi(c0) such that s1 is acceptable for c0 by responsiveness of import
preferences and ν(s1)Ps1pi(s1). We need to consider two cases regarding pi(s1):
1. First, suppose pi(s1) = c∅. Denote the home college of s1 by c1. Hence,
|ν(c1)| > |pi(c1)| by balancedness of ν and pi. As ν(c1) 6= pi(c1), by
responsiveness of import preferences and ν(c1)Rc1pi(c1), there exists a
student s2 ∈ ν(c1) \ pi(c1) such that s2 is acceptable for c1. We also have
ν(s2)Ps2pi(s2).
2. Next, suppose pi(s1) ∈ C. Denote pi(s1) by c1. As ν(c1) ≥ pi(c1), there
exists s2 ∈ ν(c1) \ pi(c1) and s2 is acceptable for c2 due to the responsive
import references and ν(c1)Rc1pi(c1). We also have ν(s2)Ps2pi(s2).
We continue with student s2 and her assignment pi(s2), similarly construct c2
and then s3. As we continue, by ﬁniteness, we should encounter the same
student sk = s` for some k > ` ≥ 1, that is, we encountered her before in the
construction. Consider the students s`+1, s`+2, ..., sk. Let sk′ be the student
who is assigned in the earliest round of 2S-TTC in this list. By deﬁnition
she points to pi(sk′). However, she prefers college ck′−1 to her assignment and
she is acceptable at ck′−1. Moreover, we know that college ck′−1 has not been
removed yet from the algorithm, as if ck′−1 was constructed in Case 1 above
then qck′−1 > |pi(ck′−1)| and sk′−1 ∈ Sck′−1 is still not removed, and if ck′−1
was constructed in Case 2 above then sk′−1 ∈ pi(ck′−1) is still not removed.
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Therefore, sk′ should have pointed to ck′−1 in 2S-TTC in that round. This is
a contradiction to ν Pareto dominating pi.
[Proof of Theorem 6] Here, we use a variant of the 2S-TTC mechanism.
In this variant, we only select one cycle in one round. If there is more than
one cycle, then the selection is done randomly. Let S(k) be the set of students
assigned in Round k of this variant of 2S-TTC. Suppose the theorem does not
hold.
Let ψ be the mechanism satisfying all four axioms and select a diﬀerent
matching for problem [q, e, P ]. Denote the outcome of 2S-TTC for problem
[q, e, P ] by µ. Since both 2S-TTC and ψ are balancedeﬃcient then there exist
at least two students such that one of them prefers her assignment in ψ[q, e, P ]
to the one in µ and the other student prefers her assignment in µ to the one
in ψ[q, e, P ].
We ﬁrst prove the following claim:
Claim: If there exists a student in S(k) who prefers her assignment in
ψ[q, e, P ] to the one in µ, then there exists another student in
k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k) who
prefers her assignment in µ to the one in ψ[q, e, P ].3
We use induction in our proof. Consider the students assigned in Round
1 of 2S-TTC. If S(1) is a singleton then the student in S(1) is assigned to c∅.
3We take
0⋃
k′=1
S(k′) = ∅.
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Any college that she prefers to c∅ considers her unacceptable. If she prefers
her assignment under ψ to c∅ then she is assigned to a college considering her
unacceptable by ψ. Therefore ψ is individually irrational. If she prefers c∅ to
her assignment under ψ then ψ is individually irrational. Then any individually
rational mechanism will assign her to c∅. If S(1) is not a singleton then all
students in S(1) are assigned to the best colleges considering themselves as
acceptable and they prefer their assignment in µ to c∅. If a student prefers her
assignment in ψ[q, e, P ] to her assignment in µ then ψ is individually irrational.
Hence, all students in S(1) weakly prefer their assignment in µ.
In the inductive step, assume that for all Rounds 1,...,k-1, for some k>1,
the claim is correct. Consider Round k. If there exists a student s ∈ S(k) who
prefers college c = ψ[q, e, P ](s) to µ(s) then c considers s acceptable and its
seats are ﬁlled in Rounds 1,...,k-1 of 2S-TTC or s is unacceptable for c. In the
latter case, ψ is individually irrational. Consider the former case. Let student
s′ be assigned to c under µ in a Round k′ ≤ k-1 but not under ψ[q, e, P ], as s is
assigned instead of her. If she prefers her assignment in c to ψ[q, e, P ](s′) then
we are done. If she does not, k′ >1, and by the inductive step, there exists a
student s′′ ∈ S(k′′) for some k′′ <k′ who prefers µ(s′′) to ψ[q, e, P ](s′′).
Now we are ready to prove the theorem. Let student s ∈ S(k) prefer
µ(s) to ψ[q, e, P ](s) and µ(s′) = ψ[q, e, P ](s′) for all s′ ∈
k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k′). Such a
student exists by the Claim, as µ 6= ψ[q, e, P ].
We will construct our proof in three steps. Assign to each round of
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2S-TTC mechanism a counter and set it as Counter(k′) = |S(k′)|−1 for all k′.
Step 1: Construct a preference proﬁle P˜ as follows: Let student s ∈ Sc
rank only µ(s) as acceptable in P˜s and P˜−s = P−s. 2S-TTC will select µ for
problem [q, e, P˜ ]. Since ψ is student strategy-proof, ψ[q, e, P˜ ](s) = c∅.
Then, we check whether the assignments of students in
k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k′) are
the same in ψ[q, e, P˜ ] and µ. If not, then for some k˜ < k, there exists a student
s˜ ∈ S(k˜) preferring µ(s˜) to ψ[q, e, P˜ ](s˜) and each student in
˜k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k′) gets
the same college in µ and ψ[q, e, P˜ ] . Then repeat this step by taking P := P˜ ,
s := s˜, and k := k˜.
This repetition will end by the ﬁniteness of rounds and the fact that
0⋃
k′=1
S(k′) = ∅. When all students in
k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k′) get the same college in µ and
ψ[q, e, P˜ ] then we proceed to Step 2.
Step 2: In Step 1, we have shown that s prefers µ(s) to ψ[q, e, P˜ ](s).
Suppose c is the home college of s. Set e˜c equal to the rank of student s in her
home college's internal priority order, that is, e˜c = rc(s), and let e˜−c = e−c.
In the problem [q, e˜, P˜ ], 2S-TTC assigns all students in
k⋃
k′=1
S(k′) to the same
college as in µ. Student s is unassigned in ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ] since ψ respects internal
priorities. We check whether the assignments of students in
k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k′) are the
same in both ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ] and µ. If not, then by the Claim, there should exist a
student s˜ ∈ S(k˜) preferring µ(s˜) to ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ](s˜) and each student in
˜k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k′)
gets the same college in µ and ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ] where k˜ < k; then we restart from
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Step 1 by taking P := P˜ , s := s˜, k := k˜, and e := e˜.
Eventually, by the ﬁniteness of the rounds of 2S-TTC and as we reduce
the round k in each iteration, we reach the point in our proof such that students
in
k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k′) get the same college in µ and ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ].
Observe that s is the last remaining eligible student of the home college
c in Round k of 2S-TTC for problem [q, e˜, P˜ ] by the choice of e˜c being equal to
the ranking of s in c. As for all s′ ∈
k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k′) we have µ(s′) = ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ](s′)
and ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ](s) = c∅, the student s′ ∈ S(k)∩µ(c) will be assigned to a diﬀerent
college in ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ] than c. Otherwise, ψ fails to be balanced. Moreover, as for
all s′′ ∈
k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k′), µ(s′′) = ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ](s′′) and s′ points to the best available col-
lege that ﬁnds her acceptable in Round k of 2S-TTC, c = µ(s′)P˜s′ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ](s′).
We decrease Counter(k) by 1. If Counter(k) > 0 then we turn back to Step 1
by taking P := P˜ and s := s′; and otherwise continue with Step 3.
Step 3: By construction above, each student s˜ ∈ S(k) ranks only µ(s˜)
as acceptable in P˜s and she is the last certiﬁed student by her home college
in problem [q, e˜, P˜ ]. In Step 2, we showed that there exist at least 2 students
s1, s2 ∈ S(k) who are not assigned to µ(s1) and µ(s2) = c1, respectively,
in ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ], where c1 is the home college of s1. Then, they are assigned to
ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ], by the individual rationality of ψ. Recall that in 2S-TTC for [q, e˜, P˜ ],
each student certiﬁed by the home colleges of s1 and s2  colleges c1 and c2,
respectively  other than s1 and s2 are removed in a round earlier than k.
Suppose for student s3 ∈ S(k), µ(s3) = c2. Since ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ](s2) = c∅, for all
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s˜ ∈
k-1⋃
k′=1
S(k′), ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ](s˜) = µ(s˜) (by Step 2), and ψ is balanced, student
s3 cannot be assigned to c2 in ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ], and hence, ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ](s3) = c∅. We
continue similarly with s3 and home college of s3, say college c3, eventually
showing that for all s˜ ∈ S(k), ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ](s˜) = c∅. Recall that students in S(k)
had formed a trading cycle in which each agent in the cycle was assigned the
home college of the next student in the cycle in µ. Thus, ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ] is Pareto
dominated by the balanced matching ν obtained as ν(s˜) = ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ](s˜) for all
s˜ ∈ S \ S(k) and ν(s˜) = µ(s˜) for all s˜ ∈ S(k); that is, ν is obtained from
ψ[q, e˜, P˜ ] by students in S(k) trading their assignments with each other to get
their assignments in µ. This contradicts the balancedeﬃciency of ψ. Hence,
ψ[q, e, P ] = µ, i.e., ψ is equivalent to 2S-TTC.
The following Lemma is used in proving Theorem 5 and Theorem 10:
Lemma 2 Let pi and p˜i be the matching selected by 2S-TTC for problems
[q, e, P ] and [(q˜c, q−c), (e˜c, e−c), P ] where q˜c ≤ qc and e˜c ≤ ec. M p˜ic j Mpic and
X p˜ic j Xpic .
We have two cases to consider:
Case 1: q˜c ≤ qc and e˜c < ec. We consider the case in which one more
student is certiﬁed by college c. Denote the student added to the eligible set by
s. Let rc(s′) = rc(s)−1. Consider the execution of the 2S-TTC mechanism for
this new problem. If college c imports q˜c students before student s's turn then
college c will be removed and certifying one more student will not aﬀect the
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set of students exported and imported by c. Now consider the case in which
college c imports less than q˜c before student s's turn. Denote the intermediate
matching that we have just after s′ is assigned by ν. Since c is removed just
after the student s′ is assigned in problem [(q˜c, q−c), (e˜c, e−c), P ], M p˜ic = M
ν
c
and X p˜ic = X
ν
c . If s is assigned to a college c
′ ∈ C \ c, college c will import one
more acceptable student. Denote that matching by µ. Given one more student
is exported and imported compared to the ones in ν we have Mpic = M
ν
c $Mµc
and Xpic = X
ν
c $ Xµc . If s is assigned to the null college, then college c will
have the same import and export set. If we keep certifying students until ec
we will have Mpic j Mµ
′
c and X
pi
c j Xµ
′
c where µ
′ is the matching selected
by 2S-TTC for problem [(q˜c, q−c), e, P ]. Note that it is also possible to have
Mpic &Mµ
′
c and X
pi
c & Xµ
′
c if one of the student with internal rank between e˜c
and ec is assigned to a college in C in matching µ′.
Case 2: q˜c < qc and e˜c = ec. Let pi and p˜i be the matchings that the 2S-
TTC mechanism selects for problems [q, e, P ] and [(q˜c, q−c), e, P ], respectively.
If |Mνc | < q˜c then 2S-TTC will select the exactly same cycles when college
c reports its true import quota. Therefore, Mpic = M
p˜i
c and X
pi
c = X
p˜i
c . If
|Mνc | = q˜c and if c leaves the market after all its eligible students are considered,
then it will not make a diﬀerence if college c reports its true quota. If |Mνc | = q˜c
and if c leaves the market before all its eligible students are considered, then at
least one more student s ∈ Sc will be considered in 2S-TTC. As in the previous
case college c may import and export at least one more student. At the end
we get M p˜ic $ Mpic and X p˜ic $ Xpic if some of the students who are considered
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only when c reports qc are assigned. Otherwise, Mpic = M
p˜i
c and X
pi
c = X
p˜i
c .
[Proof of Theorem 5]Take a problem [q, e, P ]. Take a college c. Suppose that
preference reports are ﬁxed such that c does not report any of unacceptable
students as acceptable in these reports. We have two cases to consider for
possible quota manipulations by college c:
Case 1: College c reports q˜c ≤ qc and e˜c ≤ |Sc|: In Lemma 2 we
have shown that when college c reports its import and certiﬁcation quota as
higher, the set of students imported by college c (weakly) expands. Given that
college preferences are responsive over the incoming students, then reporting
q˜c ≤ qc and e˜c ≤ |Sc| is weakly dominated by reporting true import quota and
certifying all students.
Case 2: College c reports q˜c > qc: This strategy is weakly dominated
by reporting its true import quota qc. We show this as follows: Let ν and µ be
the matchings that the 2S-TTC mechanism selects when c reports q˜c and qc,
respectively. If |Mνc | ≤ qc, thenMνc = Mµc and Xνc = Xµc ; thus, it is indiﬀerent
between the two matchings. However, if |Mνc | > qc, as import preferences are
only responsive up to true import quota and µ is individually rational, then it
prefers µ to ν.
Lemma 3 and 4 are used in proving Proposition 13:
Lemma 3 Let µk be the matching selected in some Round k of RDA and
e˜c be the number of students certiﬁed by c when RDA terminates in problem
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[q, e, P ]. If bµkc > 0, then e˜c ≥ min{ekc + bµkc , ec} where ekc is the number of
students certiﬁed by college c in Round k.
Suppose not. Since e˜c < min{ekc + bµkc , ec}, the number of additional
students certiﬁed from college c until the end of the RDA after Round k is less
than bµkc > 0. Thus, by Proposition 12, the balance of c cannot fall more than
bµkc after Round k until the end of RDA, and hence c runs a positive balance at
the end of RDA. Since e˜c < min{ekc + bµkc , ec}, college c has additional students
to certify when RDA terminates, which contradicts the termination condition
of RDA.
Lemma 4 Let µk be the matching selected in some Round k of RDA and ekc
be the number of students certiﬁed by college c in that round. Let νk,m be the
tentative matching selected in some Step m of the sequential DA algorithm
in Round k of RDA. Let ek,mc be the number of students sponsored by college
c who already made oﬀers in the sequential DA and got matched to either
a real college or null college in νk,m. If b
νk,m
c − ekc + ek,mc > 0 then bµkc ≥
b
νk,m
c − ekc + ek,mc > 0.
In each step of the sequential DA an unassigned student is considered
and a student will be removed from her seat only if another one replaced her.
That is, in the sequential DA the number of students assigned to college c in
Step m+1 cannot be less than what it is in Step m, i.e., |νk,m(c)| ≤ |νk,m+1(c)|.
Therefore, |Mνk,mc | ≤ |Mµkc |. In Round k of RDA, the maximum number of
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students exported from college c can be |Xνk,mc | + (ekc − ek,mc ). Then bµkc ≥
|Mνk,mc | − |Xνk,mc | − (ekc − ek,mc ) = bνk,mc − ekc + ek,mc .
[Proof of Proposition 13]Consider two diﬀerent orders (selection rules)
in RDA. Denote the outcome of the ﬁrst order by µ′ and the outcome of
the second one by µ′′. The outcome of RDA equals the outcome of the DA
mechanism for the given set of certiﬁed students in the last round. Denote
the set of eligible students in the last round of the two orders by E ′ and E ′′,
respectively. Let k be the ﬁrst round that diﬀerent students are certiﬁed.
Given that the sets of students certiﬁed in the previous rounds, E(k− 1), are
the same, we have µ′k−1 = µ
′′
k−1. Let s
′ and s′′ be the students certiﬁed in
round k by two diﬀerent selection rules, respectively. By Lemma 3, we have
{s′, s′′} ⊂ E ′∩E ′′. Moreover, any students certiﬁed in Round k are in E ′∩E ′′.
Then consider the last round of the ﬁrst selection rule. We run the sequential
DA in the last round. The outcome of the sequential DA is independent of the
order of students considered (McVitie andWilson, 1971). We consider students
one by one, and if a student who was tentatively accepted in an earlier step
is rejected, we consider her in the next step; otherwise, we consider a student
who has not been considered yet. We ﬁrst consider students in E(k−1). Then
we consider student s′′. In some later steps we will get the matching µ′′k. By
Lemmas 3 and 4 the set of students who are guaranteed to be certiﬁed as a
consequence of µ′′k should be in E
′. Therefore, the student who is certiﬁed in
Round k based on the second selection rule is in E ′. Then we consider her in
the next step of the sequential DA. We continue similarly and show that any
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student certiﬁed based on the second selection rule is in E ′. That is E ′′ ⊆ E ′.
We can also start with considering s′ and show that any student certiﬁed based
on the second selection rule is in E ′′. Therefore E ′ = E ′′. Thus, µ′ = µ′′.
We ﬁrst state and prove the following lemma, which is used in proving
Theorem 7.
Lemma 5 If a student s′ ∈ Sc˜ is assigned to college c′ by RDA in problem
[q, e, P ], then she will be assigned to c′ by RDA in [q, e, (P˜s′ , P−s′)] where P˜s′ :
c′ − c∅.
Let E and E˜ be the set of students who are considered in the last round
of RDA for problems [q, e, P ] and [q, e, (P˜s′ , P−s′)], respectively. First, we show
that E˜ ⊆ E. First note that certiﬁcation of student s′ does not depend on
the preference list she submits. Therefore she is certiﬁed in problem [q, e, P ]
if and only if she is certiﬁed in problem [q, e, (P˜s′ , P−s′)]. We look at the case
in which she is certiﬁed, i ∈ E and i ∈ E˜.
Consider the following variation of the RDA mechanism. In each round,
use the sequential DA mechanism and consider s′ as the last student if he is
an eligible student in that round. Before the turn of student s′, calculate the
balance of each college. By Propositions 4 and 13, we certify a student from a
college c′′ ∈ C \ {c˜} if college c′′ has a positive balance. Otherwise, if c˜ has a
positive balance and s′ is not eligible then certify a student from college c˜. If
s′ is eligible and we cannot certify a student from colleges in c′′ ∈ C \{c˜}, then
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we certify a student from c˜ as long as its balance is greater than 1. Due to
ﬁniteness we cannot update the set of eligible students and we need to consider
student s′. Denote the set of students certiﬁed so far by E0. Note that s′ ∈ E0.
Denote the round that we consider s′ by k.
When s′ reports Ps′ , due to population monotonicity and the fact that
E0 ⊆ E, in Round k s′ is assigned to college c′′, which is weakly better than c′.
Then consider the last round of the problem when s′ submits Ps′ . The outcome
of RDA when s′ submits is equal to the outcome of DA mechanism for problem
[C,E, q,, P ]. Due to strategy-proofness the DA mechanism will assign stu-
dent s′ to c′ in problem [C,E, q,, (P˜s′ , P−s′)]. Due to resource monotonicity s′
will be assigned to c′ by the DA mechanism in problem [C,E0, q,, (P˜s′ , P−s′)].
Note that [C,E0, q,, (P˜s′ , P−s′)] is the problem that we consider in Round k
when s′ submits P˜s′ . Therefore, s′ will be assigned to c′ in Round k of the
RDA mechanism when she submits P˜s′ . If the mechanism terminates in this
round when s reports P˜s, then we are done: E˜ = E0 and E˜ ⊆ E.
If the mechanism does not terminate in this round when s′ reports
P˜s′ , then we need to check two cases. In the rest of our analysis we consider
the sequential DA mechanism and s′ is the last student taken into account in
Round k. Either s causes rejection of another student, s1, from college c′ or s
is assigned to c′ and the balance of c′ becomes positive.
Case 1: We ﬁrst show that student s1 will be rejected by college c′
in the last round of RDA for problem [C, S, q, e,, P ]. Let ν be the tentative
matching selected by the sequential DA just before the turn of student s′
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in [C,E0, q,, (P˜s′ , P−s′)]. When we apply the sequential DA to the problem
[C, S, q, e,, P ] by ﬁrst considering the students in E0\s′ and then the student
s′, we get the same tentative matching ν just before the turn of s′. Since s1
is rejected from c′ when s′ applies in [C,E0, q,, (P˜s′ , P−s′)], it should be the
case that |ν(c′)| = qc′ and s1 has the lowest priority among the students in
ν(c′). Given the fact that s′ is assigned to c′ in [C, S, q, e,, P ], s′ /∈ ν(c′) and
|ν(c′)| = qc′ at least one of the students in ν(c′) has to be rejected. Since s1
has the lowest priority, she cannot be assigned to s′ in the outcome selected
for problem [C, S, q, e,, P ]. Student s1 will apply to her next choice in both
problem [C,E, q,, P ] and [C,E0, q,, (P˜s′ , P−s)]. We consider the following
subcases.
• If her next choice is c∅, then she will be assigned to c∅ and we get the
ﬁnal allocation of the sequential DA mechanism for problem [C,E0, q,
, (P˜s′ , P−s)]. Moreover, this is the outcome of the Round k of RDA
when s′ submits P˜s′ . Due to the updating procedure described above in
matching ν, all the colleges except c˜ either have a non-positive balance
or they have reached their certiﬁcation quota and bνc˜ = 1. If s1 ∈ Sc˜,
then c˜ has positive balance of 1 in the ﬁnal allocation selected in Round
k when s′ submits P˜s′ . If s1 ∈ Sc1 6=c˜, then bνc1 = 0 and the balance of c1
becomes 1. Then one more student will be certiﬁed by the home college
of s1. Let s2 be that student. Suppose s2 /∈ E. We apply the sequential
DA in problem [C,E, q,, P ]. We consider students in the same order
we described above. When we get matching ν the balance of the home
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college of s2 is either 0 or 1. The latter case is true if s2 ∈ Sc˜. By the
deﬁnition of the sequential DA the number of students assigned to the
home college of s2 in ν is weakly less than the one in the ﬁnal allocation.
If s2 /∈ Sc˜ then the number of students exported by the home college of s2
will be less than that in ν. This follows from the fact that ν(s1) ∈ C and
s1 is assigned to c∅ in the ﬁnal allocation. Therefore, the home college of
s2 has a positive balance in the ﬁnal allocation and has one more student
to certify. If s2 ∈ Sc˜, then the number of students exported by the home
college of s2 cannot be more than that in ν. Given that bνc˜ = 1, college c˜
has a positive balance in the ﬁnal allocation and has one more student
to certify. Both cases contradict with the termination condition of RDA.
Repeat case 1 by taking s1 = s2.
• If the next choice of s1 is c′′ ∈ C, |ν(c′′)| = qc′′ and all students in ν(c′′)
have higher priority for c′′ than s1 then s1 will be rejected from c′′ when
she applies in [C,E0, q,, (P˜s, P−s)]. She will also be rejected from c′′
in [C,E, q,, P ]. To show this, consider the steps of the sequential DA
applied in the last round when s′ reports Ps′ . Consider the students in
the same order described above. We have shown that s1 will be rejected
from c′ and will apply to c′′ above. From the deﬁnition of the sequential
DA all students assigned to c′′ when s1 applies will have at least high
priority as the student with the lowest priority in ν(c′′). Given that the
student with the lowest priority in ν(c′′) has higher priority than s1, she
cannot be assigned to c′′ . Therefore, in both problems s1 will apply to
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her next best choice. Repeat case 1 for the next best choice of s1.
• If the next choice of s1 is c′′ ∈ C and either |ν(c′′)| < qc′′ or at least
one student in ν(c′′) has lower priority for c′′ than s1 then s1 will be
tentatively accepted when she applies to c′′ in [C,E0, q,, (P˜s, P−s)]. If
|ν(c′′)| < qc′′ , then the sequential DA mechanism will terminate and
college c′′ will have a positive balance and certify one more student in
problem [C,E0, q,, (P˜s, P−s)]. For the same reasons explained in the
subcase 1 that student is in E. If there exists a student in ν(c′′) with
lower priority than s1 and |ν(c′′)| = qc′′ , then that student will be re-
placed with s1. Denote that student by s2. She will be also be rejected
from the same college in problem [C,E, q,, P ]. To see this, apply the
sequential DA mechanism by ﬁrst considering students in E0 \s′ in prob-
lem [C,E, q,, P ]. All the other students assigned to c′′ are preferred to
s2 by college c′′. Then she will be the ﬁrst agent to be rejected. Since s1
will apply to c′′ in the following steps in problem [C,E, q,, P ]. Repeat
case 1 by taking s1 = s2.
Case 2: In the second case when s′ applies to c′, the sequential DA mechanism
will terminate and we will get the allocation of Round k of RDA when s′
submits P˜s′ . As explained above, bνc′ = 0, and it becomes positive when s
′
applies. Therefore it certiﬁes one more student. We denote that student by
s˜. We can show that s˜ is also in E by following the similar steps in the ﬁrst
subcase of case 1.
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If we continue, we will see that the student certiﬁed when we consider
[C,E0, q,, (P˜s, P−s)] will be in E. For the next round, update E0 by adding
the new student certiﬁed and repeat the same rounds. Therefore, E˜ ⊆ E.
In problem [C,E, q,, (P˜s, P−s)] student s will be assigned to c′ by the
DA mechanism. Otherwise, strategy-proofness of the DA mechanism would
be violated. Moreover, DA will assign s to c′ in problem [C, E˜, q,, (P˜s, P−s)].
Otherwise, resource monotonicity would be violated.
[Proof of Theorem 7]Suppose not. Suppose that s ∈ Sc can beneﬁt from
misreporting her preferences. Let Ps be the true preference of s. Let c be the
best college that student s can be assigned by misreporting her preferences. As
a consequence of the claim, she will be assigned to c if she submits P˜s : c− c∅.
We ﬁrst show that student s will be assigned college c when she submits
˜˜Ps : c
′ − c− c∅ where c′ is the college just ranked above c in Ps.
We use the variant of RDA deﬁned in Lemma 5. In addition, in step
k we take the outcome of step k-1 as an intermediate (tentative) matching of
the sequential DA mechanism and continue with the student certiﬁed in step
k. Let O be the ordered list of students who applied after the application
of student i to college c by reporting P˜s. That is, o1 is the student who is
just considered after the application of i to college c. Student o1 can be the
student who was rejected from college c or the one who is certiﬁed because
college c has a positive balance after the application of s. Since student s stays
in college c, O does not contain student s. Note that a student can be listed
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in O more than once. Denote the tentative matching that the sequential DA
selects just before it is the turn of s by ν. Let O˜ be the ordered list of students
who applied after the application of student i to college c′ by reporting ˜˜Ps and
before the application of i to c.
Now consider the possible cases when s submits ˜˜Ps.
Case 1: Let all students tentatively assigned to college c′, ν(c′), be
more preferred by college c′. Then, s will be rejected from c′ without changing
anything and apply to c. Therefore, she will get c when she adds c′.
Case 2: Let there exist at least one student in ν(c′) who is less preferred
to s by college c′ or |ν(c′)| < qc′ . The student rejected from c′ or the one newly
certiﬁed will be o˜1 and we can ﬁnd all the students in O˜. Note that s will be
in O˜ because s will be rejected from college c′.
Case 2.1: If O˜ and O are disjoint, then when s applies to c she starts
the same O list and she will be assigned to c at the end.
Case 2.2: If O˜ and O have common students, we claim that O˜ is
a subset of O. After s is rejected from c′ then she will apply to c and the
rejection list O will start. At some point we reach a student in O˜. Given that
O˜ is a cycle and all the students have been moved along the cycle, we skip
the cycle. We will continue with the same student who is placed just after the
cycle O˜ in O. Therefore, nothing will change.
Therefore, s can get c by submitting ˜˜Ps : c′−c−c∅. We can continue by
adding the college just ranked above c′ in Ps. We need to check whether the
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cycle that we will have intersects with O˜ or not. If they intersect, exactly the
same students will be in both cycles. Then we repeat the same cases discussed
above. Then we will do this for all colleges ranked above c and get the upper
portion of the preference list.
[Proof of Proposition 14]RDA terminates when the matching selected
in the last round is balanced, or for each college c with a positive balance,
e˜c = ec. If µ is balanced then Bµ = 0. Since aggregate balance of any other
matching cannot be negative, Bµ ≤ Bν holds. Thus, suppose µ is not balanced
and the second case is true. Apply DA to the problem [q, e′, P ] (recall that
e′ ≥ e˜). Denote its outcome by ν ′.
Next we show that the number of students imported to any college
in matching ν ′ cannot be less than the number of students imported at µ.
Suppose this is not true and there exists a college c′ ∈ C where |Mµc′| > |Mν
′
c′ |.
Recall that, as no student ﬁnds her home school acceptable, students imported
and assigned are the same for each school under any individually rational
matching. Then, there exists a student i such that µ(i) = c′ and ν ′(i) 6= c′.
Since qc ≥ |Mµc′| and |Mµc′ | > |Mν
′
c′ | then qc > |Mν′c′ |. Hence by stability of ν ′
for [q, e′, P ], student i should prefer ν ′(i) to c′ = µ(i). This contradicts the
population monotonicity of DA, as µ, the outcome of RDA, is, by deﬁnition,
the outcome of DA in problem [q, e˜, P ] while ν ′ is the outcome of DA for
[q, e′, P ].
Let C+ be the set of colleges having a positive balance in µ. Recall
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that for all c ∈ C+, e˜c = ec, and hence, e˜c = e′c = ec. Since DA is population
monotonic, a student who is assigned to c∅ in µ is also assigned to c∅ in ν ′.
Therefore, Xµc ⊇ Xν′c for all c ∈ C+.
For any matching µ′, by deﬁnition
∑
c∈C
bµ
′
c = 0. Since
∑
c∈C+
|bµc | =
∑
c∈C+
bµc
and
∑
c∈C\C+
|bµc | = −
∑
c∈C\C+
bµc (recall that C \C+ is the set of zero and negative
balance colleges at µ), ∑
c∈C\C+
|bµc | =
∑
c∈C+
|bµc |. (A.5)
On the other hand, Xµc ⊇ Xν′c and |Mµc | ≤ |Mν′c | for all c ∈ C+ together imply
colleges in C+ have also positive balances at ν ′ and∑
c∈C+
|bµc | =
∑
c∈C+
bµc =
∑
c∈C+
|Mµc |−|Xµc | ≤
∑
c∈C+
|Mν′c |−|Xν
′
c | =
∑
c∈C+
bν
′
c =
∑
c∈C+
|bν′c |.
(A.6)
This together with
∑
c∈C
bν
′
c = 0 imply that
∑
c∈C\C+
|bν′c | ≥ −
∑
c∈C\C+
bν
′
c =
∑
c∈C+
bν
′
c =
∑
c∈C+
|bν′c |. (A.7)
Thus, Equations A.5, A.6, and A.7 together with Proposition 6 imply that
Bµ =
∑
c∈C
|bµc | ≤
∑
c∈C
|bν′c | = Bν′ = Bν .
[Proof of Theorem 8] Suppose there exists a mechanism, ϕ, satisfying
all three properties. Consider the following example. There are ﬁve colleges
C = {a, b, c, d, e} and six export candidates: Sa = {1,2}, Sb = {3,4}, Sc =
{5}, Sd = {6,7}, and Se = {8}. The true import and export eligibility quotas
for each college are: qa = 2, qx = 1 for all x ∈ C \ a and ex = |Sx| for all
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x ∈ C. The internal priority of colleges : 1 a 2, 3 b 4, 6 b 7. All students
are acceptable to each college. The preference proﬁle of students is:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
b d a c b c a a
e c∅ c∅ c∅ d c∅ c∅ c∅
c∅ c∅
Denote the outcome of mechanism ϕ by µ. We consider the following
cases.
Case 1. µ(1) = b:
Step 1: We ﬁrst show that µ(3) = a.
Suppose not. Then µ(3) = c∅. Otherwise individual rationality would
be violated. Since µ(3) = c∅, the best possible case for college b is that
µ(4) = c. College b prefers any matching in which 3 is assigned to a college
to a matching in which 3 is assigned to c∅, due to responsiveness on outgoing
student preferences. Thus, by strategy-proofness for college b, 3 would be
assigned to c∅ again if college b sets eb = 1. Let this matching be ν. Due to
balancedness for b, ν(1) 6= b, as its only sponsored student 3 is assigned to c∅.
By strategy-proofness and individual rationality for 1, when eb = 1, if
1 reports P1 = b− c∅ (i.e., e as unacceptable), then ϕ will assign him to c∅.
Now eb = 1, P1 = b − c∅. By strategy-proofness for a in quota ma-
nipulation (i.e., for the same reasons mentioned for college b above), if a sets
ea = 1, 1 should be assigned to c∅. Now ea = 1, eb = 1, P1 = b − c∅. In this
problem 3 cannot be assigned to a due to the balancedness for college a, whose
only sponsored student 1 is assigned to c∅. However, the matching selected
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in the new problem is Pareto dominated by the matching in which 1 and 3
are assigned to b and a, respectively, and all the other students keep their as-
signment. A contradiction to balanced-eﬃciency of ϕ. Hence we showed that
µ(3) = a.
Step 2: Due to the balancedness for b, which ﬁlls its unique quota with
1, we also have µ(4) = c∅.
Step 3: We also claim that µ(5) = d and µ(6) = c.
Note that due to the balancedness for d, which has a unique quota to
ﬁll in the original problem, and individual rationality, µ(5) = d if and only if
µ(6) = c. If this claim is not true, then both students are unassigned. How-
ever, if d sets ed = 1, by strategy-proofness (i.e., for the same reasons we have
explained for college b above), then both 5 and 6, the unique sponsored stu-
dents of c and d, respectively, remain assigned to c∅. This contradicts balanced
eﬃciency, as 5 and 6 could have been matched to d and c, respectively.
Step 4: All other students are assigned to c∅.
We have shown that in the initial problem, any mechanism satisfying
all properties mentioned in the theorem and assigning 1 selects the following
matching: Given that µ(1) = b, we have µ(2) = c∅, µ(3) = a, µ(4) = c∅,
µ(5) = d, µ(6) = c, µ(7) = c∅, and µ(8) = c∅.
Step 5: Now consider the initial problem. Suppose a reports 3 as
unacceptable. Denote the new matching selected in this case by µ′. Due to
the individual rationality µ′(3) = c∅. We claim that µ′(4) = c and µ′(5) = b.
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Due to balancedness and individual rationality, if µ′(5) = b then µ′(4) = c.
We consider the following two cases: (1) µ′(4) = c∅. In this case µ′(5) 6= b due
to balancedness. If 5 announces P5 = b−∅, then she will be assigned to c∅ due
to strategy-proofness. In that case, 4 cannot be assigned to any college due to
balancedness for c and individual rationality. Therefore, the Paretoimproving
trade between 4 and 5 is omitted. (2) µ′(4) = c and µ′(5) 6= b. Then µ′(5) = d
by balancedness for c. For similar reasons, if 5 announces P5 = b − ∅, the
mechanism violates balancedeﬃciency: again, a contradiction. We showed
that µ′(4) = c and µ′(5) = b.
Due to balancedeﬃciency we have: µ′(1) = e, µ′(2) = d, µ′(3) = c∅,
µ′(4) = c, µ′(5) = b, µ′(6) = c∅, µ′(7) = a and µ′(8) = a. College a beneﬁts
from misreporting 3 as unacceptable, because Xµ
′
a = {1,2} and Xµa = {1},
and as its preferences are responsive over export students, it prefers µ′ to µ.
Case 2. µ(1) = e: Suppose 1 reports P1 = b−∅. She will be assigned
to c∅ due to strategy-proofness. Note that a prefers any matching in which
1 is assigned to a college to a matching in which she is assigned to c∅, by
responsiveness of its preferences over export students. Thus, if a sets ea = 1
(while P1 = b − ∅) then 1 should not be assigned to b and should remain
assigned to c∅ in order ϕ not to violate immunity to quota manipulation.
Then, in this new problem 3 cannot be assigned to a due to balancedness, as
1 is the only sponsored student of a and she is assigned to c∅. In this new
problem, if b sets eb = 1 (that is while ea = 1 and P1 = b − ∅) then 3 should
be assigned to c∅ due to the immunity to quota manipulation (this is true, as
b prefers every matching in which 3 is assigned to a college to any matching
in which she is assigned to c∅, by responsiveness). Moreover, 1 should be
assigned to c∅ due to the balancedness of b and individual rationality for 1.
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Therefore, a Paretoimproving trade between 1 and 3 being assigned to b and
a, respectively, exists. This contradicts the balancedeﬃciency of ϕ.
Case 3. µ(1) = c∅: Then µ(8) = c∅ by balancedness for e, as no
student is assigned to e in µ by individual rationality. This violates balanced
eﬃciency. Welfare can be improved by assigning 1 to e and 8 to a.
Case 4. µ(1) ∈ {c, d}: This violates individual rationality.
[Proof of Proposition 9]We need to show that the 2S-TTC mechanism
satisﬁes all axioms mentioned in the theorem. In Theorem 3 we have shown
that the 2S-TTC mechanism is individually rational, balancedeﬃcient, and
respects internal priorities under responsive preferences over the incoming stu-
dents. The proofs of individual rationality and respecting internal priorities do
not depend on any assumption about the preferences of colleges. Similarly, the
proof of strategy-proofness for students does not depend on any assumption
about the preferences of colleges. Therefore, individual rationality, respecting
internal priorities, and strategy-proofness for students of 2S-TTC follow from
the proof of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. In the proof of balancedeﬃciency
of 2S-TTC under responsive preferences over the incoming students (Theo-
rem 3), we use the responsive preferences in the second part, where we have
shown that the outcome of 2S-TTC mechanism cannot be Pareto dominated
by a balanced and individually irrational matching. Under the no unaccept-
able import students assumption, we do not need to use responsiveness over
the incoming students, because a college would be always worse oﬀ compared
to the outcome of the 2S-TTC mechanism when an unacceptable student is
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assigned to it. Therefore, there does not exist a balanced and individually
irrational matching that Pareto dominates the outcome of the 2S-TTC mech-
anism under the assumption of no unacceptable import students. In order to
show that there does not exist a balanced and individually rational matching
that Pareto dominates the outcome of 2S-TTC mechanism, we can follow Step
1 of the same proof.
In showing that the 2S-TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism sat-
isfying all these axioms (Theorem 6), we did not use the assumption of re-
sponsive preferences over incoming students. Therefore, we can follow the
same steps in showing that under the assumption of no unacceptable import
students, the 2S-TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying the ax-
ioms.
[Proof of Theorem 10]Take a problem [q, e, P ]. Take a college c. We
have two cases to consider for possible quota manipulations by college c:
Case 1: College c reports q˜c ≤ qc and e˜c ≤ |Sc|: In Lemma 2, we have
shown that when college c over-reports its import and certiﬁcation quotas the
set of students exported by college c (weakly) expands. Given that college
preferences are responsive over the outgoing students, then reporting q˜c and e˜c
is weakly dominated by reporting true import quota and certifying all students.
Case 2: College c reports q˜c > qc: This strategy is weakly dominated
by reporting its true import quota qc. We show this as follows: Let ν and µ be
the matchings that the 2S-TTC mechanism selects when c reports q˜c and qc,
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respectively. If |Mνc | ≤ qc, thenMνc = Mµc and Xνc = Xµc ; thus, it is indiﬀerent
between the two matchings. However, if |Mνc | > qc, then the feasibility of
matching ν is violated.
A.4 Tuition Exchange Problem with Tolerance: Two
Sided TopTradingCyclesandChains Mechanism
In the previous sections, we focused on the case where each college is
required to have a zero balance. In this appendix, we relax the zero balance
constraint and allow colleges to maintain a balance within an interval [l, u]
where l ≤ 0 ≤ u.4 When either l or u equals zero, the problem turns into the
case we studied in Section 1.6.
When we allow the colleges to hold a non-zero balance, then there may
exist some colleges exporting (importing) more students than they import (ex-
port). In this case we cannot represent all the allocations by cycles. Therefore
we need to consider chains in addition to the cycles.
Formally, a chain is deﬁned as an ordered list of college-student pairs
(c1, s1, c2, s2, ..., ck) such that:
• college c1 points to student s1,
• student s1 points to college c2,
• : :
4Here, l and u are integers.
171
• college ck−1 points to student sk−1,
• student sk−1 points to college ck.
We refer to the college c1 as the tail and college ck as the head of the chain.
We only consider chain that does not cause the violation of the interval limits,
which we call valid chain.
In this section we use a mechanism similar to the toptradingcycles
andchains (TTCC) mechanism introduced by Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004).
We refer to it as the two-sided top-trading-cycles-and-chains mechanism (2S-
TTCC). For a given tuition exchange problem and an interval the 2S-TTCC
mechanism selects the outcome as follows.
Two-Sided Top Trading Cycles and Chains:
Step 0: Let pi(c) be the random number assigned to college c ∈ C. Assign
two counters for each college c ∈ C, oqc and oec, and set them equal to qc
and ec, respectively. These track remaining quotas for imports and exports,
respectively. Let bc track the current balance of the college c in the ﬁxed
portion of the matching. Initially set bc = 0 for each college c. Assign only an
export counter for the null college c∅ and set it equal to |S|.
Step 1: Each student points to her favorite college in C ∪ c∅, which considers
her acceptable, and each college c ∈ C points to the student s ∈ Sc who has
the highest internal priority. The null college c∅ points to the students pointing
to it.
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Proceed to Step 2 if there is no cycle. Otherwise locate each cycle, and
assign each student to the college that she points to.
• The eligible student counter, oec, of each college c whose student is in a
cycle is reduced by one.
 If oec = 0 and either o
q
c = 0 or bc = u then remove college c.
 If oec = 0, o
q
c > 0 and bc < u then college c becomes a passive
5
college.
• The import counter, oqc, of each college c in a cycle is reduced by one
only if the cycle includes at least two colleges.
 If oqc = 0 and either o
e
c = 0 or bc = l then remove college c.
 If oqc = 0, o
e
c > 0 and bc > l then college c is removed from all other
students' preferences.
• Return to Step 1.
Step 2: If there are no students left, we are done. If not, then all chains are
ending with passive colleges. If bc = l for each active6 college c, then remove
all passive colleges and go to step 1. Otherwise, ﬁnd the chain whose tail has
the lowest pi among the active colleges with bc > l. Here pi is used as a ﬁxed
5A college is passive if it has available quota to import but all its sponsored students are
removed. Therefore a passive college cannot point to a student.
6A college is active if all of its sponsored students have not yet been removed.
173
tie-breaker among colleges. Assign each student in that chain to the college
that she points to. Denote the tail and head colleges of the chain by ct and
ch, respectively. Other colleges in the chain are represented by c˜.
• The eligible student and import counters of each college c˜ are reduced
by one.
 If oqc˜ = 0 and either bc˜ = l or o
e
c˜ = 0, then remove college c.
 If oec˜ = 0 and o
q
c˜ > 0, then college c becomes a passive college.
 If oqc˜ = 0, bc˜ > l and o
e
c˜ > 0, then college c is removed from all other
students' preferences.
• The eligible student counter and bct of college ct is reduced by one.
 If oqct = 0 and either bct = l or o
e
ct = 0, then remove college ct.
 If oect = 0 and o
q
ct > 0, then college ct becomes a passive college.
• The oqch is reduced by one and bch is increased by one.
 If oqch = 0 or b˜c = u, then remove college c.
• Return to Step 1.
The algorithm terminates when there are no remaining eligible students left.
Denote the matching selected by 2S-TTCC by µ.
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The 2S-TTCC mechanism inherits the desired features of the 2S-TTC
mechanism. In Theorem 15 we show that students cannot beneﬁt from misre-
porting their preferences and in Theorem 17 we show that its outcome cannot
be Pareto dominated by another individually rational matching ν such that
bνc ∈ [l, u].
Theorem 15 2S-TTCC is strategy-proof for students.
We use a variation of 2S-TTCC in which only the student with the
highest priority points to a college in each round. Let µ be the matching
selected by 2S-TTCC under truth-telling. Let k > 0 be the ﬁrst round that
we cannot locate a cycle. Student s assigned in Round k′ < k (under truth-
telling) cannot aﬀect the assignments done in earlier rounds. If s forms a cycle
by misreporting in Round k′′ < k′ then she should have pointed to a worse
college than µ(s). Before Round k′, all the colleges that s prefers to µ(s)
should have been removed since each student points to the most preferred
college among the remaining ones. Therefore, student s cannot get a better
college by misreporting.
Now consider Round k. First assume that we have a proper chain.
As we mentioned above, any active student in Round k cannot aﬀect the
assignments done in earlier rounds. Then consider the student pointed to by
the tail college of chain. This student will be assigned in this round no matter
which college she points to. Therefore she will point to the most preferred
college among the remaining ones. The next students in the chain will do so
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as well. The other active students in this round cannot aﬀect the assignment
of students in the chain without hurting themselves.
Now consider the case where we don't have a proper chain. That is,
all the active colleges have a balance of l. Then we will remove all the passive
colleges and 2S-TTCC reduces to the 2S-TTC mechanism. It is easy to see
that we will not have chains in the future rounds too.
Let k′′ >k be the ﬁrst round after Round k that we cannot locate a
cycle. Then we can apply the same reasoning that we used for rounds before
k and show that all agents assigned in Round k˜ such that k < k˜ < k′′ cannot
be better oﬀ by misreporting. This is also true for Round k′′.
In the 2S-TTCC mechanism, a student starts pointing to the colleges
in her preference list after all the other students with higher internal rank are
assigned to a college including the null college. Moreover, a student points
to the colleges ranked over c∅ that consider her acceptable. As a consequence
of these two features, the 2S-TTCC mechanism satisﬁes individual rationality
and respects internal ranking.
Theorem 16 2S-TTCC is individually rational and respects internal priori-
ties.
Individual Rationality: Students will be assigned to the null col-
lege, c∅, when they point to it, and hence, they will never need to point to
an unacceptable college. Moreover, a student cannot point to a college that
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considers her unacceptable. Therefore, none of the unacceptable students for
college c ∈ C will be assigned to a college c. Thus, 2S-TTCC is individually
rational.
Respect for Internal Priorities: Suppose, contrary to the claim, that 2S-
TTCC does not respect internal priorities. Then there exists a student i ∈ Sc
who is assigned to a college in problem [(qc, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ], but not assigned
to a college in problem [(q˜c, q−c), (e˜c, e−c), P ] where q˜c ≥ qc and e˜c > ec. Let
S(k) and S˜(k) be the set of students assigned in the Round k of 2S-TTCC
applied to the problems [(qc, q−c), (ec, e−c), P ] and [(q˜c, q−c), (e˜c, e−c), P ], re-
spectively. In both problems, the same set of agents will be active in the ﬁrst
step. Since we consider the same preference proﬁle, S(1) = S˜(1). Then, if
i ∈ S(1), we are done. If not, then consider the second step. Since the same
set of students is removed with their assignments then the set of active stu-
dents and the remaining colleges in the second step of 2S-TTCC applied to
the problems will be the same. Moreover, students will be pointing to the
same colleges in both problems. Hence, S(2) = S˜(2). Then, if i ∈ S(2),
we are done. If not, we can repeat the same steps and show that i will be
assigned in the matching selected by the 2S-TTCC mechanism in problem
[(q˜c, q−c), (e˜c, e−c), P ]. (Moreover, she will be assigned to the same college.)
Theorem 17 For any problem [q, e, P ] and tolerance interval [l, u], there does
not exist an individually rational matching ν that Pareto dominates the out-
come of 2S-TTCC and l ≤ bνc ≤ u for all c ∈ C.
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Denote the outcome of 2S-TTCC mechanism by µ. Let k > 0 be the
ﬁrst round that we cannot locate a cycle. Without loss of generality, assume
k > 1. Again consider the variant that we described in the proof of Theorem
15. In the ﬁrst round, each student is pointing to her most preferred college. If
a student is assigned in this round, then she should get the same college under
ν. Now consider students assigned in Round 1 < k′ < k . All the colleges that
a student preferred to her assignment should have been removed in an earlier
round, and we cannot make that student better oﬀ without hurting another
student assigned in an earlier round. Note that all colleges removed in Round
k′ < k fulﬁlls either certiﬁcation or the import quota.
Now consider the students assigned in Round k. First, consider the
case where there exists a valid chain. All of them are assigned to a college
that they prefer most among the remaining ones. They cannot be made better
oﬀ without making some students assigned in the earlier rounds worse oﬀ. If
there does not exist a valid chain, then 2S-TTCC reduces to the 2S-TTC
mechanism. If college c is removed because of either bµc = u or b
µ
c = l, then we
cannot assign more students to c in ν.
Let k′′ > k be the ﬁrst round after Round k that we cannot locate a
cycle. Then we can apply the same reasoning that we have used for rounds
before k and show that all agents assigned in Round k˜ such that k < k˜ < k′′
cannot be better oﬀ by misreporting. This is also true for Round k′′.
Every student assigned to a college should be assigned the same college
in ν. If we assign more students in ν then either feasibility or the tolerance
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conditions are violated.
A.5 PositiveBalance Aversion
In this section, we focus on the dynamics of the second largest tuition
exchange program: The Council of Independent Colleges Tuition Exchange
Program (CIC-TEP). In particular, we analyze the equilibrium of the quota
revelation game in CIC-TEP. In CIC-TEP, member colleges are not suspended
from the program for running a negative balance. As a consequence, all stu-
dents are certiﬁed as eligible. The only requirement of the program for the
member colleges is awarding at least 3 students scholarships.7
Since the colleges are not suspended from the program when they have a
negative balance, we do not need to assume that colleges are negativebalance
averse. On the other hand, holding a positive balance cannot be considered
an insurance device for colleges for the continuation of their memberships.
Moreover, importing more students than the number of students exported can
be seen as a ﬁnancial burden for colleges. Therefore, colleges may prefer not
to have a positive balance. To capture the positivebalance aversion explicitly,
we make the following assumption in some of our results in this section:
PositiveBalance Aversion: College c prefers all µ with bµc = 0 to all ν
with bνc > 0, and otherwise ranks matchings based on its preferences over the
incoming class.
7A college is not supposed to fulﬁll this requirement if the number of applicants for that
college is less than 3.
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Proposition 24 gives us a comparative result regarding how the balances
of colleges change when they increase their import quotas.
Proposition 24 When college c sets qc as its import quota, suppose pi is a
stable matching. When it sets q˜c such that q˜c ≥ qc, suppose p˜i is a stable
matching. Then bp˜ic ∈ {bpic , ..., bpic + q˜c − qc}.
We have shown that the balances of colleges are the same in all stable
matchings. In the rest of the proof we consider pi and p˜i as the outcome of DA
for the corresponding problems. We consider two possible cases: (1) |pi(c)| < qc
and (2) |pi(c)| < qc.
• |pi(c)| < qc and q˜c = qc + k for k > 0: Due to the non-wastefulness
of pi, pi(s)Psc for all s ∈ S \ pi(c). We know that the DA mechanism
is resource monotonic: when the number of seats increases then every
student will be weakly better oﬀ (Kesten, 2006). That is, pi′′(s)Rspi(s)
for all s ∈ S. By combining resource monotonicity and non-wastefulness,
we can say that if a student is not assigned to c in pi then she will not
be assigned to c in p˜i. Therefore |p˜i(c)| < qc. By combining resource
monotonicity and individual rationality of the DA mechanism, we can
say if a student is assigned to a college in pi then she will be also assigned
to a college in p˜i. Now we need to show that all students assigned to c
in pi are also assigned to c in p˜i. Suppose not. Let pi(i) = c 6= p˜i(i).
Due to non-wastefulness, p˜i(i)Pic. Moreover, i should be acceptable for
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p˜i(i) not to violate individual rationality of matching p˜i. The reason why
i is not assigned to p˜i(i) in the stable matching pi is that all seats of
p˜i(i) are ﬁlled by students with higher priority. Therefore, at least one
of the students assigned to p˜i(i) in matching pi is assigned to a better
college. Denote this student by i′. Similarly, due to non-wastefulness
and individual rationality, p˜i(i′)Pi′c and i′Pp˜i(i′)∅. The reason why i′ is
not assigned to p˜i(i′) in the stable matching pi is that all seats of p˜i(i′)
are ﬁlled by students with higher priority. Therefore, at least one of the
student assigned to p˜i(i′) in matching pi is assigned to a better college.
If we continue like this, we will have a Paretoimproving cycle without
violating the priorities of students. This contradicts the fact that pi is
undominated stable matching. Therefore, bp˜ic = b
pi
c .
• |pi(c)| = qc and q˜c = qc + k for k > 0: For this case we refer to the proof
of Proposition 7. In that proof we show that bp˜ic ∈ {bpic , ..., bpic + q˜c − qc}.
Proposition 24 shows that if a college has a positive balance in a sta-
ble outcome of a problem, then increasing the import quota is never a best
response for that college. Moreover, there always exists q˜c < qc such that
college c with a positive balance in a stable matching of problem [q, e, P ] has
a non-positive balance in all stable matchings of the problem [(q˜c, q−c), e, P ].
In the following theorem, we show if a college has a positive balance in
a stable matching when all colleges report their true import quotas then in any
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Nash equilibrium of quota revelation games associated with a stable mecha-
nism, the number of students assigned to a college is less than the number of
students assigned under truth-quota reporting.
Theorem 18 Let q = (qc)c∈C be the vector of true import quotas and µ be the
outcome selected by stable mechanism ψ in problem [q, e, P ] where ec = |Sc|
for all c ∈ C. Under positivebalance aversion, if there exists a college c′ ∈ C
such that bµc′ > 0, then in any Nash equilibrium of the import quota revelation
game associated with ψ, college c′ reports its import quota weakly less than
|µ(c′)| − bµc′.
Since the balance of any stable matching is the same we consider ψ as
the DA mechanism. Suppose the statement is not true. Let q˜ = (q˜c)c∈C be a
Nash equilibrium proﬁle and q˜c′ > |µ(c′)| − bµc′ . First consider the case where
q˜c = qc for all c ∈ C \ {c′}. From the ﬁrst part of the proof of Proposition
24, if c′ sets its quota to |µ(c′)|, college c′ will have the same balance and the
assignment of all the students will not change. Then if c′ keeps lowering its
import quota, due to resource monotonicity, exports of college c′ will never
increase. But it is possible that the number of students exported by college c′
may decrease as a consequence of a decrease in the import quota. Therefore,
in the best case, college c′ can have a non-positive (zero) balance when it sets
its import quota to |µ(c′)| − bµc′ .
Now consider the case where q˜c 6= qc for some c ∈ C \ {c}. Due to
responsive preferences, if q˜c > qc, then the number of students assigned to the
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college c should be less than or equal to qc. Otherwise c can deviate and set its
import quota to qc. Therefore, the same outcome will result by setting import
quota to its true value. This follows from the proof of Proposition 24. Here we
will consider the under-reporting case. When some colleges under-report their
import quotas due to resource monotonicity the number of students exported
by college c′ will weakly decrease. Moreover, due to stability, the number of
students assigned to c′ will not decrease. Therefore, in any stable matching
of problem [(qc′ , (q˜)C\{c′}), e, P ], the balance of college c′ will be greater than
bµc′ . For the same reasons explained in the earlier case, c
′ will have a positive
balance if it sets its import quota greater than |µ(c′)| − bµc′ .
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Appendix B
Chapter 2 Appendix
[Proof of Theorem 11]
We ﬁrst show that the TTC mechanism satisﬁes all of the axioms in
the theorem. Then, we show that it is the unique mechanism satisfying all
of the axioms. Pareto eﬃciency and strategy-proofness of TTC follows from
Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (2003).
Mutual Best: Suppose TTC does not satisfy mutual best. Then,
there exists a student school pair, (i, s), such that student i has the highest
priority for school s and prefers school s to any other school and i is not
assigned to s by TTC. In the ﬁrst step of the TTC, s will point to i and i will
point to s. They will form a cycle and i will be assigned to s. Therefore, TTC
satisﬁes mutual best.
Resource Monotonicity for Top-Ranked Student: To show that
TTC is resource monotonic for top-ranked students take a student school pair
(i, s) such that s ∈ ti and qs > 0. Denote the assignment of TTC in problem
[I, S, q, P,] with µ. Now consider the problem [I, S, (q˜s, q−s), P,] where
q˜s > qs. We consider a variant of the TTC mechanism in which only one
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cycle is removed in each step.1 Fix the cycle selection rule. In particular, let
Cy(k) be the cycle that is selected in the kth step of the variant of the TTC
mechanism when we consider the problem [I, S, q, P,]. Let s be removed in
step k of TTC when we consider problem [I, S, q, P,]. We will also select
Cy(k˜) in step k˜ < k if we observe that cycle when we run the variant of TTC
for the problem [I, S, (q˜s, q−s), P,].
School s cannot be removed before student i is assigned to a school in
problem [I, S, q, P,]. Therefore, i is assigned in step k′ ≤ k in the problem
[I, S, q, P,]. To see this recall that in the TTC mechanism, s will point to
i until i is removed. Therefore, none of the seats of s will be assigned to any
student before i is removed. Also note that all the cycles selected in step
k′′ < k′ in problem [I, S, q, P,] will be observed in step k′′ of TTC when
we consider the problem [I, S, (q˜s, q−s), P,] because none of them includes a
student pointing to s and an increase in the number of available seats in s will
not aﬀect their assignments. As a result the set of remaining schools in step k′
of the TTC mechanism in both problem will be the same and we will observe
the cycle including i in both problems.
Weak Consistency: We again consider the variant of the TTC that is
deﬁned above. Let J be the set of students and let µ(J) be their assignments.
Due to the requirement in the deﬁnition of the weak consistency we only check
the case in which each student in J has the highest priority for one of the
1TTC is independent of the order in which cycles are selected.
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schools in µ(J). Suppose none of the students in J belongs to a Cy(k) where
k < k˜. Then, it is clear that the assignment of students in Cy(k) where k < k˜
will not be aﬀected by the removal of students in J with their assignments.
Suppose i ∈ Cy(k˜). Let µ(i) be his assignment. Therefore, i1 who is the
top-ranked student in the priority order of µ(i) should be in J . This is also
true for the top-ranked student of the school that i1 is assigned. Due to the
ﬁniteness we should have a cycle. That is, Cy(k˜) ⊆ J and µ(Cy(k˜)) ⊆ µ(J).
Therefore, removing these students before running the TTC mechanism or
removing them within the mechanism will not aﬀect the assignments of the
remaining students.
Uniqueness: Suppose there exists another mechanism φ satisfying
all these 5 properties and there exists a problem [I, S, q, P,] in which φ and
TTC select diﬀerent matchings. Let TTC [I, S, q, P,] = µ and φ [I, S, q, P,]
be the outcome of TTC and φ in problem [I, S, q, P,], respectively. We
will consider the version of TTC mechanism in which only one cycle is re-
moved in a step and if there are more than 1 cycle the one which will be
removed is selected based on some exogenous rule. Then suppose that each
student removed before step k ≥ 1 of the TTC mechanism is assigned to the
same school under φ and TTC. Denote these students with set J . That is,
TTC [I, S, q, P,] (j) = φ [I, S, q, P,] (j) for all j ∈ J . Let i be the student
who is removed in the step k of TTC and assigned to a diﬀerent school by
φ. If we remove students assigned in the ﬁrst step of TTC with their assign-
ments then we get the reduced problem [I1, S1, q1, P 1,1] where I1 = I\Cy(1),
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S1 = S, q1s = qs−
∑
j∈Cy(1)
1(φ[I, S, q, P,](j) = s), P 1 = PI1 and 1=I1 . Note
that each student h ∈ Cy(1) |th ∩TTC[I, S, q, P,]| = |th ∩φ[I, S, q, P,]| =
1. Due to weak consistency assignments of the students in I1 in the out-
come of both mechanisms will not change. That is, φ[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1](i′) =
φ[I, S, q, P,](i′) and TTC[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1](i′) = TTC[I, S, q, P,](i′) for all
i′ ∈ I1. Moreover, φ[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1](j) = TTC[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1](j) for all
j ∈ J ∩ I1. If k 6= 2, then we remove students in Cy(2) with their assignments
in TTC[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1]. We get the reduced problem [I2, S2, q2, P 2,2]
where I2 = I1 \ Cy(2), S2 = S, q2s = q1s −
∑
j∈Cy(2)
1(TTC[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1
](j) = s), P 2 = PI2 and 2=I2 . Note that for each student h ∈ Cy(1)
|t1h ∩TTC[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1]| = |t
1
h ∩φ[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1]| = 1. Note that each
student h ∈ Cy(2) |t1h ∩ TTC[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1]| = |t
1
h ∩ φ[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1
]| = 1. Due to weak consistency assignments of the students in I2 in the out-
come of both mechanisms will be the same in problem [I1, S1, q1, P 1,1] and
[I2, S2, q2, P 2,2]. That is, φ[I2, S2, q2, P 2,2](i′) = φ[I1, S1, q1, P 1,1](i′)
and TTC[I2, S2, q2, P 2,2](i′) = TTC[I1, S1, q1, P 1, 1](i′) for all i′ ∈ I2.
Moreover, φ[I2, S2, q2, P 2,2](j) = TTC[I2, S2, q2, P 2,2](j) for all j ∈ J∩I2.
Similarly, we can continue removing students with their assignments in the fol-
lowing order: Cy(3) − ... − Cy(k − 2) − Cy(k − 1). Let Ik′ = Ik′−1 \ Cy(k′),
Sk
′
= S, qk
′
s = q
k′−1
s −
∑
j∈Cy(k′)
1(TTC[Ik
′−1, Sk
′−1, qk
′−1, P k
′−1,k′−1](j) = s),
P k
′
= PIk′ and k′=Ik
′
where k′ < k. Note that
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qk
′
s = q
k′−1
s −
∑
j∈Cy(k′)
1(φ[Ik
′−1, Sk
′−1, qk
′−1, P k
′−1,k′−1](j) = s)
and for each student h ∈ Cy(k′)
|tk′−1h ∩ TTC[Ik
′−1, Sk
′−1, qk
′−1, P k
′−1,k′−1]| = 1.
|tk′−1h ∩ φ[Ik
′−1, Sk
′−1, qk
′−1, P k
′−1,k′−1]| = 1.
Due to weak consistency
φ[Ik
′
, Sk
′
, qk
′
, P k
′
,k′ ](i′) = φ[Ik′−1, Sk′−1, qk′−1, P k′−1,k′−1](i′)
and
TTC[Ik
′
, Sk
′
, qk
′
, P k
′
,k′ ](i′) = TTC[Ik′−1, Sk′−1, qk′−1, P k′−1,k′−1](i′)
for all i′ ∈ Ik′ where k′ < k. Denote reduced problem [Ik−1, Sk−1, qk−1, P k−1,k−1
] with
[
I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜
]
where I˜ = I \ J , S˜ = S, q˜s = qs −
∑
i∈J
1(TTC[I, S, q, P,
](i) = s) = qs −
∑
i∈J
1(φ[I, S, q, P,](i) = s), P˜ = PI˜ and ˜ =I˜ . We
apply TTC and φ to the problem
[
I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜
]
. Due to weak consistency
TTC[I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜](i) = TTC[I, S, q, P,](i), φ[I, S, q, P,](i) = φ[I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜](i)
and TTC[I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜](i) 6= φ[I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜](i). When we apply TTC mecha-
nism to the problem
[
I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜
]
we remove the cycles one by one by using
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the same cycle selection rule used in problem [I, S, q, P,]. In the reduced
problem student i will be removed in the ﬁrst step of the TTC mechanism.
Let s be the school pointing to i in the ﬁrst step of TTC mechanism in the
reduced problem
[
I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜
]
. Note that there can be more than one school
pointing to i in the ﬁrst step of TTC mechanism. Here school s is the one
which is in the cycle together with i. By the deﬁnition of the TTC mecha-
nism student i should be the top-ranked student in ˜s. By the deﬁnition of
TTC, TTC assigns i to his favorite school2 among the ones with available seats
in problem [I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜]. Therefore, TTC[I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜](i)P˜iφ[I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜](i).
We consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case TTC assigns student i to s and in the
second case TTC assigns i to another school.
Case 1: Student i points to the school s in the ﬁrst step of TTC in the
reduced problem [I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜]. School s should be the most preferred school
in P˜i among the ones having available seats. Suppose i reports P ′i : sP
′
is∅.
Due to the strategy-proofness TTC will assign i to s and φ will assign i to s∅.
Any mutually best mechanism should assign i to s in the reduced problem.
Therefore, φ fails to satisfy mutual best.
Case 2: In this case i is assigned to s′ 6= s. Since s belongs to the
cycle, there is another student i1 ∈ Cy(k) assigned to school s. Now suppose
student i reports s′P ′isP
′
is∅. TTC will select the same matching in problems
[I˜ , S˜, q˜, P˜ , ˜] and [I˜ , S˜, q˜, (P ′i , P˜−i), ˜]. Due to the strategy-proofness φ will as-
2Here we consider preference proﬁle P˜i. This statement is also true for Pi since P˜i = Pi.
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sign i to either s where he is top-ranked or s∅ in problem [I˜ , S˜, q˜, (P ′i , P˜−i), ˜].3
First consider the latter case where φ[I˜ , S˜, q˜, (P ′i , P˜−i), ˜](i) = s∅. Now con-
sider the problem [I˜ , S˜, q˜, (P ′′i , P˜−i), ˜] in which i submits sP ′′i s∅. Due to
strategy-proofness φ[I˜ , S˜, q˜, (P ′′i , P˜−i), ˜](i) = s∅. However this violates mu-
tual best. Therefore the latter case is not possible. Therefore, when i submits
P ′i he will be assigned to s by φ in problem [I˜ , S˜, q˜, (P
′
i , P˜−i), ˜].
Now consider the case where i submits P ′i and school s have only one
available seat. That is, we are considering problem [I˜ , S˜, q¯0, P¯ 0, ˜] where
q¯0s′′ 6=s = q˜s′′ 6=s, q¯
0
s = 1, P¯
0
i′ 6=i = P˜i′ 6=i and P¯
0
i = P
′
i . Then, TTC[I˜ , S˜, q¯
0, P¯ 0, ˜] =
s′. Suppose φ[I˜ , S˜, q¯0, P¯ 0, ˜](i) = s'. We showed that φ[I˜ , S˜, q˜, P¯ , ˜](i) = s. If
q˜s = q¯s, then mechanism φ selects two diﬀerent outcome for the same problem.
If q˜s > q¯s, then resource monotonicity for top-ranked students is violated since
i becomes worse oﬀ when the number of available seats in school s increases.
Then he will be assigned another school or s∅. Due to the aforementioned
reasons he will be assigned to s. Therefore, student i1 who is assigned to s in
TTC[I˜ , S˜, q¯0, P¯ 0, ˜] will be assigned to another school by φ. Given s is the top
choice of i1 among the schools with available seats i1 prefers his assignment in
TTC[I˜ , S˜, q¯0, P¯ 0, ˜] to φ[I˜ , S˜, q¯0, P¯ 0, ˜].
Since student i1 is assigned to a school by TTC in the ﬁrst step of prob-
lem [I˜ , S˜, q¯0, P¯ 0, ˜] there should be another school s1 where i1 is the top-ranked
3Here, it is possible that i can be also assigned to another school that he doesn't include
to his preference list. However, we can prove that this will violate either strategy-proofness
or mutual best as a similar way that we follow for showing that i cannot be assigned to s∅.
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student according to ˜. Then consider the following problem [I˜ , S˜, q¯1, P¯ 1, ˜]
where q¯1s′′ 6=s1 = q¯s′′ 6=s1 , q¯
1
s1
= 1, P¯ 1i′ 6=i1 = P¯i′ 6=i1 and P¯
1
i1
: sP¯ 1i1s1P¯
1
i1
s∅. Similarly
we can show that TTC[I˜ , S˜, q¯1, P¯ 1, ˜](i1) = s and φ[I˜ , S˜, q¯1, P¯ 1, ˜](i1) = s1.
By following similar steps we get problem [I˜ , S˜, q¯, P¯ , ˜] where q¯s′′ /∈µ(Cy(k)) =
qs′′ /∈µ(Cy(k)), q¯s′′∈µ(Cy(k)) = 1, P¯i′ /∈Cy(k) = Pi′ /∈Cy(k), P¯ ix∈Cy(k) : µ(ix)P¯ixsxP¯ixs∅,
sx ∈ µ(Cy(k)) and student ix is the top ranked student in ˜sx . In this prob-
lem, TTC[I˜ , S˜, q¯, P¯ , ˜](ix) = µ(ix) and φ[I˜ , S˜, q¯, P¯ , ˜](ix) = sx. Therefore
they will be assigned to strictly worse school by φ and no other student will be
assigned to those schools since all schools quota will be equalized to 1. There-
fore a trade between these students will increase the welfare without worsening
any other student and φ fails to be Pareto-eﬃcient.
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Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 3
The two mechanisms do not always select diﬀerent matchings for a
given house allocation problem. In the following proposition we state the
conditions that guarantee the equivalence of the outcomes of the DA and
TTC mechanisms.
Proposition 25 If 0 < |IE| ≤ 2 and each existing agent has either the top
rank or the second rank in f , then TTC and DA will select the same matching
for all problems.
Let |IE| = 2, f(1) = i and f(2) = j are both in IE. We use the same
variants of TTC and DA explained in the proof of Proposition 1. We look at
the following cases.
Case 1: If i prefers a new house or hi most, then he will get that house
in both pi and µ. Then j will have top priority in all remaining houses and
gets his most preferred house among the remaining ones. Then the outcome
for the remaining new students will be exactly the same in µand pi.
Case 2: If i prefers hj most, i will get hj in both pi and µ as long as j
does not prefer hj most. In this case everything mentioned in case 1 will hold.
192
Otherwise, j will be assigned to hj and i will get his second choice in both pi
and µ.
Let |IE| = 1. Let existing agent i have the highest priority in f. He will
have the highest priority for any house he prefers most and will get that house
in both pi and µ. Then the outcome for the remaining new students will be
exactly the same in µ and pi. Let i = f(2). In this case f(1) ∈ IN will get his
top choice unless his top choice is not hi and i does not prefer hi most. This
corresponds to case 2 described above.
The conditions mentioned in Proposition 25 are the necessary condi-
tions for the equivalence of DA and TTC in the house allocation problem. We
will illustrate this in the following examples. In the ﬁrst example we show that
if |IE| > 2, then there exists a problem in which DA and TTC select diﬀerent
outcomes.
Example 12 There are 3 houses H = {hi1 , hi2 , hi3} and 3 students I =
{i1, i2, i3}. Here i1, i2 and i3 are existing students currently occupying hi1,
hi3 and hi3, respectively. Let f(1) = i1, f(2) = i2 and f(3) = i3. The prefer-
ence proﬁle is given by: hi3Pi1hi1Pi1hi2, hi1Pi2hi2Pi2hi3 and hi1Pi3hi3Pi3hi2.
In this problem TTC will select the following matching: pi(i1) = hi3,
pi(i2) = hi2 and pi(i3) = hi1. On the other hand DA will select the following
matching: µ(i1) = hi1, µ(i2) = hi2 and µ(i3) = hi3.
In the following example we show that when 0 < |IE| ≤ 2, if each
existing agent does not have either the top rank or the second rank in f , then
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TTC and DA will select diﬀerent matchings.
Example 13 In this example |IE| = 1, but it is easy to construct an example
where |IE| = 2. For instance, we can consider the same example where i1 is
the existing tenant of h1.
There are 3 houses H = {h1, h2, hi3} and 3 students I = {i1, i2, i3}.
Here i3 is an existing student currently occupying hi3. Let f(1) = i1, f(2) = i2
and f(3) = i3. The preference proﬁle is given by: hi3Pi1h1Pi1h2, h1Pi2h2Pi2hi3
and h1Pi3hi3Pi3h2.
In this problem TTC selects the following matching: pi(i1) = hi3, pi(i2) =
h2 and pi(i3) = h1. On the other hand DA selects the following matching:
µ(i1) = h1, µ(i2) = h2 and µ(i3) = hi3.
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